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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
 
Sarah Ray Rondot 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of English 
 
September 2015 
 
Title: Radical Epistemologies in Twenty-First Century Trans* Life Narratives 
 
 
This dissertation explores how trans* individuals narrate their lives within a 
culture that does not view trans* as a viable social category. I show how life narratives 
created by trans*-identified people (transsexual, transgender, genderqueer, and other non-
binary identities included in the term’s asterisk) imagine new categories by re-working 
familiar stories; trans* life narratives are thus indispensable for comprehending how 
gender, identity, and self shape each other across social contexts in relation to dominant 
cultural narratives and embedded epistemologies. 
Prevailing U.S. ideologies (created and maintained through medical and media 
discourses) conceive of trans* identity through a binary formation, reinforce trans* 
people as objects who exist for nontrans* consumers, and rationalize trans* people as 
trapped within improper bodies or liberated within surgically constructed new ones. In 
opposition, twenty-first century narratives by filmmakers Jules Rosskam and Gwen Tara 
Haworth, autobiographers Jennifer Finley Boylan and Alex Drummond and YouTube 
digital storytellers Ky Ford and Skylar Kergil imagine trans* identity as productive – the 
goal is not to explain or justify gender diversity but to embrace it and to continue to 
widen its collective scope. The twenty-first century narratives I analyze reconceptualize 
v 
 
trans* identity as viable with or without medical intervention and articulate a whole, 
continuous subject rather than a subject split between pre- and post-transition. Evoking a 
new historical moment, these life writers and media producers celebrate their identity in 
spite of or even because of the transphobia they experience. In so doing, radical trans* 
life narratives exemplify how medical models and popular media fail those who they 
purport to protect and represent. 
Gender is an identity as well as a social and historical process, which is constantly 
open to investigation. If laying claim to an identity makes subjects, as Michel Foucault 
argues, the process also occurs bi-directionally: identities come into existence through the 
act of naming and narrating them. As more individuals articulate what it means to be 
trans*, personal and collective knowledges will expand to include a range of diverse 
subjectivities, some of which have yet to be narrated into existence. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
CONTEXTUALIZING RADICAL TRANS* EPISTEMOLOGIES  
 
 
Time Magazine’s May 24th, 2014 issue features a bold and provocative image of 
Laverne Cox in a skin-tight, dark blue cocktail dress. Next to Cox’s image, the text 
proclaims: “The Transgender Tipping Point: America’s Next Civil Rights Frontier.” Time 
Magazine portrays Cox, a trans*-identified actress and activist most prominently known 
for her role in the Netflix series, Orange is the New Black (2013), as the symbol of a new 
era of gender politics. In her cover story, Katy Steinmetz suggests that because trans* 
images and narratives proliferate in contemporary media, the concept of “trans*” 
(transsexual, transgender, genderqueer, two-spirit and other non-binary identities 
included in the term’s asterisk) is becoming more understandable for nontrans* 
Americans. From 20/20 exposés and talk shows, to reality television and bestseller book 
lists, trans* stories are more visible than they were even ten years ago. Though Steinmetz 
shows how trans* stories have become much more mainstream, she doesn’t analyze the 
types of representations available or the detrimental effects simplified and sensationalized 
stories can have on individual trans* people. Instead, Steinmetz erroneously suggests that 
heightened trans* visibility inevitably leads to heightened trans* acceptance.  
In reality, most mainstream representations tell a homogenous trans* story, which 
makes visible only a sliver of those of us who identify as trans*. Popular representations 
reinforce a history of degradation by displaying trans* people as objects who exist for the 
consumption of nontrans* consumers. What’s more, as Kristen Schilt and Laurel 
Westbrook show, simplified and sensational trans* representations can produce increased 
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levels of real world discrimination, violence, incarceration, and death. Though art may 
imitate life, it also strongly affects how individuals experience and navigate their world.  
My dissertation, “Radical Epistemologies in Twenty-First Century Trans* Life 
Narratives,” harnesses the energy of our cultural “tipping point” yet takes up the 
immediate need for representations that foreground the diversity and viability of trans* 
lives. Though mainstream media represents trans* people as one-dimensional, trans* 
people’s life narratives tell a radically different story. In relation to dominant ideals and 
medical institutions, twenty-first century trans* life narratives reveal epistemological 
changes on both macro and micro levels of society. Trans* life narratives post-2000 
illuminate a distinct cultural moment, in which individuals are breaking from and 
reworking prevailing trans* knowledges.  
To make this argument, I engage in several distinct yet interconnected discussions 
in each chapter: first, I explore dominant ideologies and representations of trans* 
individuals throughout the last seventy-five years. With an emphasis on “wrong body” 
narratives, rather than a spectrum of trans* subjectivities, mainstream media explain 
trans* people as “trapped” within incorrect bodies, which must be fixed by medical 
technologies. In Steinmetz’ article, for example, she claims that many trans* people feel 
that “the body they were born in is a suffocating costume they are unable to take off,” 
which encourages some trans* people to “go so far as to get facial feminization surgery 
and speech therapy.” Steinmetz suggests that trans* people who engage in medical 
interventions represent extreme and—in her words—“fascinating” examples of body 
modification. Steinmetz’ language pathologizes and “others” trans* people while it 
simultaneously suggests that nontrans* people are comfortable in their bodies and do not 
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similarly modify themselves in “extreme” ways. As I discuss in Chapter II, this narrative 
references an extensive history of pathological theories of trans* people as “inverts,” 
which is damaging to those who do not identify as such yet who find solidarity in trans* 
communities. Highlighting this narrative as the only trans* story denies and erases 
alternative knowledges and experiences.  
Second, to historicize contemporary trans* life narratives, each chapter then 
examines texts—documentary in Chapter III and literary autobiography in Chapter IV—
produced by transsexual-identified people between 1954 and 1999. By understanding 
their experiences through the scientific and psychiatric discourses of their time, twentieth 
century transsexual life narrators similarly justify and normalize trans* existence. 
Written for a white, straight, cisgender readership, transsexual life narratives complicate 
and expand what it means to live a normatively gendered life at the same time as they 
constrain trans* identity.  
Third, I investigate texts produced by transgender- and trans*-identified 
filmmakers, writers, and digital storytellers (in Chapters III, IV, and V, respectively) 
published between 2000 and 2014, which stray from the previous century’s normalizing 
framework. In contrast to earlier narratives, twenty-first century texts reconceptualize 
trans* identity as viable with or without medical intervention. Rather than viewing 
themselves as in need of an external fix, contemporary trans* individuals who 
incorporate radical knowledges view social and political systems as in need of change. 
Analyzing life narratives elucidates how trans* people understand their lives and imagine 
new categories by re-working familiar stories. 
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To subvert dominant understandings of trans* selfhood, radical narratives 
articulate a whole, continuous subject rather than one that is split between pre- and post-
transition existence. Unlike hegemonic twentieth century texts, many contemporary 
narratives do not mourn a “previous” self. Instead, they illuminate the ways that all 
individuals are constantly changing in relation to personal and societal contexts. Further, 
the trans* individuals I highlight refuse male/female identifications. Rather than moving 
from one gender to another, radical trans* texts articulate gender as fluid. In so doing, 
radical texts articulate visions of difference for future generations of trans* people.  
As indispensable as these radical trans* knowledges are, they do not necessarily 
reflect radical social change. U.S. culture still subjugates, oppresses, and denies trans* 
people in systemic and institutional ways. U.S. judicial systems still refuse to protect 
trans* people thereby making an already vulnerable population even more vulnerable.1 
Trans* people are still more likely than nontrans* people to be arrested, spend time in 
jail, and experience police brutality.2 Trans* people experience much higher rates of 
physical and sexual violence, and trans* people (particularly trans* women of color) are 
much more likely to experience attempted or completed murder.3 The medical institution 
still regulates trans* identity, unequally granting access to economically privileged 
individuals and those who fit wrong body models. These and other lived realities affect 
trans* people on a daily basis.  
Marilyn Frye’s metaphor of a “birdcage” is a helpful visualization of how 
dominant U.S. culture, popular media, and medical legitimation discourses work together 
to constrain trans* people. In this metaphor, Frye invites us to think about systems of 
oppression as a cage with interlocking bars. If we look at the cage up close, one or two 
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bars may become apparent and we might ask, why doesn’t the bird merely fly around 
those bars? If we imagine a birdcage as a metaphor for the oppression trans* people 
experience, it might be appealing to argue that if only media representations would 
change, or if only the medical field would expand understanding, or if only politicians 
would champion trans* people, etc., trans* people would be liberated. However, looking 
only at the micro aspects of the birdcage fails to account for how the bars reinforce one 
another on a macro level. If we take a step back and view the cage as a whole—as what 
Patricia Hill Collins calls a “matrix of oppression”—we more adequately see how 
intersecting oppressions are interdependent. The combination of individual prejudice and 
institutional power, which co-constructs the birdcage, is often a toxic recipe.  
Nevertheless, throughout “Radical Epistemologies,” I work to understand how 
trans* life narrators epistemologically create new conceptualizations of gender, which 
fundamentally change the shape of the oppressive systems in which they exist. To see the 
big picture, it is crucial to analyze trans* people’s micro resistances in relation to macro 
systems. In Gloria E. Anzaldúa’s understanding, trans* individuals—like others who are 
caught between two cultures—negotiate two or more realms and thus develop a kind of 
“double or multiple ‘seeing’” (This Bridge 547).4 By cultivating the “capacity to see in 
surface phenomena the meaning of deeper realities, to see the deep structure below the 
surface,” trans* people incorporate “double or multiple seeing” to challenge the micro 
and macro forces in their lives. This type of radical seeing encourages trans* people to 
differently define the self and identity.5 In light of these notions, radical trans* texts 
reveal a moment in a history of change rather than an end point. Undoubtedly, it is 
unclear what new trans* knowledge activists, authors, filmmakers, and artists will 
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produce in the coming decades; it is possible that future trans* narratives will prove early 
twenty-first century texts obsolete. Radical texts subvert dominant narratives but they do 
not necessarily create new discourses out of thin air. As such, in each chapter, rather than 
solely investigating what texts represent, I also use them to think about the cultural 
frameworks in which they exist.  
Though the texts I analyze promote radical gender epistemologies, they do not 
evince radical racial knowledges. I began this research with hopes of centering 
articulations of trans* identity that situate themselves outside dominant categorization, 
which I imagined would include a plethora of narratives by white and nonwhite trans* 
people alike. However, in over two years, I have been unable to locate more than a few 
life narratives by trans* people of color, though I spent an exorbitant amount of time 
searching for, reading, and watching materials produced by and about trans* people.6 
Though Time Magazine’s cover features Cox, a trans* woman of color, trans* life 
narratives by people of color are decidedly uncommon and white people produce an 
overwhelming majority of trans* texts.  
While there are countless explanations for why I was unable to locate more than a 
few narratives by trans* people of color, justifications tend to fall into one of two camps: 
access and identification. In the first logic, white people are simply more likely to be able 
to publish the texts they generate: they are more likely to have the leisure time and 
support to create life narratives and are more likely to be otherwise financially secure. 
Though a disproportionate number of trans* people spend time in jail, white trans* 
people are much less likely than trans* people of color to experience jail time or legal 
discrimination. They are more able to receive a post-secondary education, middle to 
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upper-class employment, and adequate and safe housing. White trans* people are much 
less likely to experience physical and sexual violence, as well as attempted or completed 
murder. Because of their skin privilege, white trans* people who publicly declare a trans* 
identity might not—to the same extent—risk the social, political, and legal repercussions 
that many nonwhite trans* people face. All of these factors aid (or at least do not deter) 
white trans* people who want to create and publish life narratives. In these ways, it is 
possible that more white trans* people produce and publish their narratives simply 
because it is a more doable and beneficial endeavor.  
At the same time, it is certainly not that simple: in addition to issues of access, 
there are significant issues related to identification. I suggest that more gender-diverse 
white people identify with the term trans* and understand their experiences through 
dominant epistemologies that validate their existence. Though this line of inquiry is 
perhaps unverifiable, it is possible that because white gender-diverse people have more 
access to higher education, community resources, and counseling, all of which encourage 
(and sometimes require) a trans* narrative, white people are more likely to identify as 
trans*. If so, trans* identity is co-constructed by whiteness and thus a trans* framework 
might erase or render unintelligible other identities and epistemologies that do not call 
themselves trans* or white at all. For example, in the 2006 documentary The Aggressives, 
Daniel Peddle and Jenny Tsai follow a group of gender-diverse African Americans who 
might in dominant terms fall under the trans*-masculine or female-to-male category. 
However, these individuals do not identify as male, female, or trans*. The members of 
this group—which becomes a chosen family—express themselves and identify in public 
settings (such as work, school, church, and with extended family) as women and in 
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private settings as men, “aggressives,” or “studs.” Though some aggressives choose to 
physically transition, they often share hormones with others in their community who 
might not have access to testosterone or who might not be able to pay for doctor’s visits 
and prescription costs. In sharing hormones, physical transition becomes a much slower 
and yet more communal process. In these ways, an identity like “stud” or “aggressive” 
may not be as comprehensible within a trans* framework since “aggressive” is co-
constructed by blackness.  
Furthermore, throughout this dissertation, I strongly critique ideologies that rely 
on fixed conceptions of gender as consistent over time and individual in nature. Those of 
us who are intelligible within this system inevitably benefit from its continuance and 
those of us who are not coherent inevitably disrupt it. At the same time, binary 
epistemologies perpetuate white privilege; U.S. cultural ideals of masculinity and 
femininity rely on ideals of white masculinity and white femininity, though whiteness is 
rarely emphasized. By definition, then, people of color interrupt cultural gender 
categories, which are colonial and supremacist in nature.7 According to Matt Richardson, 
“the Black female body has historically been irreconcilable to white society in relation to 
notions of womanhood” (7). In these racist formations, which seek to categorize 
individuals by sex, whiteness goes unnoticed and privilege remains unchecked.  
At the same time, white individuals who experience institutional discrimination or 
violence based on their gender might find the experience shocking and, in light of new 
knowledges, may decide to create narratives that more adequately reflect their life story. 
Trans* identity becomes a more salient part of white individuals’ conceptions of 
themselves, and white trans* people work to develop radical epistemologies in light of 
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new experiences of discrimination. For trans* people of color, however, institutional 
discrimination and violence are not novel occurrences. As The Aggressives shows, trans* 
people of color have more experience combating racist, transphobic institutions and thus 
may make sense of their gender identities in even more radical, less clearly trans* ways. 
In The Queer Limit of Black Memory: Black Lesbian Literature and Irresolution, 
Richardson offers a critique of trans* and queer histories and draws attention to the ways 
that Black queer individuals are not legible within a (white) trans* archive. And yet, 
Richardson argues, Black individuals have always used queer forms of sexuality and 
gender diversity as “method[s] of resistance to oppression” (6). Creating what he calls a 
“counternarrative of history,” Richardson documents how “sexual and gender variance” 
is a central part of a “repertoire of everyday acts of pushing back against the 
overwhelming epistemic violence that situates Blacks as nonhuman Other” (6). Black 
queers “reinvent our bodies, renaming ourselves according to the genders we create, 
regardless of anatomy” (Richardson 2). Because “queer history” scholars do not 
adequately incorporate gender diversity, Richardson shows that there is a “queer limit to 
how we understand our history and ourselves” (3). In other words, because “the politics 
of respectability” structures dominant representations and rememberings of Black people, 
Black gender-diverse individuals are either erased or driven toward a “narrative of 
resolution and normativity” (Richardson 5). Black trans* people are either wiped from 
the collective consciousness, or reimagined in normative ways.  
Even when gender diversity is the main focus, academic research consistently 
foregrounds narratives written by white trans* people, which allows white people’s 
narratives to stand in for a universal trans* experience. In The Transgender Studies 
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Reader, for instance, which scholars widely regard as the first comprehensive collection 
of trans*-related scholarship, only two articles out of fifty focus on race.8 Though Susan 
Stryker speaks to this issue in the collection’s introduction, the fact that a 
“comprehensive” trans* publication does not fully explore race is indicative of the 
widespread lack of intersectional trans* approaches and perspectives. In other words, 
many trans* scholars implicitly allow whiteness to go unmarked. For example, the cover 
of Jason Cromwell’s Transmen and FTMs: Identities, Bodies, Genders, and Sexualities 
(1999) shows three white trans* men though Cromwell offers the text as an exploration 
of all trans* men. Cromwell fails to see the exclusive nature of his research though the 
cover image betrays his “universal” intent.  
Because more white individuals create trans* life narratives, the texts I analyze 
are by white trans* people. Rather than imagining my focus as restrictive, however, I 
explore what we can learn from the texts white trans* people produce, given authors’ 
shared identity categories. I ask, how and in what ways are whiteness and trans* identity 
co-productive and co-dependent categories? How do white people experience trans* 
identity, and what narratives do they use to tell their life stories? Studying whiteness 
through a critical lens helps to cognize how dominant categories go unmarked in research 
as well as how dominant identities are invisible to those who experience privilege 
through them. “Race, like gender, is ‘real,’” Ruth Frankenberg argues, “in the sense that 
it has real, though changing, effects in the world and real, tangible, and complex impact 
on individuals’ sense of self, experiences, and life chances” (11). In White Women, Race 
Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness, Frankenberg develops a framework to 
more adequately understand how whiteness affects one’s perspective. As she shows, 
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whiteness is both a “location of structural advantage” as well as a “‘standpoint,’ a place 
from which white people look at ourselves, at others, and at society” (Frankenberg 1). At 
the same time, whiteness “refers to a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked 
and unnamed” (Frankenberg 1). To name whiteness is to fundamentally “question” and 
“delimit” its authority (Frankenberg 234). Because it is often unmarked, critically 
analyzing whiteness can be difficult; nevertheless, it is necessary. If trans* studies 
scholars do not study whiteness, race becomes the property only of those who are 
marginalized by it, which further perpetuates systems of white supremacy.9 As a white, 
queer-identified trans* ally and scholar, I work to consciously use my privilege to 
foreground trans* voices and narratives while nevertheless paying attention to the ways 
that my privilege might prevent me from fully comprehending the lived realities of trans* 
people.  
At the same time, I acknowledge that critics of my work might argue that because 
I do not identify as trans*, I am appropriating trans* people’s stories for my own 
betterment, which continues the violent cycle I mean to question. This critique is valid, 
particularly because nontrans* individuals have spoken for and continue to speak for 
trans* people. At the same time, it is important to remember that while trans* people may 
be visibly “doing gender” work, everyone “does gender” (Lorber 125) and to imagine 
trans* liberation as a job for only trans*-identified people is disingenuous and tokenizing. 
Although trans* experience is an integral part of gender destabilization, “it is neither fair 
nor realistic to lay the task of being a revolutionary vanguard at the doorstep of those who 
are already marginalized” (Calhoun Davis 125). Anti-racist movements should not rely 
on people of color to teach and help white people, just as trans* liberation movements 
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should not expect trans* people to educate nontrans* individuals. In reality, in anti-racist 
movements, it is white people who need to take responsibility for and reject their 
unearned privileges. Similarly, I believe that it is nontrans* academics and activists who 
must take responsibility for and reject privileges associated with being cisgender. My 
goal is not to co-opt the narratives I analyze but to draw attention to the systems that 
allow nontrans* people’s benefits to continue at the expense of trans* individuals’ lives. 
A good first step for nontrans* people who want to create a more just world is to 
take accountability for the gender privileges they experience. As a white nontrans* 
scholar who identifies as a queer woman, my social position comes with a lot of privilege 
as well as glimpses of discrimination. Though I don’t identify as cisgender, others read 
me in this way and I am afforded many unearned benefits because my physical body 
“matches” my gender expression. I can walk into any public restroom and know that my 
gender presentation will not be cause for expulsion or violence. Aside from identifying 
and presenting as a woman in a patriarchal society, I can be reasonably sure that my job 
application materials will not be rejected outright because I check the “F” box. I can be 
reasonably sure that others will not question my experience and ideology on the basis of 
my gender, though my social position as a woman may negate some of this privilege. The 
list of gender privileges I experience is endless, and I recognize my position in this 
regard. Still, nontrans* academics should question why trans* people bear the 
responsibility for “subverting the gendered status quo” when all people have the capacity 
to do so (Calhoun Davis 125). If more nontrans* scholars took up these goals, the burden 
of responsibility would not fall so heavily on the shoulders of trans* people.  
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In the following sections, I articulate my dissertation’s frameworks. First, I 
discuss my use of language and vocabulary to show how practices of naming directly 
affect dominant as well as radical epistemologies of gender. Second, I explore 
epistemology, which is a methodology and analytical tool I use throughout all five 
chapters. I explain what epistemology is and how it works in my analyses, as well as 
what it can do for future trans* scholarship. Third, I investigate the most common 
problems associated with trans* representations in contemporary media. Focusing on 
how these depictions do not satisfactorily portray trans* people, I illuminate how trans* 
life narratives offer new and viable stories, which our cultural moment so desperately 
needs. Finally, I offer brief descriptions of Chapters II-V. 
 
Language and Vocabulary 
Language is an influential and necessary tool, which has the capacity to 
encourage or prohibit social change. How an individual thinks about hirself and the world 
corresponds with how ze uses language, both in the syntax of hir speech patterns as well 
as in the identity terms ze has and can create. Because identity terms are not merely 
imposed by others nor completely chosen, they have the capacity to connect and divide 
populations in powerful ways. Contemporary media’s continual emphasis on the 
“realness” of bodies and identities, an individual’s “legitimacy” to “claim” a trans* 
existence, or the widespread use of “the trans* community” as if it is one homogeneous 
group (among many other language issues, which I discuss in Chapter II), greatly 
influences how nontrans* people understand and treat trans* individuals as well as how 
trans* individuals understand their own identities. Language also divides like-minded 
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academics who engage in oppositional rather than solidarity tactics. In these ways, 
language and knowledge are interconnected and should not be separated. Because I 
believe that new systems of knowledge require new languages, in this section I explain 
the terms I incorporate.  
While individuals and discourses use the terms transgender, transsexual, 
transexual, genderqueer, cross-gender, third gender, bigender, agender, multi-gender, 
genderless, two-spirit, gender non-conforming, gender-variant, and gender-diverse in 
different contexts to mean different things, I use trans* as an umbrella expression that 
refers to all of these categories, which “cross over, cut across, move between, or 
otherwise queer socially constructed sex/gender boundaries” (Stryker, “My Words” 254). 
Of course, not all who fit in the trans* category name themselves as such; when I refer to 
these persons, I use the terms and pronouns they prefer. In the 2008 edition of Women’s 
Studies Quarterly, Stryker lobbies for trans- as an all-inclusive term, which could link 
with other suffixes: national, racial, generational, and able, among others (11).10 Trans- 
allows for theoretical movement. Unlike transsexual or transgender, it is not closed off 
from definition but instead represents the intersectional need to see gender categories as 
“potentially porous and permeable, spatial territories arguably numbering more than two” 
(Stryker, “Trans-” 12). Trans- does not “signify a static identity category or specific ways 
of being” and thus it can be used to engage in “multiple modes of analysis” (Stryker, 
“(De)Subjugated Knowledges” 7). Stryker’s definition concurrently moves beyond a 
“rights-and-representation based framework” (“Introduction” 7).  
For similar reasons, I use trans*, which is a descriptor of one identity vector 
rather than a closed referent. Trans* is a term that directly opposes mainstream media’s 
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tactics, which consistently use incorrect pronouns and names and refer to trans* people as 
“transgenders.” In our politically correct culture, it is preposterous to refer to African 
American women, for example, as “blacks,” just as it is unacceptable to refer to 
individuals with walking disabilities as “cripples.” Instead, we tend to afford people of 
color and individuals with disabilities their humanity by using “black” and “disabled” as 
descriptors rather than terms that stand in for the whole. Trans* people, however, are 
consistently identified by their gender status or lumped together as a homogeneous group. 
In this way, an unknowing nontrans* reader may think that one trans* person’s story can 
stand in for all trans* people’s realities. To resist this custom, I use the phrase “those of 
us who identify as trans*” as well as trans*-identified and trans* to emphasize individual 
agency and draw attention to the fact that gender is one of many personal attributes. 
These terms and phrases stress the fact that some people may not be visible as trans* but 
may still identify as such. “Those of us who” is also an inclusive rather than exclusive 
phrase, which moves away from “them” versus “us” language traps. If U.S. media outlets 
regularly used this phrase rather than “transgenders,” and did not consistently refer to 
trans* people as “them” in opposition to an invisible “us,” our cultural understandings of 
trans* identity might shift; language, in and of itself, is a powerful tool for social change. 
Trans* suggests that there are multiple ways to understand the term and that the 
term itself is historically and culturally situated in twenty-first century America. While 
trans typically refers to trans men and trans women, trans* makes special note to include 
individuals who may not identify in this way but who might be read by others as gender-
diverse or who do not express traditional conceptions of masculinity and femininity.11 As 
Hugh Ryan explains, “by removing –gender, which instinctively brings to mind women 
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and men, trans* might help transcend the gender binary and provide more space for 
people who are in the middle, who move back and forth, or who don’t identify with the 
binary at all.” The asterisk also highlights the fact that individuals and groups may no 
longer use this term (as well as transgender, transexual, etc.) within a few years time. In 
all likelihood, by the time I finish this dissertation, trans* may be an outdated—or even 
offensive—word. At the same time, the narratives I analyze problematize the very 
category and vocabulary that attempts to define them and I agree with Stryker and Aren 
Z. Aizura who anticipate “a future in which our own visions will be eclipsed by new 
imaginaries that might not even call themselves transgender at all” (10). Because of the 
fast-paced nature of the field, the asterisk that modifies trans points to these potential 
limitations and ambivalences.  
Throughout “Radical Epistemologies,” I also use trans* to demarcate historical, 
medical identity categories, which fit under the trans* umbrella, though doctors and 
psychiatrists did not use the terms trans*, transgender or even transsexual until well into 
the twentieth century. I risk historical inaccuracy as a political gesture, which 
acknowledges what Leslie Feinberg in Transgender Liberation: Beyond Pink or Blue 
(1998) calls a radical “transgender genealogy.” Still, claiming a trans* genealogy doesn’t 
come without risk: it is possible that using trans* to describe individuals in the early 
twentieth century could erase the realities of those who no longer have the opportunity to 
speak, if they ever did.12 It also risks pitting identities against one another, eliding the 
very real distinctions between individuals who claim (or are given) different labels. For 
instance, to refer to an individual in a 1910 sexology “case study” as trans* where the 
term was not used could downplay the ways that sexologists did not adequately 
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differentiate homosexual, queer, intersex, and trans* subjects. It also does not address the 
ways that early conceptions of trans* identity relied on racist, classist, and ableist 
conceptions of “normal” bodies and roles.  
Though I believe that the benefits of this political gesture outweigh the risks, 
anachronistically mapping trans* may project current conceptions of sex and gender onto 
a cultural moment that produced different conceptions of bodies, identities, and roles. As 
such, I will sometimes use transsexual and transsexuality to refer to understandings of 
trans* as biological inversion or cross-sex identification, which requires a dualistic 
understanding of gender and inevitably relies on medical intervention. At the same time, 
transsexual identity is not entirely out of date; many trans* people continue to use and 
rally around this term. When apt, I will draw attention to its contemporary usage, which 
continues to frame gender as dichotomous. Gender-diverse will refer to a range of 
understandings, which change throughout time and culture but which consistently refer to 
individuals with female-typical bodies who do not conform to feminine standards and 
individuals with male-typical bodies who do not conform to masculine standards. 
Gender-diverse, in this conception, includes trans* identity. Gender-diverse also includes 
individuals who reject the gender binary altogether. I sometimes use transgender to refer 
to the more recent understanding of trans* as an identity one claims without desire for 
intervention at the level of the body. In all other places where these historically accurate 
terms do not seem applicable, I use trans*, which in this schema includes all forms of 
gender diversity. Scholars contentiously discuss these language problems and, similarly, I 
will grapple with the fact that the language issues of our contemporary moment may not 
time travel as neatly or productively as I would like. 
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Finally, cisgender describes an individual whose gender identity and expression 
align with hir sex as assigned by doctors and midwives at birth. It describes, for instance, 
an individual who has a body with a uterus, vagina, and breasts who grows up to identify 
as a girl and woman and who typically finds the behaviors and appearances of femininity 
to be comfortable most of the time. Cisgender combats “normal” and “natural” 
conflations of sex and gender and downplays the notion that anatomy is destiny. This 
attention to cisgender identity is more inclusive of trans* identity, because it suggests that 
trans* people are not abnormal but simply not cisgender. However, several theorists 
argue that cisgender is not a productive term and can be quite harmful if used 
unconsciously. For instance, A. Finn Enke criticizes its use (particularly in liberal, white 
classrooms on college campuses) as part of the “neoliberal rights” discourse, which 
“promotes the sense that people are either transgender or cisgender” (235-37). Further 
reifying what trans* identity can be, cisgender demands that “trans must never have been 
or become cis but instead be consistently trans across all time and in all spaces” (Enke 
242). In other words, a trans* person could not declare a cisgender identity, even if hir 
body and identity “match” through access to hormone treatment and surgery. Because the 
categories “woman” and “man” assume a cisgender status, the widespread use of 
cisgender actually “forces transgender to ‘come out’ over and over through an ever-
narrower set of narrative and visual signifiers” (Enke 243). By reinscribing an equally 
limiting binary, Enke argues, white, middle class academics who unthinkingly use 
cisgender dismiss issues of race, ability, sexuality, and class.  
Though I understand and agree with this argument, particularly in the sense that 
the term’s use by nontrans*, white, middle class, straight college students and professors 
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holds heightened “cultural capital,” which one can use to claim rather than resist privilege 
(Enke 243), I nevertheless think it is a useful term if used conscientiously. Using 
cisgender, above all else, prevents the use of “normal,” “real,” “true,” or “biological” in 
reference to cultural prescriptions of nontrans* gender. Taking the term’s limitations into 
account, I will sometimes use cisgender to refer to people whose physical bodies and 
gender expressions match dominant ideals. More often, however, I use nontrans* to 
designate those who identify in ways that are not encompassed by trans*. By using 
nontrans* instead of cisgender, I center trans* identity as the focus of my arguments 
rather than as the exception to the cisgender rule.  
I acknowledge these difficulties and limitations to draw attention to my language 
and pronoun use, which will not follow academic norms. First and foremost, I 
consistently use the terms and pronouns individuals choose when I am aware of those 
preferences. Otherwise, I take liberties to incorporate new pronouns in reference to 
gender-diverse individuals about whose identity terms I am ignorant. Most often, I use ze 
(pronounced “zee,” which replaces she, he, and they), hir (pronounced “here,” which 
replaces her, his, and their) and hirs (pronounced “heres,” which replaces hers, his, and 
theirs).13 Like S. Bear Bergman in Butch is a Noun (2006), I urge readers to notice the 
moments of hesitation or frustration with these potentially new pronouns, to “stumble” 
over them in the same way that trans* individuals stumble over being misidentified as 
“he” or “she.” I use these terms because “it seems congruent to use language that has the 
most possibility inherent in it” (Bergman, Butch is a Noun 17), and the constricting and 
oppositional language we currently have does not fit the bill. 
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Epistemology: What Is It and What Can It Do? 
Throughout this dissertation, my primary goal is to search for and validate radical, 
alternative trans* epistemologies. Epistemology is the study and theory of knowledge 
with particular attention to knowledges that we tend to imagine as truthful or valuable. 
Using an epistemological framework begs several questions: as a culture and community, 
what do we know? How do we come to value certain understandings of the world over 
others? How do we collectively decide what is constant knowledge—which might exist 
outside of our ability to theorize it—and what is socially constructed? How do individual 
explanations influence collective knowledge and vice versa? By asking these questions, 
what it means—what we imagine it to mean—to narrate a gendered life becomes clearer.  
Epistemology also highlights how an individual’s experience relies on hir social 
location—or position in a stratified society, which affords privileges to some at the 
expense of others—as well as how ze identifies. Both macro and micro forces influence 
how individuals behave as well as how they are inculcated in a system that may or may 
not value their identities. Because of these factors, a trans* life narrative illuminates 
one’s standpoint epistemology as well as social epistemologies that circulate within one’s 
culture. As feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman explains, “knowledge is socially 
created, under historically specific conditions…[and thus] there can be no valid 
epistemology that is inattentive to the conditions [and] politics under which and in 
response to which knowledge is created and judged” (185). Following Scheman’s claim, I 
document the knowledges trans* people create and illuminate the social realities that 
exist to allow those knowledges to flourish.  
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Furthermore, standpoint epistemology allows me to situate twenty-first century 
trans* life narratives that expand notions of gender. Standpoint epistemology—what 
Adrienne Rich and bell hooks call a “politics of location”—defines how one understands 
oneself and the world from a particular perspective. In conjunction, Collins maintains that 
the individual can change how identity is understood on the micro level, which may 
affect how policy makers regulate categories on the macro level.14 Individual trans* 
people expand personal ideologies of gender, which, taken collectively, have the capacity 
to influence macro systems of control. At the same time, similar to how hooks and 
Collins understand race intersectionally, gender must be analyzed in relation to race, 
sexuality, class, ability, and other factors, which co-create gender. Gender is always 
racialized, for example, just as race is always gendered.15 Gender is thus an identity and a 
historical process, which is constantly open to investigation.  
In relation to standpoint epistemology, hooks also argues that racial categories 
and bodies hold traces of historical trauma. Her mantra in Yearning: Race, Gender, and 
Cultural Politics, “our struggle is also a struggle of memory against forgetting,” works to 
“reclaim a past” so as to not forget the “legacies of pain” her black ancestors endured at 
the hands of white masters and politicians (hooks 147). For hooks, race itself changes 
shape and image over time in ways that reflect fluctuating racial formations. 
Concurrently, trans* identity and trans* bodies also hold traces of historical trauma based 
on the “legacies of pain” trans* people have endured at the hands of dominant systems of 
control, which punish trans* people. Nevertheless, the historical and generational 
“legacies” of trauma hooks theorizes are not present in the same familial and cultural 
ways with gender diversity. Most trans* individuals’ families have not been subject to 
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histories of transphobia, and trans* identity is not written on and through the body in the 
same ways as nonwhite identity. Though hooks’ idea that one can resist legacies of 
trauma by incorporating personal perspective influences how I use epistemology, there 
are stark differences between the material conditions that influence one’s standpoint 
based on racial, familial, and historical trauma.16  
By centering standpoint epistemology, I question how trans* experience becomes 
known or recognized as valuable as well as who is able to influence the conversation. In 
answering these questions, I turn away from an epistemology that privileges knowledges 
produced by medical experts and mainstream media and towards one that privileges the 
lived experience of trans* individuals themselves. In making this move, I also turn from 
an epistemology that generalizes based on studies of large groups to one that focuses on 
the diversity and range of individual experience. I track dominant and historically 
specific cultural ideologies so as to explain how common beliefs and frameworks 
inculcate and influence trans* people as well as how trans* individuals negotiate these 
established knowledges. In so doing, I argue that trans* life writers and creative 
producers create new gendered knowledges in radical ways.  
The most influential framework of gender, which sexologists solidified in the 
early twentieth century, is the notion that only two, opposite categories exist: male or 
female, girl or boy, man or woman. A century later, there are still no institutionally 
recognized gender categories outside of these rigid statuses. Though many sexologists 
presented “evidence” that many forms of gender existed (invert, for example, being a 
kind of gender variant), they continued to insist on the binary nature of “normal” gender. 
Common binary distinctions—black/white, wealthy/poor, man/woman, and so on—can 
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be visually represented with the image of a seesaw (see Image 1.1). Though this image 
and idea is simplified, it is nevertheless a good tool to assess lived experience in relation 
to macro systems of privilege and oppression. 
 
Image 1.1: This simplified image exemplifies how binary distinctions relationally 
privilege some at the expense of others. (“Life’s Binary Code”) 
 
This binary concept illuminates how identities are relational; one side of a binary always 
exists in a higher state because of the other side’s lower state. Tom Wise rightly argues 
that though we tend to say that some people are “under-privileged,” we do not tend to say 
that others are “over-privileged,” for we tend to gloss over the oppression privilege 
causes. Though U.S. culture tends to recognize that white, heterosexual, wealthy, able-
bodied, and cisgender people receive privileges (and that nonwhite, queer, poor, disabled, 
and trans* people experience discrimination), the relationship between privilege and 
discrimination is not as clear-cut. In dual epistemologies of gender, not only must 
individuals position themselves on one side of the spectrum or the other (with little 
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possibility to maintain a position closer to the center), the effect of the seesaw’s pull 
hierarchizes and divides, thereby granting privilege to nontrans* people at the expense of 
trans* people. In other words, trans* does not exist without nontrans*. 
This dominant understanding structures the way individuals live and limits 
possibilities for other viable realities. From the time of conception, we inculcate babies as 
one or the other sex, which influences everything from how parents name their children, 
to how adults hold infants, to acceptable styles of dress, hobbies, and so on. These 
experiences create and mold the “seeming naturalness” of “biological” females and males 
into “girls” and “boys” who will later become “women” and “men” (Martin 511). In her 
study of preschools, Karin A. Martin finds that teachers use “hidden curricula” to 
differently speak to, instruct, touch, and control preschoolers based on gender. The 
teachers in Martin’s study (who are all women) permit boys to speak at louder levels and 
about different topics, and to use larger amounts of physical space. Relationally, teachers 
encourage girls to be quieter and to use less space, which communicates to little girls that 
they need to “tone down their physicality” (Martin 504). Teachers are much more likely 
to reprimand, struggle physically, and “negatively interact” with boys (Martin 506). 
Teachers socialize boys to associate physical interaction with resistance and anger, and 
thus boys are “more likely to be aggressive or disruptive” later in life (Martin 508). In 
Michel Foucault’s words, these socialization processes are “productive” in that how 
teachers treat preschoolers actually produces differences in behavior. Encouraging girls 
to take up less space and be more soft-spoken actually creates timid, apologetic, passive 
young women. These practices happen in such unconscious ways that preschool teachers 
themselves (as one example of many) do not recognize them. They become a “normal” 
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way to distinguish girls from boys and, subsequently, to treat them differently based on 
culturally defined gender assumptions.  
These socialization processes not only train and discipline individuals, they also 
force all people to be one way or another. Children who do not follow societal 
prescriptions associated with being male or female are bullied by schoolmates, policed by 
family members, teachers, and friends, and often made to feel that something about them 
is wrong. Because we imagine a binary gender system as natural or inevitable, we also 
deny individuals the right to claim an existence that would destabilize that binary. To 
disrupt a binary ideology of gender would be to call the entire system into question. 
Those who do not or cannot fit within this conception are silenced or quite literally forced 
back within its confines. In this understanding, individuals spatially move from one side 
of a spectrum (in terms of social location and identity) to another. Disregarding how 
gender continually changes, a linear conception tries to capture diverse experiences in 
simplified ways (see Image 1.2). 
 
 
Image 1.2: In this linear gender spectrum, individuals fall on one point of the line. This 
conception provides only two gender options (where falling closer to the “middle” is a 
blending of masculinity and femininity rather than something that exists outside of 
feminine/masculine). (“Gender Based Analysis Plus”) 
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 Nevertheless, because we socially construct gender, gender can change as 
individuals question and rework its definition; “Radical Epistemologies” therefore 
explores how trans* life writers use what Michel Foucault calls “subjugated knowledges” 
to resist binary and linear conceptions of gender.17 Subjugated knowledges represent 
alternative ways to understand oneself and the world, which dominant ideologies cannot 
adequately encompass. Within the U.S., individuals in power tend to trivialize and deny 
subjugated knowledges, writing them off as insignificant or preposterous. Detrimentally, 
individuals in power generally deny subjugated knowledges based more on the voices 
that articulate them than what the knowledges destabilize. For instance, if a white 
individual articulates anti-racist ideologies, ze is generally not disregarded (without at 
least some consideration) as aggressive, self-interested, or subversive. If a person of color 
articulates the same anti-racist ideologies, however, ze might be characterized as militant 
or angry, and thus hir ideas are more easily trivialized or denied by those in power. 
Similarly, woman-identified feminists who speak out against sexism are met with 
decidedly stronger and more vitriolic backlash than are man-identified feminists, even 
when the ideologies they tout are the same. I will take these considerations into account 
as I mine radical trans* life narratives for meaning.  
 The subjugated knowledges trans* people use spatially remap how we 
understand, experience, and express gender – not as a seesaw or linear spectrum but as a 
multi-dimensional field (see Image 1.3). Though Irene Gammel argues that subjugated 
knowledges must be legitimated through authoritative recognition,18 gender-diverse 
identities can be equally confirmed through collective perception. The knowledge that 
one is not alone or unique—that others share experiences, feelings, and identities—is a 
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powerful tool for personal and political resistance. If we consider Foucault’s notion of 
power, that it is “everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes 
from everywhere,” it becomes easier to see how trans* people claim power rather than 
fight for the right to be given power (qtd. in Pullen 14). Identity is thus both redemptive 
and constraining; individuals reclaim power from institutional control and yet the 
identities that are institutionally recognized are fraught with an extensive history of 
violence, pathology, and subjugation.   
 
Image 1.3: This image represents gender as a two-dimensional map, which encapsulates 
the diverse identities trans* people incorporate.  
 
 
“Wrong Body” Epistemologies in Mainstream Media 
If I have the wrong body, whose body do I have and where is my body? 
              -Jason Cromwell, Transmen and FTMS 
 
 
Reinforcing dominant ideals, mainstream media unrealistically represent trans* 
people through the linear, hierarchical, and limiting methods I discuss above. Talia Mae 
Bettcher illuminates the ways that mainstream narratives represent trans* people as, on 
one hand, victims of patriarchal stereotypes, and, on the other, pretenders who dupe 
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cisgender people. For instance, films like Dressed to Kill (1980) and Silence of the Lambs 
(1991), among many others, feature sadistic killers who are trans* (which the movies 
illuminate in a moment of “reveal,” suggesting that trans* identity correlates with or 
causes the sedition). In disturbing clarity, Bettcher, Kristen Schilt, and Laurel Westbook 
show how these types of fictional narratives actually produce heightened levels of real 
world discrimination, violence, incarceration, and death.  
Representations imitate life, but they also strongly influence and affect how we 
live in and understand the world. In their research on how mainstream news outlets report 
instances of violence against trans* people, Schilt and Westbrook find that journalists 
tend to “depict violence as resulting from private, sexual interactions in which the 
perpetrator feels ‘tricked’…by ‘gender deceivers’” whose bodies do not correspond with 
the perpetrators’ imaginations (452). Unsurprisingly, this coverage parallels sentencing 
patterns, even for those who confess to the killings: judges and jury members alike 
suggest more lenient punishments for perpetrators who use deception as a motivating 
factor. In this and other examples, the discourses surrounding trans* identity privilege 
nontrans* people’s narratives, even when it is clearly unethical and unfounded. Of 
course, these media representations and real world reflections are far from new: for over 
a century, nontrans* voices have replaced the voices of trans* people.  
Rather than explaining trans* identity in a way that acknowledges diverse 
subjectivities, dominant U.S. institutions rationalize trans* people as trapped within 
improper bodies or as liberated within surgically constructed new ones. The implicit 
assumption within this framework, which also characterizes trans* people as deceptive, 
contributes to the notion that trans* people are partially responsible for the violence they 
 29 
experience. In this understanding, trans* people whose minds do not “match” their bodies 
must change themselves or risk exclusion, discrimination, or illegibility. This narrative 
does not address how social expectations limit and control how all individuals understand 
gender or that violence against trans* people is always unacceptable. Instead, wrong body 
narratives place the burden of change on trans* people.  
Mainstream representations that use wrong body narratives tend to connect 
images of young, normatively attractive trans* women with “proof” of political or social 
change. In one review of Laverne Cox’s Time interview, for instance, a writer for the 
Examiner proclaims: “Times, they are a changing. A person’s sexual orientation is no 
longer a taboo subject. The way a person decides to define his or her self whether gay, 
straight or transgender has become part of main stream society.” Though gramatically 
incorrect, the Examiner article’s use of “main stream” is representative of how nontrans* 
individuals capitalize on trans* realities. Separating trans* experience from the “main 
stream,” first and foremost, reifies how popular ideologies erase trans* people. Further, 
this author’s use of passive voice—that “transgender has become part of main stream 
society”—glosses over exactly how this movement occurs. Not only does ze imply that 
the “main stream” merely incorporated trans* people, which essentially praises the 
“open-minded,” “kind-hearted” liberals who produce Time Magazine, it also rests on the 
notion that incorporation is a good thing. Trans* activism becomes invisible in light of 
the positive movement of mainstream culture.  
Moreover, confusing sex, gender, and sexuality, the Examiner’s review 
exemplifies the ways that dominant discourse views trans* as a marker of sexuality 
rather than gender. Placing trans* people within the “queer” category conflates gender 
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and sexuality and fails to acknowledge the important roles trans* people have historically 
played to make queer activism possible. Because “main stream” narratives imagine trans* 
activism as queer activism rather than separate and distinct, U.S. histories of homophobia 
and “subsequent” resistant projects become the foundation for trans* acceptance. This 
narrative invokes an utterly false history. Stryker, Jack Halberstam, and David 
Valentine—among others—clearly show how trans* activism existed both in relation to 
and separate from queer activism. Trans* women of color, for example, were at the 
forefront of the 1950s and ‘60s queer activist movements, holding sit-ins and fighting 
back against police brutality even before the infamous Stonewall Riot. Nevertheless, 
trans* becomes the added-on component of the LGBT movement, existing in an unstable 
place within queer groups (which may or may not fight for trans* individuals). Trans* 
people, in these conceptions, are either invisible or invalid.  
Nevertheless, many trans* activists resist wrong body ideologies. For instance, in 
“Transgender Media: Why I Dislike ‘Trapped in the Wrong Body,’” Janet Mock argues 
that the wrong body narrative “is a blanket statement that makes trans* people’s varying 
journeys and narratives palatable to the masses.” Rather than representing the complexity 
of trans* experience, wrong body justifications offer only a “soundbite of struggle” 
(Mock, “Transgender Media”). Though it is possible that individuals and institutions 
might understand trans* people through this lens in an attempt to humanize those of us 
who are trans*, these efforts are misdirected. Wrong body narratives implicitly recognize 
trans* people as “alien, as freaks, as less-than-human and other” (Mock, “Transgender 
Media”). Further, as S. Bear Bergman clarifies in The Nearest Exit May Be Behind You 
(2009), “I have never really felt like a girl is not the same as I have always felt like a 
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boy” even though medical discourse and popular media represent these feelings as 
inseparable (97). Calling the wrong body narrative the “destination model of transition,” 
Bergman jokingly explains in hir essay “I’m Just Saying” that the gender binary “will 
suck you right back in to its uncompromising orbit without remorse,” no matter what 
narrative one uses to combat its importance (The Nearest Exit 97). As I discuss in 
Chapter II, the wrong body “destination model” is harmful to those who do not identify in 
this way yet who find solidarity in trans* communities, as well as to individuals who do 
not have access to the bodywork they desire. Ultimately, the wrong body narrative 
reinforces the notion that nontrans* identity and experience is somehow more natural and 
diverse. Rather than encouraging true acceptance, wrong body ideologies underscore the 
“otherness” of trans* people. 
At the same time, it is important to note that many trans* people find the wrong 
body narrative compelling or closest to their experiences and represent themselves using 
its associated rhetorical tropes. Wrong body conceptions are not always restrictive or 
harmful: some trans* individuals view their bodies as incorrect and seek medical 
intervention to fix this problem. Because it is so pervasive, some trans* people find it 
helpful in coming out to friends and family, even if it doesn’t match one’s history. Still 
others find the narrative to be useful in psychiatric and medical facilities to receive care. 
Whatever the reason, some individuals employ this narrative and thus a blanket rejection 
of it is unwarranted.  
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Twenty-First Century Trans* Discourses 
In opposition to these limiting representations, the twenty-first century has seen 
an influx of radical trans* knowledges. Some mainstream media feature an array of 
trans* narratives, characters, actors, and themes. What’s more, trans* representations 
receive a tremendous amount of attention from all sides of the political spectrum.19 It 
seems, in 2015, that everyone is talking about gender diversity. For example, after the 
release of Mock’s autobiography, Redefining Realness: My Path to Womanhood, Identity, 
Love & So Much More (2014), which People magazine featured in its popular books 
section, social media exploded with trans*-related content and discussion. Mock, a 
trans*-identified woman of color, fashion correspondent, author, and activist, appeared 
on countless television talk shows, from Huffington Post Live to Piers Morgan Tonight. 
In one popular interview from January 2014, Mock iconically schooled Piers Morgan 
after he derogatorily focused on her “becoming” a woman through undergoing sexual 
reassignment surgery—more correctly called gender reassignment surgery—after “being” 
a man for eighteen years. The interview went viral and outraged viewers overwhelmed 
Morgan with tweets, emails, and phone calls. Morgan later publicly apologized to Mock 
and, soon after, MSNBC’s producers offered Mock her own show, So POPular!  
Other recent examples of mainstream trans* representations include but are not 
limited to MTV’s TransGeneration, a two-season reality show that follows four diverse 
individuals as they medically and socially transition while also navigating college life, 
family strife, issues of disability and deafness, and language barriers; Transparent, 
Southern Comfort, She’s A Boy I Knew, Against a Trans Narrative, Call Me Malcolm, 
and Becoming Ayden, among dozens of documentaries, which center an assortment of 
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trans* stories that expand the wrong body narrative; reality television shows that feature 
trans* contestants, like America’s Next Top Model’s Isis King from the eleventh and 
seventeenth seasons, RuPaul’s Drag Race’s Carmen Carrera from season three and 
Monica Beverley Hillz from season five, The Glee Project’s transgender-identified Tyler 
Ford and genderqueer-identified Alex “Unique” Newell, who went on to play hirself in 
Glee, and Dancing with the Stars’ Chaz Bono; and, finally, mainstream movies and 
television shows, which include fictional trans* characters (for example, Transamerica, 
Itty Bitty Titty Committee, Better Than Chocolate, Degrassi: The Next Generation, 
Orange is the New Black, Orphan Black, and Transparent, among others). In conjunction 
with this influx of representation, the twenty-first century trans* life stories I analyze 
have the capacity to expand cultural ideologies of gender.  
One way trans* life writers illuminate new knowledges is by putting their gender-
diverse identities into context; in one representative example, in Bergman’s The Nearest 
Exit, ze writes, “Gender is an à la carte arrangement, even though the macroculture rarely 
realizes this and doesn’t usually act accordingly. We are all, I firmly believe, in charge of 
our own genders” (91). Within the same essay, “The Field Guide to Transmasculine 
Creatures,” Bergman complicates hir original statement: “When we live in a world that 
leaves only the tiniest sliver of room for the least complicated among us, it’s difficult to 
find a place for all our complexities” (94). Instead of reading Bergman’s statements as 
contradictory—that gender is self-fashioned yet controlled by “macroculture”—these 
statements demonstrate the complex ways twenty-first century life writers negotiate 
mainstream recognition. In these ways, trans* life writers expose how gender is 
externally imposed and internally chosen.  
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Bergman assures hir trans*-positive audience that gender is unimaginably 
expansive, and, in the same essay, ze uses hir own experiences to show how we cannot 
control how others (mis)read gender cues. Bergman recounts moments where others 
incorrectly gender hir, identifying hir variably as a straight man, gay man, butch lesbian, 
dyke, and trans* man. Recognizing hir ability to relationally change how others identify 
hir by performing gender differently, Bergman consciously “fucks” with gender: ze 
lowers hir voice while buying jewelry and engages in stereotypically feminine behaviors 
at the local Jiffy Lube. Bergman shows how recognition is dependent on accepted 
“schemes” (choosing from an “à la carte menu,” as ze puts it, which only offers two 
items) and yet, in hir ability to put on or take off these “schemes,” ze suggests that 
influencing others is possible. Recognition becomes a powerful site in which trans* 
identity relies on and invalidates hegemonic conventions.  
Creating a trans* life narrative within a system that denies trans* existence is a 
political act of survival. Deidre McCloskey explains in the preface to her autobiography, 
Crossing: A Memoir (1999), that gender-diverse individuals write stories so that they are 
“heard and talked about and might even be imagined as one’s own” (xvi). For individuals 
with institutionally unrecognizable identities, life writing can be “the difference between 
shame and life” (McCloskey xvi). Additionally, John Paul Eakin contends that “narrative 
is not merely an appropriate form for the expression of identity; it is an identity content” 
in and of itself (How Our Lives 100). In Eakin’s view, narratives do not merely describe 
selves but actually produce them. As more trans* people share their stories, and as 
representations become more realistic and diverse, cultural epistemologies of what it 
means to live a trans* life expand.  
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Nonetheless, it is too easy to imagine contemporary trans* life writers as 
revolutionary vanguards who create systems that defy gender categorization; in 
conceptualizing this dissertation’s goals, I might have made this claim. Though I believe 
that this notion is true in some cases for trans* life writers who are privileged by other 
identity vectors (being white, middle class, or conventionally attractive, for example), it 
is not true for the vast majority of those who produce life narratives and completely 
untrue for those who cannot and will not publish. To be sure, moving between subject 
positions requires a tremendous amount of challenging work – work that some theorists 
disguise by uncritically reading textual moments of happiness as gender liberation. 
Trans* life narratives are not liberatory in and of themselves; they are liberatory because 
they offer new and different ways to narrate and understand trans* lives.  
Many trans* life narratives reveal radical knowledges through rewriting familiar 
stories, which exposes cracks or openings within dominant ideology. These resistant 
moments can be both devastating and transformative for those who experience them. 
These moments also illuminate how trans* people are inculcated within a system that 
does not recognize their trans* identity. For instance, a familiar life moment many trans* 
life writers recount is one in which one’s elementary school teacher asks the class, “What 
do you want to be when you grow up?” Because most Americans who were born in and 
after the 1940s share this experience, the non-normative responses trans* writers include 
in their narratives are profound. In her autobiography, Mock recalls that when her teacher 
asked her this question in front of her classmates, she said she wanted to be a secretary 
(37). Similarly, in The First Lady (1974), April Ashley remembers when her first grade 
teacher posed the same question; in this fraught moment, Ashley enthusiastically blurted 
 36 
out that she wanted to be a princess. Written forty years apart, Mock and Ashley’s 
narratives similarly focus on how they did not know their responses were “wrong” until 
peers and teachers responded with laughter, in Mock’s experience, and outright 
punishment, in Ashley’s. These memories become resistant in relation to a culture that 
prescribes strict gender roles and punishes those who do not follow the system’s rules. 
These moments of resistance theorize how U.S. society limits individual 
expression by fixing what is socially normal. Initially lacking cultural terms and models 
with which to identify, Mock and Ashley are shocked and humiliated by these 
experiences. Rather than reinstating dominant paradigms or dwelling in sorrow or defeat, 
however, these resistant moments layer one upon another to produce a new understanding 
of trans* identity. These examples epitomize how the simple, popular narratives in 
mainstream media create a climate in which transphobic laughter, derision, and 
punishment are socially acceptable and, in fact, necessary for the system’s continuation.  
 
What’s to Come: Chapters II-V 
The cultural life narratives “Radical Epistemologies” considers span several 
genres: memoir, essay, autobiography, documentary, and digital storytelling. Though the 
texts differ in form, they nevertheless similarly politicize personal experience. In Chapter 
II, “Simple, Sensational, and Pathological: How Dominant Discourses Misunderstand 
Trans* Lives,” I continue to investigate how U.S. systems produce and perpetuate 
negative understandings of trans* individuals. I explore the ways that late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century sexologists created a gender diversity framework that was 
fundamentally unconcerned with individual trans* experience outside dominant and 
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historical understandings of binary gender. Engaging with these debates as well as their 
contemporary psychiatric successors—the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders and the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s “Standards 
of Care”—I argue that though medical discourse has and continues to place itself within a 
politically neutral terrain, trans* life narratives uncover the ways that medical discourse, 
in its ability to regulate bodies, is neither neutral nor apolitical. By tracing the damaging 
epistemologies sexologists created – epistemologies which continue to flourish – I 
illuminate how contemporary medical discourse must be reevaluated so that it reflects the 
diverse narratives trans* people produce. Subsequently, in Chapters III-V, I investigate 
how trans* life narratives expand, reject, deny, claim, and radicalize historical, medical 
ideologies. 
Chapter III, “Against a Single Trans* Story: Destabilizing Dominant Narratives 
through Documentary,” explores films that feature trans* individuals. In contrast to 
documentaries produced by nontrans* people, autobiographical documentaries produced 
by trans* filmmakers emphasize identity processes and communities that share in the 
production of meaning rather than a closed-off identity product. Specifically, Jules 
Rosskam’s Against a Trans Narrative (2008) and Gwen Tara Haworth’s She’s a Boy I 
Knew (2008) expand trans* representational horizons by telling diverse stories. 
Complicating the wrong body narrative, these films offer expansive and sometimes 
contradictory stories. Rather than focusing on how someone might come to identify as 
trans* or what procedures and tactics one uses to transition—though “medical issues and 
transition may be included”—the stories Rosskam and Haworth represent reject the 
medical model as the “be-all and end-all of the narrative” (Ryan, “Diversifying” 11). 
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While Against a Trans Narrative is an experimental film that explodes conventional 
notions of identity, community, and visibility, She’s a Boy I Knew is a first-person look at 
one trans* woman’s experience within a conservative, white, middle class family. In 
reclaiming agency over their narratives, these documentarians exemplify the 
democratization of new digital technologies and radical means of production. 
Chapter IV, “‘Bear Witness and Build Legacies:’ Twentieth and Twenty-First 
Century Trans* Autobiography,” shifts in focus from film to literary works. In Chapter 
IV, I examine the historical tradition of transsexual autobiography to contextualize the 
radical epistemologies contemporary trans* texts employ. Similar to how contemporary 
theorists think about gender, scholars such as Egan and Sidonie Smith show how 
definitions of autobiography change over time as individuals narrate new and different 
life stories—in other words, as cultural knowledge evolves. Because autobiography 
“creates and reinvents the self through writing” in relation to an imagined discourse 
community (Hall 96-7), trans* life narratives have the capacity to “provide witness for 
others, create a community of affirmation, and encourage social transformation” (Hall 
104). Specifically, I analyze Alex Drummond’s theoretical autobiography, Grrl Alex: A 
Personal Journey to a Transgender Identity (2012), and Jennifer Finley Boylan’s literary 
autobiography, I’m Looking Through You: Growing Up Haunted (2008). In contrast to 
earlier writers, Drummond and Boylan representatively show a new era of trans* 
epistemology, which does not rely on the wrong body model as the foundational aspect of 
trans* existence. Boylan remembers her haunting male past, which inevitably leads her to 
seek personal and social acceptance through medical transition, while Drummond situates 
her trans* identity in opposition to medical discourse.  
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Though their stories differ, their embedded epistemologies reflect radical 
conceptions of gender. Because Boylan and Drummond narrate continuous subjects 
rather than subjects split between discordant pasts and the present, these writers put forth 
a new way to understand trans* identity: it does not demand one narrative nor does it 
require that individuals feel disturbed by their prior selves. Instead, Boylan and 
Drummond illuminate how gender is neither “stable” nor a “locus of agency” but rather 
“an identity tenuously constituted in time” (Butler, Undoing Gender 519). Drummond 
and Boylan explore rather than explicate trans* identity and experience.  
Finally, in Chapter V, “Collective Archives of Resistance: Trans* Digital 
Storytelling on YouTube,” I build on these arguments yet shift to digital storytelling, 
which is a uniquely twenty-first century form of life narrative. On user-generated digital 
platforms—like LiveJournal in the early 2000s and contemporary sites like Tumblr, 
WordPress, and YouTube—diverse trans* voices, narratives, and images proliferate. By 
documenting seemingly mundane activities, trans* digital storytellers expand conceptions 
of what it means to transition in twenty-first century America. Blurring the boundaries 
between individual and collective knowledge of the self, digital storytelling offers some 
trans* youth the possibility of sharing life stories in personal and political ways.  
Chapter V focuses on two white, straight-identified trans*-masculine vloggers: 
SkylarkEleven, a twenty-three year old musician and activist who has documented his 
transition since the age of seventeen by posting more than 200 videos, and KyFord23, a 
twenty-four year old trans* man from Iowa who similarly documents his changing 
identity and body throughout his twenty-four videos. Because SkylarkEleven and 
KyFord23 use digital storytelling to document their changing bodies and, at the same 
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time, to resist medical legitimation, they use digital storytelling as a reflexive survival 
tool, which helps them negotiate the societal oppression they experience in safe ways. 
Instead of merely acknowledging the nightmares of contemporary transphobia and 
heterosexism, these digital storytellers perform new ways of being.  
 
Conclusion: What Might Trans* “Liberation” Look Like? 
We get to determine how and when to explain ourselves, bodies not reduced 
to medical histories and issues but rather belonging fully to us, doctors 
playing only small, bit roles. A politics of self-determination…discards the 
notion that our bodies are medical curiosities, scientific theories, social 
burdens and perversities. It is a simple, matter-of-fact, and entirely profound 
politics. By valuing self-determination, we invite many different kinds of 
bodies to the table. We reach toward liberation rather than privilege. 
-Eli S. Clare, “Body Shame, Body Pride: Lessons from the Disability Rights 
Movement” 
 
According to Leslie Feinberg, who identifies as a “human being” yet is read 
variably as a lesbian woman and trans* man, “trans liberation” involves the emancipation 
of all people from rigid gendered stereotypes. In hir conception, “trans liberation” would 
include everyone who does not follow normative guidelines: for example, women who do 
not want to have children as well as men who like to wear pink or who do not understand 
aggression as a component of success. Building off of the women’s liberation movement, 
of which Feinberg was an integral part, “trans liberation” movements acknowledge that 
trans* people’s lives “are proof that sex and gender are much more complex than a 
delivery room doctor’s glance at genitals can determine, more variegated than pink or 
blue birth caps” (“Works in Progress” 195). This goal is worthwhile and I avidly fight for 
“trans liberation,” as Feinberg conceives of it.  
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Nevertheless, Feinberg’s conception of “trans liberation,” which would equally 
empower nontrans* individuals, does not sufficiently take into account dominant 
epistemologies. While men who like to knit may be oppressed by the cultural conception 
that they are not “fully” men, they are not daily stripped of their humanity or rendered 
unrecognizable under the law. They are, instead, seen as harboring “secret” longings or 
imagined as queer. As Cressida Hayes argues, Feinberg’s understanding of trans* identity 
as a “freedom of individual expression” relies too heavily on choice, blanket toleration, 
and “no rights and wrongs in the ways people express their own gender style” (Hayes 
205). Hayes’ critique shows how Feinberg’s “trans liberation” model might theoretically 
condone masculine violence or control by all genders, which comes from the 
“willingness to treat gender expression as an individual matter, rather than as a web of 
relations in ongoing tension and negotiation” (Hayes 206). Though I support Feinberg’s 
idea of “trans liberation” in all the widespread ways it might come to fruition, I focus on 
the factors that affect trans* people specifically. Instead of judging Feinberg’s arguments 
as misdirected, I imagine “trans liberation” as a tactic that illuminates viable modes of 
living that are already available rather than one that points to the ways that all people can 
live less binary-oriented lives. These are similar political goals: to expand what it means 
to identify as trans* also expands what it means to identify as a woman or man.  
Because U.S. dominant ideologies in the twenty-first century do not recognize 
gender diversity, it is first and foremost necessary to show how trans* people flourish in 
spite of hegemonic misrecognition. The future fight for trans* “liberation,” based on this 
project, would inherently be more about recognition and anti-assimilation strategies than 
toleration or acceptance. Future trans* movements must address the need for social 
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systems to change rather than certain individuals gaining rights over others. Once U.S. 
culture values trans* lives in the same way as nontrans* lives, breaking down the gender 
binary and expanding “trans liberation” to include all people will be inevitable. It is this 
crucial middle step that Feinberg skips, and which this dissertation articulates.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 For a comprehensive look at U.S. law, which prohibits discrimination based on gender, 
see transgenderlaw.org. As of April 2015, only sixteen states (and Washington D.C.) 
protect trans* people from discriminatory treatment.  
  
2 In the National Coalition for Anti-Violence Programs’ (NCAVP) 2013 report, of those 
who reported incidences of violence, “transgender survivors were particularly likely to 
experience physical violence at the hands of the police.” What’s more, NCAVP found 
that “transgender survivors were 3.7 times more likely to experience police 
violence…and 7 times more likely to experience physical violence when interacting with 
the police.” Not only are trans* survivors of violence less likely to report, they are more 
likely than nontrans* survivors to actually get arrested when they do (NCAVP).  
 
3 According to Alexandra Bolles, Communications director for the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD), gender-diverse people are 27% more likely than 
“people who are gender normative” to experience “physical violence.” As Bolles claims, 
violence against gender-diverse people is on the rise and 87% of this violence is 
committed against trans* people of color. More specifically, according to the NCAVP’s 
2013 report, 72% of “homicide victims were transgender women and more than two-
thirds (67%) of homicide victims were transgender women of color.” Disproportionately, 
black trans* women are most likely to be assaulted or murdered: of trans* people of color 
killed in 2013, 78% were black trans* women (AVP).  
 
4 After all, Anzaldúa herself plays with notions of gender diversity: she has a “Shadow 
Beast” or gender rebel living inside of her and is literally “mita’ y mita’” or “half and 
half” (Borderlands 41). Anzaldúa calls gender-diverse people “divine warriors” who 
have to fight to assert that they are not “sick” and that society is wrong and they are right 
(Interviews 122). Anzaldúa claims, contrary to medical legitimation discourses, that 
trans* people do not suffer from a “confusion of gender” but from an inability to inhabit a 
rigid, binary system in a culture that disallows “two in one body” (Borderlands 41). 
 
5 Change becomes possible when subordinated subjects recognize one another as allies, 
which expands the borders that control or cage in trans* lives. Living without borders 
requires that subjects enact activism. As Anzaldúa maintains, it is not enough to be born a 
“racialized, gendered mestiza in the borderlands,” one must fight to earn consciousness, 
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forge “the ultimate rebellion” to “uncove[r] the lie” of culture and “fight hard to resist 
stasis” (Borderlands 12). 
 
6 The life narratives produced by trans* people of color, which I could locate include 
Janet Mock’s 2014 autobiography, Max Wolf Valerio’s Testosterone Files (2006), one 
part of MTV’s TransGeneration, which features Andrea Gabrielle Gibson who identifies 
as a Puerto Rican, deaf transsexual woman, and several of Laverne Cox’s recent 
interviews. There have also been four contestants on RuPaul’s Drag Race and The Glee 
Project who identify as trans* people of color. Apart from these somewhat limited 
representations, a majority of which nontrans* people produce, trans* life narratives to 
date come most significantly from white trans* people.  
  
7 For an extensive discussion of how binary institutions of gender are colonial, see 
Michael Hames-García’s argument in Identity Complex: Making the Case for 
Multiplicity.  
 
8 These articles include Viviane K. Namaste’s “Genderbashing: Sexuality, Gender, and 
the Regulation of Public Space,” in which she discusses race in relation to street 
harassment, violence, and prostitution, as well as “Whose Feminism Is It Anyway?: The 
Unspoken Racism of the Trans Inclusion Debate,” in which Emi Koyama emphasizes 
how whiteness is assumed in feminist spaces, particularly in regards to womyn-only and 
trans*-exclusive groups. In the Transgender Studies Reader 2, eleven out of fifty articles 
focus on race, which is certainly a slight improvement. Nevertheless, a majority of these 
eleven texts explore trans* identity and experience in non-U.S. contexts. Though the 
second edition improves on the first edition’s lack of race, it seems that writing about 
trans* people of color “elsewhere” is more viable or at least publishable than writing 
about trans* people of color in the U.S.  
 
9 At the same time, it is possible that the winds are shifting in terms of trans* 
representation. There is something significant about the fact that two trans* women of 
color (Laverne Cox and Janet Mock) have become the mainstream faces of trans* 
activism. In relation to these shifting representations, perhaps we will see a wider range 
of trans* lives and narratives in the coming years. Though Cox and Mock are 
conventional in their appearance, youth, and binary identifications, they nevertheless 
provide “possibility models” (in Cox’s words) for other trans* people of color to share 
their stories.   
 
10 For a discussion of the dangers in using one trans* term over another, see David 
Valentine’s argument in Imagining Transgender: An Ethnography of a Category (2007). 
 
11 Though there isn’t one consensus about where or when the term trans* originated, 
many trans* scholars point to the fact that it may come from computer language. In any 
common search function, to type an asterisk at the end of a word makes that word a 
“wildcard.” An asterisk also stands in for a blank. For instance, one could type “women 
who * like to *” in a Google search and come back with millions of websites – the 
 
 44 
 
asterisks, in this example, act as placeholders, which could be filled by any word or set of 
words. Using trans*, then, means that the search will bring back all relevant materials 
related to “trans” but also to its possible suffixes (transnational, transgender, or 
transcultural, as examples). Historian Cristan Williams argues that individuals she 
interviewed in the early 1980s would use t* on early message boards “as a way of 
sidestepping an ongoing debate in part of the trans* community about the origins and 
uses of the terms transsexual and transgender” (qtd. in Ryan). It is quite possible that the 
asterisk associated with “t” or “trans” has been appearing and disappearing for decades. 
In terms of the term’s pronunciation, those of us who use this term in academic 
scholarship, activism, and/or as a personal identification do not tend to pronounce the 
asterisk, though some do draw attention to it by saying “trans asterisk” or “trans star.” 
 
12 For example, Jacob Hale in “Consuming the Living, Dis(re)membering the Dead in the 
Butch/FTM Borderlands” explores how scholars and journalists address Brandon Teena 
after his death. According to Hale, Teena’s unstable, shifting gender identity and variable 
self-naming practices were fixed and curtailed by his killers and, at the same time, those 
who fought over Teena’s identity and name might have colluded with his killers.  
 
13 As I discuss in more detail in Chapter II, I acknowledge that there are many other 
viable gender-neutral options. In Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us, 
for example, Kate Bornstein suggests variations on the singular they by shortening it to 
“ey, em, eir, eirs, and emself.” Others suggest using new terms such as zhe, zhim, mer, 
thon, yo, ve, per, and hu, among others. I do not believe that ze and hir are more 
beneficial than any other pronoun; apart from “they/theirs,” “ze/hir” are simply the 
pronouns I have most often come across in trans* media, literature, and online forums. 
 
14 Throughout Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of 
Empowerment, Collins uses standpoint epistemology theory to position herself as a Black 
Feminist woman with particular “lived experiences” that “stimulate a distinctive 
consciousness” (23-4). Through recognition of shared experience and relations to power 
and privilege (which she terms an “outsider-within social location”), she explores black 
“women’s” epistemology (Collins 10). Collins suggests that if black women could 
recognize shared experience as allies rather than competitors, black women could more 
productively resist white supremacy and institutional racism while enacting a “recurring 
humanist vision” (42). In these ways, Collins’ project is two-fold: she relies on strategic 
essentialism to posit that there is a definable category of “black women,” and she 
configures race as categorical, which relies on macro conceptions of visible identity and 
kinship. However, as she specifies, her racial project opposes the larger racial formation 
that allows “democratic promises of individual freedom” to categorize, hierarchize, and 
discriminate against women of color, poor people, and other oppressed groups (Collins 
23). Her goal in using this dual racial project is to eradicate discrimination but not 
difference. I find these goals to be incredibly productive and similarly work to eradicate 
trans* discrimination but not difference. 
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15 For an eloquent and extended discussion of how gender, sexuality, and race are co-
productive and co-dependent rather than additive, see Hames-García’s Identity Complex: 
Making the Case for Multiplicity. 
 
16 hooks clarifies how trans* people of color (particularly black trans* women) 
experience multiple and interconnecting forms of racial and gender-based trauma, which 
one should not imagine as separate. Though the texts I consider are produced by white 
individuals, in future work I intend to analyze how notions of “trauma” differently affect 
trans* people of color in ways that trans* may not encompass. 
 
17 Social constructionism encourages us to see how all facets of culture—individual 
understandings of the body and personal identification, medical-scientific standards, 
stereotypical representations, and public policy—infuse trans* with meaning. 
Considering the ways that identity is socially constructed forces us to question where 
knowledge comes from—who can speak, about what, and in what ways—as well as why 
certain discourses work (or perpetuate themselves) more fruitfully than others. Cultural 
meanings that “work” preserve “a hierarchy…that determines the distribution of 
privilege, status, and power” (Garland Thomson 6). In this way, social constructionism 
explains more than just the way things are; it also explains how individuals unwittingly 
allow detrimental practices to continue. 
 
18 Irene Gammel argues that “the confessional speech act is characterized by an 
imbalance between the confessor’s power” and the “confessant’s impotence” (5-6). In 
other words, as Gammel maintains, “the confession has little authority of its own, but 
needs the voice of an authority—religious, medical, psychological, or legal—to 
legitimize it and assign it a truth value” (5-6). 
 
19 At the same time, in the political realm, trans*-focused legislation is currently on the 
docket for at least half of all states, which would expand housing, education, and 
employment anti-discrimination laws to gender-diverse people. According to the Human 
Rights Campaign’s website, nine states already include the right to change gender and 
name on documents, including identification cards and birth certificates, while another 
twenty-two states allow trans* individuals to change gender on birth certificates or 
driver’s licenses. Six states have all-inclusive trans* health care laws, and at least as 
many specify “gender” in their anti-discrimination laws relating to education, 
employment, and housing. Though the passing of pro-trans* bills does not necessarily 
correlate with better treatment for trans* individuals, the fact that local, regional, and 
national U.S. governments are beginning to address trans* issues is a significant cultural 
change.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
SIMPLE, SENSATIONAL, AND PATHOLOGICAL:  
HOW DOMINANT DISCOURSES MISUNDERSTAND TRANS* LIVES 
 
Trumpeted as the masculine “ex-GI” who sailed overseas to transform into a 
feminine “blonde beauty,” Christine Jorgenson forced everyone in 1950s U.S. culture to 
newly consider gender—what it is, what it looks like, how it affects us, and how we 
affect it. Days after Jorgenson returned to the U.S. after undergoing gender reassignment 
surgery (GRS), Time Magazine touted her as a “national sensation” (qtd. in Steinmetz). 
Appearing on the front cover of every magazine in the country, Jorgenson became the 
symbol of a new gender epistemology. For decades, U.S. media obsessed over the fact 
that her mere existence destabilized dominant understandings of sex as fixed and natural.  
With gaping mouths and flashing camera bulbs, American media transfixed its 
ravenous gaze on Jorgenson. Against her wishes, newspaper outlets, television talk 
shows, writers, and photographers relentlessly stalked her even after she hid from the 
public eye. Decidedly, as her 1967 autobiography makes clear, Jorgenson did not want to 
be the poster girl for transsexuality and thought the attention was preposterous and 
downright terrifying. In Christine Jorgenson: A Personal Autobiography (1967), 
Jorgenson recalls being unprepared for the media frenzy that began the moment she 
stepped off the plane onto American soil. Calling reporters “the enemy,” Jorgenson 
explains, “My arrival was fully reported, sometimes in a friendly and sometimes hostile 
way: what I wore, what I said, what I looked like, my behavior, all with varying degrees 
of accuracy…If I sneezed, it was duly reported as an event” (60-1). Reporters commented 
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on everything from her fashion sense to how she held her hands, while discussing 
whether she was “really” now a woman. Because of the overwhelming and stifling media 
coverage she endured, Jorgenson went into hiding at her parents’ home, refusing to 
declare her whereabouts. Though she never released her address, she was so infamous 
merely for transitioning from a socially masculine category to a recognizably feminine 
one that the post office continued to deliver her mail even though senders addressed their 
letters to “Christine Jorgenson” or “Miss Jorgenson” with no address (60). In the years 
following, Jorgenson spent much of her time reading the “twenty thousand letters [she] 
had received,” which were largely penned by other trans* individuals who were desperate 
for Jorgenson’s help: in her bewildered words, “I seemed to represent some sort of 
guidepost for accomplishment” (63).  
Jorgenson’s astute realization turns out to have been an understatement; for 
decades, media representations and medical discourse exploited Jorgenson’s story as the 
example of “successful” transsexuality. Both Harry Benjamin—who wrote the original 
version of the “Standards of Care,” a newer version of which medical practitioners still 
use—and Alfred Kinsey, famous for his research on sexual fluidity and behavior in men, 
used Jorgenson’s story as the prototypical example when counseling other individuals 
seeking GRS. Trans* histories scholar Joanne Meyerowitz marks Jorgenson’s notoriety 
as the watershed moment wherein the American public began to seriously consider 
transsexuality as a viable (though abnormal) life course brought about by surgical 
technologies and psychological research, which began to separate sex and gender.  
If Jorgenson’s notoriety contradicted her desire to simply become a “normal” 
American woman (as she articulated in her autobiography), we must question why she 
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became and, more than fifty years later, continues to be the poster girl for transsexuality. 
Why did journalists publicly and relentlessly hound Jorgenson? What was it about her or 
her narrative, in particular? One explanation might be that her story—from “ex-GI” to 
“blonde beauty”—represents an acceptable rendition of a trans* life. Before undergoing 
surgery, Jorgenson epitomized white masculinity: she joined the military, married a 
woman, and was widely known as a handsome “ladies man.” After surgery, Jorgenson 
returned to the U.S. as the demure, feminine lady headlines promoted. Though other 
trans* individuals successfully transitioned in the 1950s and ‘60s, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that Jorgenson “represented some sort of guidepost for accomplishment”: 
instead of signifying fluidity, Jorgenson’s story reinforced binary gender ideals. In 
contrast to headlines, her iconic narrative did not destabilize cultural epistemologies or 
disrupt commonly held notions of what it meant to be a woman or man. Rather, her story 
(in particular, the way journalists reported it) established visual and conceptual 
frameworks, which mark trans* people as unnatural, pathological, and deceptive.1 These 
instances of sensational journalism—reinforced by dominant medical paradigms—
illuminate a familiarly othering story. Jorgenson’s notoriety sets the stage for how 
contemporary dominant narratives continue to exploit trans* individuals. It will be useful 
to keep in mind the persistence with which Jorgenson’s story echoes today; her 
nonconsensual popularity points to contemporary obsessions with stereotypical gender at 
the same time as it illuminates how mainstream media deny the desires of trans* people.  
This chapter explores the historical frameworks that contextualize twenty-first 
century trans* narratives by focusing on three key discourse systems: practices of 
naming, medical legitimation, and popular media. First, I historicize contemporary 
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language to show how collective and individual practices of naming are intimately linked 
with conceptions of trans* legitimacy and political efficacy. Second, I explore the major 
historical texts and moments that influence current medical understandings of trans* 
identity. Through nineteenth and early twentieth century sexology, the “Standards of 
Care,” and the latest versions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals for Mental 
Disorders, I analyze how medical discourse has misunderstood and continues to 
misunderstand trans* people. Third, in light of these models, I consider the film Let Me 
Die a Woman (1978) to articulate how media texts incorporate medical ideologies by 
similarly sensationalizing and simplifying trans* lives. Along with Chapter I, this chapter 
frames what the rest of the dissertation argues: because of the transphobic culture in 
which they are produced, trans* narratives have been and continue to be liberating and 
constraining for the subjects who create them.  
 
What’s in a Name? Language Systems and Common Issues  
According to Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman (1997), gender is 
“omnirelevant” (qtd. in Lucal 783). From the categories and pronouns we use to how we 
relate to others, gender influences our every interaction. In its omnirelevance, gender 
permeates all realms of cultural production most significantly through language. In the 
English language, it is very difficult to abandon gender when referring to individuals who 
fall outside normative, binary ideals.2 If English-speakers incorporated gender-neutral 
pronouns, we might not feel such a strong need to gender others with whom we come in 
contact on a daily basis. D.G. Allen illustrates the detriment in not having more pronoun 
options: “description is the creation of difference, difference entails classification, and 
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classification involves power” (66). This dearth in descriptive language and classification 
is deeply dangerous. In naming others, we also unwittingly place them within a social 
system of privilege and oppression and, in turn, position ourselves in relation. This 
difficulty “creates an obvious problem for those people who do not wish to be labeled as 
male or female, as well as a difficulty for those who wish to address or refer to gender-
diverse people with respect” (Merryfeather 142). Relying on binary gender and thus 
gender-specific pronouns is a glaring problem in academia and popular culture and yet 
the English language continues to offer few alternatives.  
Though some individuals lay claim to the pronouns ze/hir/hirs and incorporate 
them in their everyday interactions, most English-speakers do not recognize them as 
intelligible options. As The American Heritage Book of English Usage clarifies, 
the project to supplement the English pronoun system has proved to be an 
ongoing exercise in futility. Pronouns are one of the most basic 
components of a language, and most speakers appear to have little interest 
in adopting invented ones. This may be because in most situations people 
can get by using the plural pronoun they or using other constructions that 
combine existing pronouns, such as he/she or he or she.  
This explanation completely erases the lived experience of trans* individuals who cannot 
“get by” in most situations without trying to pass as one gender or another (which may or 
may not be how ze identifies). This explanation also relies on dualistic distinctions of 
male/female in its insistence on “he/she or he or she.” Though some trans* people have 
more than “a little interest in adopting invented” pronouns, American Heritage is 
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unfortunately right in that it is an anomaly to see nontrans* people use radical gender-
neutral pronouns even when trans* people request their usage. 
In addition to challenges surrounding pronoun use, academic divisions have 
occurred in relation to identity terms. In 2002, defining “both/neither” as a transgender 
position that refuses to “fit within categories of woman and man” whereas “either/or” 
refers to a transsexual imperative to “pass convincingly as either a man or a woman,” 
Katrina Roen addressed yet perpetuated problematic language formations (505).3 
Similarly, in 2006, Eli R. Green argued that someone who identifies as transgender “lives 
as a member of a gender different than that expected based on anatomical sex” (Green 9). 
Green’s use of “different” highlights the fact that there are more than two viable gender 
categories. In contrast, one who identifies as transsexual “identifies psychologically as a 
gender/sex opposite from the one to which they were assigned at birth,” and hormonally 
and surgically transforms hir body to match hir internal self (Green 10). Green’s use of 
“opposite” assumes that there are only two, widely dissimilar gender options. Judging 
from these contradictions, it is not shocking that theorists who privilege one term over 
another conceptually clash in their goals and perspectives.  
 Unfortunately, trans* theorists sometimes purport that either transsexual or 
transgender people are the “real,” “authentic” or “political” gender rebels, which defames 
the other term (and those who identify as such). For example, Jack Halberstam, Susan 
Stryker, Leslie Feinberg, and Kate Bornstein (among others) purport that those of us who 
claim a transgender or trans identity are more political. Others, like Erin Calhoun Davis, 
Viviane K. Namaste, and C. Jacob Hale (not surprisingly, all self-identified transsexual 
writers), argue that emphasizing transgender fluidity “insufficiently recognizes the 
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embodied experiences and implications of compulsory gender performance” (Calhoun 
Davis 98). The dichotomies that flourish in these debates (between stable/fluid, 
hegemonic/subversive, and stealth/out, for instance) pervade trans* theory to a ruinous 
extent: to focus on hegemony’s control is to neglect to see the power trans* people have 
over their lives. As AnaLouise Keating argues, “when we base identities and alliances on 
oppositionally defined categories, we establish and police boundaries—boundaries that 
shut us in with those we’ve deemed ‘like’ ‘us’ and boundaries that close us off from those 
whom we assume to be different” (247). Eli S. Clare expounds these contentious issues: 
“in trans communities we talk a lot about disclosure, but so often that talk is full of 
misunderstanding and accusation. Folks who choose to be ‘stealth’ are accused of shame, 
and folks who choose to be ‘out’ are told they’ll regret it later” (263). This damned-if-
you-do, damned-if-you-don’t narrative does not adequately represent the multi-variant 
lived experiences of trans* people with diverse perspectives. These tense debates divide 
like-minded people who could work together towards a common goal, whether or not 
their chosen identity terms are the same.  
 Though a shared vocabulary is necessary, most scholars are divided on how to go 
about producing such a vocabulary. In 2000, Namaste proposed that separations between 
the terms are necessary so that transsexual (but not transgender) individuals can survive 
in a violent world (Invisible Lives 105). During the same year, Halberstam and Judith 
Butler pushed for inclusivity and the political advantages of identifying as transgender 
rather than transsexual. In 2008, Lucas Cassidy Crawford advocated for prying open the 
terms transgender and transsexual “in a way that might allow more people to belong to 
them or to desire them” (130). In essence, Crawford called for the definitions of these 
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terms to change but not the terms themselves. In contrast, in 2009, Calhoun Davis 
argued: the “postmodern positioning of transgender as disrupting gender regulations, 
transcending gender boundaries, and revealing the artificiality of gender identification 
tends to overlook transsexed individuals’ subjective experiences of gender realness” 
(123). These dialogues exemplify how complicated and inflammatory these debates can 
be in that they consistently rely on the very humanity of the scholars and individuals who 
debate them.4  
 What these deliberations show is that all identity terms are fundamentally flawed 
and carry with them so much baggage that they “often require individuals to downplay or 
obscure parts of their experiences or history” (Elliot 8-9). In this regard, A. Finn Enke has 
helped me to understand the stakes of not having any good words. I agree and follow 
Enke’s line of thinking in my own work: “I am humbled by the extent to which we 
exceed the English language. Words fail utterly, as do all conventions of naming the 
variety of ways we live with gender” (244). Like Enke, I have a “vested interest in 
keeping the categories woman, man, and trans* wide open, their flexible morphologies 
blending into one another and becoming accessible in more ways than we can even 
imagine” (244). Heeding Enke’s suggestions, I will consistently stress the flexibility of 
language and, above all, keep these categories open rather than fixed.  
Moreover, within academia, scholars sometimes use trans* as a metaphor, 
example, or case study—something to incorporate for the betterment of an argument and 
then abandon—with little consideration of the realities of trans* people. Halberstam 
documents the various ways scholars take up “transgender”: “the transgender body 
becomes a symbol par excellence for flexibility” as well as a “form of rigidity, an 
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insistence on particular forms of recognition” (In a Queer Time 120). As a theoretical 
category, “transgender” symbolizes a “different form of temporality” or spatiality, which 
renders trans* people as invisible or abstract (Halberstam, In a Queer Time 120). Even 
trans*-identified theorists sometimes metaphorize trans* identity: for example, Bobby 
Jean Noble offers “transgender” as a “site” in which the “imperatives” of a binary gender 
system crystallize. Stryker makes a similar move by posing trans* as “phenomena,” 
which can be mined for meaning (“Transgender Feminism” 253).5 To treat trans* identity 
as a metaphor unethically represents the lived reality of flesh-and-blood individuals. 
Resisting this tactic, I highlight the ways that trans* writers narrate and represent their 
lives in their own words and images.  
 
A Deviation Rather than a Difference: Historical Constructions of Trans* Identity  
For more than 150 years, sexologists, psychiatrists, and social workers have 
characterized trans* people as classifiable objects in need of intervention. Sexology, “the 
study and classification of sexual behaviours, identities and relations,” developed as early 
as the 1870s throughout Britain, Europe, and North America. Richard von Krafft-Ebing, 
Havelock Ellis, and Magnus Hirschfeld, among others, “displaced the old view of sexual 
practices as sinful—and hence under the jurisdiction of the church—and imposed a new 
view of sexual perversions as disease and/or manifestations of degeneracy, and thus 
under the jurisdiction of medicine” (Bland 2). Undoubtedly, sexologists did not 
adequately take into account the actual stories of their trans* patients. In their “case 
studies,” doctors re-narrated patients’ experiences as evidence of an “abnormal” 
personhood. In these instances, doctors uncritically classified patients using sexist, racist, 
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and classist criteria. In this section, I outline several of the most ubiquitous theories of the 
early twentieth century with special emphasis on those theories that continue to inform 
medical discourses. To make these claims, I investigate how U.S. medical models have 
constructed trans* identity throughout the last 150 years.  
Throughout the last two centuries, cultural narratives of gender diversity and 
queer sexuality construct trans* identity as a deviation—rather than a difference—from 
an idealized norm. In other words, social epistemologies construct transsexuality through 
ideas of (ab)normalcy. According to Lennard J. Davis, “normal” is a relatively recent 
term, appearing in English discourse in the late nineteenth century (10).6 Davis argues 
that the use of “normal” paralleled rising interests in “compiling information about the 
state” (11). As scientists compiled data, “normalcy” began to define individuals whom 
they deemed “physically” and “morally average” (Davis 11). This new construct 
scientifically justified a middle class in America and Europe through capitalist markets, 
which sought consumers through fear-laden discourses: “abnormality” could be “cured” 
through conspicuous consumption. Sexologists understood gender diversity as falling 
outside “normal” constructions of selfhood, which they themselves defined.7  
Sexologists relied on biological determinism and heteronormativity to explain 
“normal” forms of gender, sex, and sexuality (Bland 13). In his 1894 essay “Man and 
Woman,” for instance, Ellis classifies human sex characteristics as “zoological fact,” 
which rooted biology in a (culturally conceived) procreative milieu (24). In a subsequent 
1899 essay, Ellis repeatedly refers to women as “the female animal” while referring only 
to men as “the male” (34). In his conception, female individuals (who would later be 
referred to as women) are responsible for perpetuating the human species and little else. 
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Because Ellis does not similarly conceive of males as “animals,” he affords men a level 
of humanity, which is unavailable to women. Ellis creates a system of hierarchy that 
relies on significant differences between male and female sexes. Similarly, Ivan Bloch 
relied on evolutionary language and progress narratives, declaring that men and women 
are different “species” (30). In these views, all men were above all women just as all 
humans were above all chimpanzees or rats (Bloch 30). Further confusing gender roles 
and characteristics (as well as sexual desire and behavior), Otto Weinenger in “Sex and 
Character” (1903) argues, “the female principle is…nothing more than sexuality; the 
male principle is sexual and something more” (25). Relying on Plato and Aristotle’s 
theories of gender hierarchy, Weinenger claims that “the male principle is the active 
agent, the female principle the passive matter on which the form is pressed…Woman is 
the material on which man acts…Woman is matter, is nothing” (27). Not only does 
Weinenger reduce biological sex to heterosexual relations, he also renders the female 
form as a lack. Female-bodied women in this formation are nonexistent without male-
bodied men.8  
In classifying sex characteristics, sexologists also documented “deviant” forms of 
sexuality: non-heterosexual, non-procreative, and overly carnal proclivities. Any activity 
that diverged from the norm was initially labeled “sex inversion.” By the early twentieth 
century, “sex inversion” became synonymous with what we now understand as 
homosexuality, “denoting a sexuality where sexual desire was directed towards a member 
of the same sex” (Doan and Waters 41). Nevertheless, Karl Heinrich Ulrichs’ 1864 
writings “gave rise to the paradigm of sexual inverts” as members of a “third” or 
“intermediate” sex “between male and female” (Terry 43, 16). In this discourse, 
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sexologists “collapsed” sex, gender, and sexuality (Terry 36). As Jennifer Terry shows, 
sex “inverts” who desired same sex partners were not rationalized as homosexual in the 
contemporary sense of the term; instead, sexologists imagined them as “characteristic of 
the ‘opposite’ sex” based on their abnormal “bodies, conduct, attitudes, tastes, and 
personalities” (35). Rather than theorize gender-diversity, sexologists aimed to assuage 
taboos surrounding homosexuality. If inverts’ brains did not match their bodies, then they 
in fact exhibited heterosexual tendencies in “mistaken” bodies: “for a woman to desire a 
woman sexually, she must have some male characteristics, and for a man to desire a man 
he must be, in some way, female” (Terry 35). Reinforcing heteronormativity, sexologists 
understood sex inverts as having been born in the wrong body.  
This inversion category was both liberating and constraining to those with same 
sex desires; though it proved to be a framework for understanding same sex desire as 
recognizable and viable, theories of inversion reinscribed homosexuality as abnormal, 
pathological, and, in some cases, criminal.9 Krafft-Ebing, for example, associated 
inversion with a “perversion…afflicted with pathologies of the will” (Terry 48). The 
most prominent theories of the time understood inversion as a symbol for “mental 
instability, and moral decadence” (Terry 50). Responding to Krafft-Ebing, Ellis assumed 
that same sex desire was a “predisposition developed in an individual’s early embryonic 
life” (Terry 50). At the same time, instead of imagining same sex desire as pathological, 
Ellis stressed the “moral fortitude of homosexual men and noted their superior artistic 
abilities and intelligence” (Terry 51).  
Though some sexologists attempted to rationalize sexual diversity and remove the 
stigma surrounding homosexuality, they actually reinforced the notion that one’s 
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anatomy determines one’s desire; in other words, individuals who desired same sex 
partners were heterosexual gender deviants. Ellis, Ulrichs, and Weininger argued that 
“the homosexual” was someone who “belonged to one sex as far as his or her body was 
concerned, but who belonged mentally and emotionally to the opposite sex” (Doan and 
Waters 43). Sexual inversion, then, was not a precursor to homosexuality but rather the 
predecessor to contemporary notions of transsexuality, in which one’s sex, rather than 
sexual desire, is inverted. Above all, sexologists rooted “inversion” in binary categories 
of man/woman, heterosexual/homosexual, and normal/abnormal.  
In one representative study, Ellis documents “Miss D.,” who he diagnoses as a 
“sexual invert.” Before an extensive narrative written by Miss D., Ellis introduces hir:  
Miss D., actively engaged in the practice of her profession, aged 40. 
Heredity good, nervous system sound, general health on the whole 
satisfactory. Development feminine but manner and movements somewhat 
boyish…Hips normal, nates small, sexual organs showing some 
approximation toward infantile type with large labia minora and probably 
small vagina. Tendency to development of hair on body and especially 
lower limbs. (91) 
Consistent with other case studies, of which there are hundreds, Ellis foregrounds Miss 
D.’s biological and anatomical characteristics over hir social roles and experiences. Using 
subjective and assumptive language (for example, “scanty” menstruation and “probably 
small vagina”), Ellis places himself as Miss D.’s decoder. Ellis sets out, above all, to 
diagnose Miss D. in order to rationalize her inability to fit into “normal” categories of sex 
and sexuality. His attention to superficial attributes underscores how culturally biased this 
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discourse was: though sexologists worked to establish sexology as a hard science (much 
as craniometry had been in the nineteenth century), sexologists invented sex and gender 
schema of the “normal” and then measured all patients in relation to it. In this way, Ellis 
and other sexologists enacted an epistemology of sexuality and gender that figured the 
individual as an object of study, which could be measured and evaluated based on 
morphological and psychological categories experts themselves created.  
Sexologists’ “research subjects,” however, sometimes resisted these theories 
based on their own subjective experience. For example, Miss D.’s personal narrative tells 
a radically different story, which does not foreground anatomy but, rather, identity and 
cultural gender roles:  
ever since I can remember anything at all I could never think of myself as 
a girl and I was in perpetual trouble…When I was 5 or 6 years old I began 
to say to myself that, whatever anyone said, if I was not a boy at any rate I 
was not a girl. This has been my unchanged conviction all through my 
life…When I could only crawl my absorbing interest was hammers and 
carpet-nails. Before I could walk I begged to be put on horses’ backs, so 
that I seem to have been born with the love of tools and animals which has 
never left me. (qtd. in Ellis 91) 
Miss D. bases hir self-understanding as a boy—or at least “not a girl”—on the fact that ze 
never desired to do stereotypically feminine activities. Though at one point in the 
narrative Miss D. writes of the “physical backwardness which nature, probably in mercy, 
bestowed,” ze at no other point mentions menstruation, body hair, hip or vagina size, or 
any of the other sex characteristics Ellis details (96). This discrepancy between “expert” 
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opinion and the patient’s narrative is a common feature in sexology. Although sexologists 
often printed patients’ unchanged narratives, they did not fully take them into account in 
their diagnoses and documentation. This practice of re-appropriating patients’ narratives 
continues in medical discourse today and is a topic to which I soon return.  
Furthermore, as Elizabeth Reis clarifies, historical understandings of individuals 
who displayed differences of sexual development (which we now understand as intersex) 
were also wrapped up in cultural constructions of homosexuality. If a patient’s body was 
typical but ze desired the “wrong” sex, then ze was thought to have an intersex brain. If a 
patient’s body was atypical in that hir “genital conformation” was “ambiguous,” ze was 
considered a “potential homosexua[l]” (Reis 55). This link between intersexuality and 
homosexuality increasingly allowed sexologists to “impose a genital conformation that 
suited their prejudices against same sex unions” by developing “surgical techniques” to 
“correct” patients’ bodies (Reis 56). Sexologists would later use these same surgical 
techniques to “correct” intersex infants and transsexual individuals. Relying on 
heterosexual mandates of penetrative sex, sexologists routinely inspected or guessed the 
genitals of their patients to determine their “true” sex (as Ellis does in reference to Miss 
D.’s “probably small vagina”). In this example, Ellis foregrounds Miss D.’s “probably 
small vagina” to rationalize hir masculine attributes as anatomical and to suggest that ze 
is incapable of engaging in heterosexual penetrative sex. In these ways, Ellis conflates 
sex, gender, sexuality, and anatomy to pathologize Miss D., whose body, desires, and 
social roles Ellis defined as culturally “abnormal.” 
 At the same time, theories of inversion cannot be separated from sexologists’ 
understandings of race and class. Many sexologists, Ellis included, believed that sex 
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inversion was rampant among “lower races” and “lower classes” (210). Others, like C.G. 
Seligmann, associated sex inversion with European and “Oriental luxury” or “advanced 
civilization” (213). Seligmann’s 1902 essay, “Sexual Inversion Among Primitive Races,” 
claims that “few details of sexual inversion and perversion are known among savages” 
because “primitive” peoples were so “uncontaminated by external influences that even 
white men’s diseases had not yet obtained a footing among them” (213-15). Seligmann’s 
use of “savage” emphasizes a colonial epistemology of selfhood and sexuality, which 
foregrounds detrimentally racist ideologies. As Kobena Mercer and Isaac Julien show, 
“the personage of the savage was developed as the Other of civilization and one of the 
first ‘proofs’ of this otherness was the nakedness of the savage, the visibility of its sex” 
(qtd. in Somerville 5). Whether sexologists associated inversion with Euro-American 
decadence or nonwhite “savagery,” inversion narratives relied heavily on individual 
sexologist’s assumptions of bodily value and cultural meaning. Sexologists’ accounts, 
whatever their intent, must be considered with intense skepticism for “each was 
inextricable from the ideological biases of the day” (Somerville 21). 
 In Queering the Color Line: Race and the Invention of Homosexuality in 
American Culture, Siobhan B. Somerville brilliantly documents how racial and sexual 
categories emerged concomitantly: “this early work in sexology, poised at the crossroads 
of anthropometry and psychoanalysis, illustrates the ways in which the development of 
new sexual categories was mediated by methodologies and conclusions borrowed from 
previous studies of racial difference” (10). Racialized postulations concerning the 
“heightened surveillance of bodies in a racially segregated culture demanded a specific 
kind of logic,” which was largely white supremacist (Somerville 10). As Somerville 
  
62 
explores, sexologists “othered” sex inverts and nonwhite people using similar tactics. The 
anatomical measurements sexologists gathered share a key assumption with the 
anatomical measurements “race crusaders” gathered: the body, in and of itself, is a 
classifiable text, with “various keys or languages available for reading its symbolic 
codes” (Somerville 23). Sexual and racial classifications, then as well as now, should not 
and cannot be separated. 
Further, class assumptions permeated sexology texts. For example, Dan Irving 
documents how early constructions of trans* and intersex bodies “exemplify the 
reciprocal relationship between economic regimes of accumulation and sex/gender 
categories” (18). Not only were sexologists concerned with anatomical “abnormalities” 
and racial characteristics, they were also concerned with their patients’ class, particularly 
in regards to their family’s “occupation and social status” (Irving 18). In the example of 
Miss D., Ellis begins hir case study by assuring the reader that Miss D. is “actively 
engaged in the practice of her profession” and that hir “heredity” is “good” (92). Other 
sexologists similarly focused on the capitalist productivity of their patients, displaying 
more negative views of those who were incapable of working or who had lower paying 
jobs. Sexologists disciplined gender-diverse individuals because they imagined them as 
non-productive citizens and social parasites who were incapable of “contribut[ing] to the 
growth, development, and global expansion of the domestic economy” (Irving 19).  
Even in case studies that feature wealthy, “productive” patients, sexologists 
tended to see them as more “valuable” if they did not act on their same sex desires or 
cross-gender identifications. Sexologists viewed inverts as “valuable” if they at least 
pretended to enjoy reproductive sex and identified as the sex assigned to them at birth. 
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Consistently focusing on the invert’s “dependency”—on parents, extended family, 
friends, or even alcohol and drugs—sexologists firmly linked cross-gender identification 
with an inability to achieve capitalistic independence or American morality: “Within a 
heteronormative capitalist society organized around binary sex/gender and exploitative 
labor relations, transsexuality did not work” (Irving 22). 
In relation to their racist and classist undertones, inversion narratives of the early 
twentieth century clearly inform later articulations of transsexuality, which Harry 
Benjamin and others voiced in the late 1940s and ‘50s. Sexology case studies, which 
narrativize inversion, subsequently “enabled transgendered subjects to speak their stories 
and give transgendered shape to their lives” (Prosser and Storr 75). At the same time, 
inversion narratives of the turn of the twentieth century influenced some trans* people to 
try to “convince physicians that they were, in fact, intersexed, so that they could get the 
surgery and hormones that they wanted to effect gender reassignment” (Reis 203). Even 
today, Reis argues, “there is a growing contingent of transsexuals who take the position 
that their intersex condition is invisible because something atypical in their brain 
necessitates the need for transsexual surgery” (203). Narration of one’s life history 
became and continues to be a key function of transsexuality.  
Individuals who identify in gender-diverse ways are agents of a particular kind of 
knowledge and yet, at the same time, claiming an identity “places” the individual in a 
system of classification and control. As Michel Foucault clarifies, “the truthful 
confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power” 
(59). “Through a clinical codification of the inducement to speak” (Foucault 65), the 
confession “I feel like a man” or “I am a man” would become the symptom of 
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transsexuality, “the sex changing of the body utterly dependent on such narrativization” 
(Prosser and Storr 75). Because current cultural understandings of trans* identity 
continue to use sexology’s tenets, contemporary trans* narratives repeat these liberating 
yet constraining tensions.  
 
Contemporary Medical Legitimation Discourses  
Though current trans* epistemologies do not solely rely on the pathological 
rhetoric of the previous century, twenty-first century medical legitimation discourses 
continue to echo these frameworks. Because the U.S. medical establishment “enforces the 
duality of gender through definitive sex assignment, intersex sexual assignment surgeries, 
and reliance on the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care,” there are few “alternative 
options” (Green 236). The Standards of Care (SOC), more aptly called the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health’s (WPATH) “Standards of Care for the 
Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender Nonconforming People,” is a 110-page 
document that therapists, surgeons, social workers, and doctors consult when making 
decisions that affect trans* individuals’ health care. WPATH, an international group that 
consists of thirty-four scholars, determines when and why doctors should grant trans* 
people access to hormone therapy, surgery, puberty inhibitors, reproductive options, and 
other forms of bodywork. Though WPATH specifies that the SOC are “based on the best 
available science and expert professional consensus,” it is unclear whether members 
themselves identify as trans* (1).  
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Throughout the SOC, WPATH touts its respect for trans* individuals yet 
consistently uses passive and pathological language to describe trans* patients. For 
example, WPATH outlines its “principles,” the first three of which ask professionals to:  
exhibit respect for patients with nonconforming gender identities (do not 
pathologize differences in gender identity or expression); provide 
care…that affirms patients’ gender identities and reduces the distress of 
gender dysphoria…[and] become knowledgeable about the health care 
needs of transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people, 
including the benefits and risks of treatment options. (5) 
Within the same breath, WPATH asks professionals to not “pathologize differences” and, 
at the same time, incites professionals to “reduc[e] the distress of gender dysphoria” (5), 
which is by definition a pathology as outlined in the most recent Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V). WPATH places medical practitioners 
in an impossible position: doctors must document a diagnosis and yet not pathologize that 
diagnosis. Though the SOC indicate that trans* people experience “symptoms” that are 
“socially induced” and “not inherent,” WPATH relies on the DSM-V to argue that a 
“cure” is “medically necessary,” thereby reinforcing clinical trans* epistemologies (4-7). 
A clinical trans* epistemology, then, is one that exclusively understands trans* people 
through pathological and scientific frameworks. Trans* people who fall outside these 
frameworks are thus suspicious or invalid. 
 Furthermore, within a clinical trans* epistemology, though “decisions about 
hormones” are “first and foremost a client’s decision,” the detailed and restrictive 
“eligibility” requirements WPATH outlines suggest otherwise (26).10 Some of these 
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guidelines are as follows: before a professional can prescribe hormones, patients must see 
a therapist and receive a Gender Dysphoria (GD) diagnosis as listed in the DSM-V. Based 
on these referrals, professionals must “assess eligibility” of clients based on “identifying 
characteristics,” the “referring health professional’s relationship with the client…[and] 
the clinical rationale for supporting the client’s request” (WPATH 26). Individuals who 
wish to medically transition must explicitly indicate that they will shift to the “opposite” 
sex and remain that sex thereafter. In addition, to qualify for GRS, which WPATH 
defines as “effective and medically necessary,” an individual must “liv[e] in a gender role 
that is congruent with their gender identity,” and receive hormones for a period of twelve 
months (54-60).11 WPATH specifies that health professionals should “clearly document a 
patient’s experience in the gender role in the medical chart, including the start date of 
living full time for those who are preparing for genital surgery” (61). In some situations, 
if needed, health professionals may “request verification that this criterion has been 
fulfilled” (WPATH 61). In light of these restrictions, trans* people who do not want 
surgery or who identify in non-binary ways must lie to therapists if they choose to seek 
bodywork. 
 Because the SOC outline what doctors should do and what patients have to do, C. 
Jacob Hale argues that WPATH sidesteps the American Medical Association’s ethical 
treatment requirements: “respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice” (“Ethical Problems” 492-94). By specifying how trans* individuals should 
identify so that they can receive “medically necessary” care, WPATH subjects trans* 
patients to standards “that no other class of prospective patients is subjected to” (Hale, 
“Ethical Problems” 493). In this way, doctors grant trans* individuals “far less 
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autonomy” than any other category of adult patients, which—above all else—is an 
inherently unjust practice (Hale, “Ethical Problems” 493).  
 These intrinsic contradictions underscore the ambivalence at the root of the SOC 
and, detrimentally, at the root of trans* health care. WPATH’s recommendations are 
suspicious of trans* people as experts of their own identities and bodies. WPATH 
consistently universalizes the conception that trans* individuals exist within incorrect or 
“wrong” bodies and thus because their identities cannot change, their bodies must. This 
alienating narrative disregards the important social aspects of trans* experience, 
particularly for trans* women who negotiate a binary gender system in which maleness 
and masculinity are more highly valued than femaleness and femininity. What’s more, 
the medical distinction between mind and body “presupposes a self that is claimed as the 
authentic core of being,” which disregards the importance of phenomenological 
understanding experienced through and with one’s body (Sullivan 107). Inherently, like 
early sexology texts, the SOC divide people by category, emphasize how bodies should 
be fixed to conform to cultural (rather than scientific) standards, and condemn those who 
do not or cannot succeed.    
 At the root of the SOC, WPATH encourages practitioners to be cautious of trans* 
individuals’ claims, even going so far as to note that professionals “may communicate 
with individuals who have related to the patient in an identity-congruent gender role, or 
request documentation of a legal name and/or gender marker change” (61). Even if 
mental health practitioners do not follow these guidelines, they are still encouraged to 
determine “whether gender variant prospective patients should be allowed to act on their 
decisions” (Hale, “Ethical Problems” 502). In this way, providers are allowed to break 
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the client’s trust in order to find out if ze is “telling the truth.” Hale argues that these 
standards “violat[e] the principle of respect for autonomy,” since practitioners can breach 
confidentiality standards by seeking information from patients’ friends and family who 
may or may not know about (let alone support) the patient’s transition (“Ethical 
Problems” 491). Moreover, these provisions do not take into account the fact that some 
people cannot cross-live without fear of violence, harassment, loss of employment, 
housing, or child custody, and other extenuating circumstances that may or may not relate 
to identifying as trans*.  
 To be sure, part of the reason why WPATH pathologizes trans* individuals is due 
to the fact that the DSM-V includes Gender Dysphoria (GD) – previously called Gender 
Identity Disorder (GID) in the DSM-IV – in its diagnoses, even after widespread debate 
over its inclusion. In the DSM-V, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) makes 
several changes to the previous diagnosis: the APA characterizes GD as a disorder that 
produces “strong desires to be treated as the other gender or to be rid of one’s sex 
characteristics” (17), whereas the APA characterized GID as “the desire to be, or the 
insistence that one is, of the other sex” (576). By specifying gender as opposed to sex—
and separating gender from “sex characteristics”—the APA takes one small step towards 
understanding gender as a spectrum rather than a binary. Still, the APA fails to explicitly 
define sex and gender distinctions and thus the change—however productive—does not 
rightfully educate potentially ignorant practitioners. In both diagnoses, though the 
language shifts, the “symptoms” rely on rigid assumptions, particularly in regard to ideal 
gender roles. The APA maintains that “removing stigma” is an important reason why 
Gender Dysphoria—a “more appropriate and consistent” term that “removes the 
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connotation that the patient is ‘disordered’” replaced Gender Identity Disorder (576). 
Though this goal is laudable, the DSM-V continues to pathologize trans* people; no 
matter what the clinical title, the APA reinforces a medicalized understanding of trans* 
identity as abnormal yet treatable.12  
 Though WPATH suggests that GD causes or characterizes trans* identity, GD 
and trans* identity are separate understandings of gender diversity. Individuals who 
experience GD tend to feel persistent, long-term distress due to their inability to inhabit 
prescribed gender norms. An individual who experiences GD often seeks medical care to 
hormonally and surgically alter hir body so that it is more in line with hir sense of self. 
To be sure, some trans* people experience GD and, in these cases, medical intervention 
is a rightful response. Nevertheless, many trans* people never or rarely experience 
distress based on gender. Some trans* individuals celebrate their gender and do not 
believe that medical intervention is necessary or even effective. Because WPATH doesn’t 
separate GD from trans* identity, the SOC suggest that trans* people more often than not 
experience discomfort and psychological trauma. Conflating trans* identity and GD, 
WPATH encourages practitioners to pathologize those who do not fit contemporary 
conceptions of “normal” gender even if they do not experience symptoms of GD. 
 Many trans* people choose not to follow the SOC by socially transitioning but 
not medically altering the body. For instance, some trans* people choose not to medically 
transition to maintain fertility so as to have children of their own. Some trans* men 
maintain that they do not want to lose their hair by ingesting testosterone, since hair is an 
important aspect of identity. Some trans* men like their breasts and the pleasure they 
experience through them and do not want to risk losing this feeling post-surgery. Some 
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trans* people of all identifications—men, women, and non-binary—find pleasure in the 
genitals they have and do not desire to alter them to fit cultural assumptions, even if they 
identify as a gender that does not correlate with their anatomy. Others cite the 
undeveloped skills of surgeons in fashioning penises that may or may not be able to get 
hard or penetrate, if so desired. Some trans* people begin hormone treatments and later 
choose to lower the dose or go off treatment altogether, citing a plethora of reasons from 
depression and financial burden to queer or trans* invisibility. All of these and many 
other factors contribute to whether trans* people choose to seek medical care and one 
narrative or interpretation should not be valued over any other.13 
 Further, the SOC are built around specific ideologies, which may or may not 
relate to the views of the practitioners who use them. Undoubtedly, medical professionals 
do not inflexibly follow these requirements, especially in relation to recommendations 
that encourage doctors to “verify” a patient’s ability to pass as the “other” gender. Many 
physicians rightfully view the SOC as suggested principles rather than required mandates 
and help their patients in whatever way they see fit, even if that means that they abandon 
WPATH’s guidelines. In my critiques of the SOC and DSM-V, I am not suggesting that 
individual doctors who treat trans* patients are responsible for perpetuating trans* 
oppression. Rather, the medical establishment’s sexist, racist, ableist, and classist 
ideologies are responsible for disenfranchising and unethically treating trans*, nonwhite, 
poor, and disabled people. 
 At the same time, not all trans* people see these medical mandates as negative. 
Many trans* people find the SOC to be a beneficial document that lays out trans* health 
care practices, which have for so long been opaque and unreachable, particularly for 
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patients who are not upper class, white, and heterosexual. Some trans* people find value 
in receiving a diagnosis that helps them explain (to others and/or to themselves) their 
experiences and feelings in clearer ways. Some trans* people find solace in being able to 
tell friends, family, and coworkers that their discontent comes from researched criteria 
developed by medical experts, which advises cross-living, hormone treatment, and 
surgery. The SOC and DSM-V sanction easier access to bodywork, particularly in the 
states that allow insurance companies to cover or partially pay for these expenses. 
Disregarding these responses also erases poor trans* people and trans* people who live in 
rural areas who would not otherwise be able to access the care they need. At the same 
time, some trans* people critique WPATH’s health care directives yet support doctors’ 
practices, particularly for individuals who seek bodywork to feel more comfortable in 
social situations. To say that the SOC and DSM-V are always detrimental or limiting does 
not take into account the diverse and wide-ranging responses trans* people exhibit.  
 I emphasize the problems associated with the SOC so as to open up more 
possibilities for trans* existence. Because the SOC act as a barrier to self-identification 
and self-fashioning outside of the gender binary, and because the SOC limit who has 
access to medical care, WPATH does not significantly address the diversity of trans* 
lives. Essentially, WPATH erases trans* individuals who do not desire bodywork but 
who want to (or need to) legally change their names and gender classifications. Above 
all, trans* people should be able to take hormones, receive surgery, and legally change 
names and genders without rigid procedures that sometimes give practitioners more 
control than is medically necessarily.   
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 Because of their widespread impact, we need to question medical discourses that 
pathologize trans* identity. Why do contemporary U.S. medical epistemologies 
understand trans* identity as an abnormality in need of fixing when so many trans* 
people narrate their experiences in alternative ways? How might cultural, legal, and 
political understandings of trans* identity shift if WPATH and the APA categorized 
trans* people as gender-diverse rather than gender-deviant? How might trans* health care 
improve if WPATH rearticulated gender as a spectrum rather than a binary? Taking into 
account the very real need for trans* health care mandates, particularly for those who 
seek hormone therapy and surgery, how might medical discourses reimagine gender 
diversity in ways that do not normalize heterosexuality and sex/gender congruence nor 
minimize the cultural aspects of trans* identity? 
 As I will discuss in Chapters III-V, in response to medical legitimation discourses, 
many contemporary trans* life writers reclaim agency by identifying in ways that 
depathologize and celebrate trans* identity. Many trans* life writers blatantly defy the 
SOC in narrative and in practice. Others submit to the medical model’s normalizing gaze 
yet subvert the gaze back onto itself, illuminating the contradictions within an institution 
that relies on “fixing” trans* bodies that are not biologically disordered. Through these 
simple yet profound tactics, many contemporary trans* filmmakers, autobiographers, and 
digital storytellers claim radical epistemologies of trans* identity. 
 Since contemporary U.S. culture glorifies medical knowledge as objective and 
universal, medical epistemologies infiltrate and influence all realms of life. Medical 
discourse impacts a wider cultural landscape than the doctor’s office, hospital, or clinic 
can encompass. In other words, WPATH’s recommendations and the APA’s inclusion of 
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GD affect all trans* individuals, whether or not they request bodywork. At the same time, 
these medical discourses affect nontrans* individuals as well by constricting cultural 
understanding of what gender is and could be. One common theme, for example, which 
appears in both medical literature and popular media is an emphasis on trans* bodies to 
the detriment of trans* epistemologies. By emphasizing bodies, medical discourse and 
popular media reinforce trans* people as objects who exist for nontrans* consumers. In 
medical and popular representations, trans* people have the “added incitement to show” 
and not just to speak, if they are allowed to speak at all (Heaney 18). To more fully 
illuminate how medical conceptions filter into media depictions, in the next section I 
explore an outdated though popular documentary film, Let Me Die a Woman. Though Let 
Me Die was produced in 1978, many of the ideologies it incorporates continue in quieter 
or hidden forms within contemporary representations of trans* lives. 
 
Let Me Die a Woman: How Medical Ideologies Filter into Media Texts  
Though many films and independent productions before 1978 include trans* 
characters and themes, Doris Wishman’s cult classic, Let Me Die a Woman, was the first 
documentary to do so. Though Let Me Die tries to represent trans* identity, it instead 
shows how medical professionals appropriate trans* people’s stories. This film 
documents how doctors “fix” trans* bodies to be more in line with what a cisgender, 
heteronormative, white, middle class audience finds comforting. Following the 
exploitative history of trans* treatment and representation in U.S. public discourse, Let 
Me Die literally and figuratively uses “trans bodies for display as though there was 
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something to be learned simply by looking” and renders medical discourse the be-all and 
end-all of trans* identity (Heaney 17).14  
Dubbed a “proto-documentary” and “exploitation film,” Let Me Die includes 
several interviews with Deborah Hartin, a transsexual woman who recently underwent 
GRS, interspersed with sex change doctor Leo Wollman’s views of transsexuality, his 
“patients’” stories (re-told through Wollman), semi-explicit pornographic scenes, and 
sensational surgery footage. Throughout the film, Wollman equates trans* identity with 
anatomy, confuses sex, gender, and sexuality (not unlike sexologists a century ago and 
WPATH today), and routinely asks his patients to disrobe so that he may display various 
parts of their bodies for viewers. Because of these tactics, the trans* individuals in the 
film become interchangeable bodies with no personal narrative.  
Let Me Die suggests that transsexuality is a unified category with particular rules 
and outcomes that are, above all, determined by experts like Wollman. The film tellingly 
begins with the image of Hartin, a feminine, conventionally beautiful Puerto Rican-
American trans* woman, as she wakes in her bed (see Image 2.1), stands in front of a 
mirror topless, and then dresses (see Image 2.2). Hartin’s soft, breathy voice narrates the 
scene: she explains that she “loves her life” as a woman and “loves clothes,” as if these 
two aspects of her identity are one and the same or, at the least, that being a woman 
means paying particular attention to appearances. Hartin sits down to paint her nails and 
slowly applies makeup (see Images 2.3 and 2.4). Hartin’s narration continues: “last year, 
I was a man.” She resumes gazing at herself in the mirror when a male voice—which we 
later understand to be Wollman’s—interrupts her and the scene shifts to disjointed 
images of Greek statues, paintings, 1950s photography, and children playing in the park. 
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Wollman explains, “we are male or female…but perhaps it is not that simple. Imagine if 
you will, being a man trapped in the body of a woman…before this, anatomy was destiny 
[but] we have made genetic men into real women.” As Wollman’s voice speaks, Hartin 
again appears onscreen reading a magazine; she touches her pleated skirt, fiddles with her 
hair, and looks at her newly painted nails. These images of Hartin’s silent attention to her 
appearance, paired with Wollman’s direct address to a clueless nontrans* audience, 
trivializes Hartin’s identity as a woman and, at the same time, casts doubt on what it 
means to be a “real” woman in 1970s U.S. culture. 
 
 
Image 2.1: In Let Me Die a Woman, Hartin wakes up in a see-through nightie. 
 
 
 
Image 2.2: In the opening sequence of Let Me Die a Woman, a topless Hartin gets 
dressed for the camera. 
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Image 2.3: In the opening sequence of Let Me Die a Woman, Hartin paints her nails. 
 
 
 
Image 2.4: In the opening sequence of Let Me Die a Woman, Hartin applies lipstick. 
 
 
The emphasis on Wollman as the ultimate narrator who is more capable of 
understanding transsexuality than those who experience its “symptoms” sets a medical, 
colonial tone to an otherwise experimental film. When Wollman’s voice eclipses 
Hartin’s, the documentary becomes justifiably his narrative, not hers. He is, after all, the 
“expert,” which the film clarifies over and over again; in later scenes, Wollman lectures 
in front of a room of trans* individuals about what it means to transition and what “they” 
should be doing to prepare. He does not let these individuals speak their own truths, but 
instead he projects his views of transsexuality onto them somewhat indiscriminately. 
Though he differentiates between trans* women and trans* men, he still “others” all 
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trans* people as “disordered” and in need of his intervention. This scene’s setting and 
Wollman’s comportment reinforces his control over trans* “patients”: wearing black 
slacks, a white shirt, black tie, and a doctor’s lab coat, he stands at the head of the room 
in front of a wall full of what appear to be his ornately framed medical degrees (see 
Image 2.5). The looming degrees visible in all shots of him reinforce his higher status in 
relation to his trans* listeners. In other scenes, the camera consistently places him in the 
center of the screen, even when this practice causes his trans* patients to be cut out of the 
frame. He is often the only one standing, even when he is alone in his office, which 
further reinforces his patriarchal, figurehead status. These scenes clarify Wollman as the 
ultimate narrator and gatekeeper who has the power to decide trans* people’s fates 
through a medical logic that relies on hierarchical understandings of knowledge.15 
 
 
Image 2.5: In Let Me Die a Woman, Dr. Leo Wollman lectures his “boys and girls” while 
standing in front of a wall filled with his medical and psychiatric degrees. 
 
As the documentary progresses, several pornographic scenes feature trans* 
women (who Wollman calls “male transsexuals,” a term that highlights anatomical 
characteristics rather than preferred identity) engaged in sexual acts with nontrans* men. 
Early in the film, Wollman describes two individuals having sex: “here is a man and 
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another man who thinks he is a woman,” he drones. In actuality, one of these individuals 
is not a man but a trans* woman who has feminized her body through breast enlargement 
surgery and estrogen therapy but who has not undergone GRS. As these individuals 
embrace, the camera zooms in on the trans* woman’s penis next to her male partner’s 
(see Image 2.6). Wollman’s voice explains: the “penis and testicles of both are clearly 
shown.” In other frames, the trans* woman’s scrotum is clearly visible (see Image 2.7). 
Dramatic music amplifies the sense that these images in relation to the sex acts that are 
taking place are supposed to disturb or perplex the viewer. After the camera zooms in on 
the trans* woman’s penis, her partner is shown sucking her nipples as her head falls on 
the pillow and she emits a pleasurable sigh. Immediately after, the camera again zooms in 
to focus on her genitals and the accompanying music reaches a screeching high note. This 
scene’s emphasis on the penis of a socially perceived woman reinforces Wollman’s and 
the film’s view that she is really a man—or at least, really male—after all. She is really a 
man, that is, unless Wollman intervenes to produce a “real, heterosexual woman” of her, 
as he later does onscreen in the first ever recorded GRS operation. 
 
 
Image 2.6: In Let Me Die a Woman, a trans* woman and nontrans* man engage in sex 
acts as Wollman narrates. 
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Image 2.7: In Let Me Die a Woman, the camera emphasizes a trans* woman’s genitals as 
she kisses her partner. 
 
 
Consistent with the above scene, Let Me Die regularly shows trans* women’s 
naked bodies to emphasize that one’s body reveals the “truth” behind one’s identity. For 
example, after the sex scene, the same trans* woman takes a shower. She soaps her body, 
rubbing her hands up and over her breasts to her face. The camera lingers on her breasts 
then her typically male genitals and then back to her face; her eyes close and her mouth 
parts, suggesting a moment of pleasure (see Images 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10). She is a 
contradictory though sexualized trans* body with no personal narrative.  
 
 
Image 2.8: In Let Me Die a Woman, a trans* woman is shown in the shower as she soaps 
her feminine body. 
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Image 2.9: In the same sequence in Let Me Die a Woman, the camera lingers for several 
seconds on a trans* woman’s male-typical genitals. 
 
 
 
Image 2.10: After the camera moves from her body to her genitals, it zooms in on her 
face in a moment of pleasure.  
 
These unsettling scenes, which depict trans* women engaged in sexual acts, 
undressing or getting dressed, and experiencing pleasuring (specifically as the backdrop 
for Wollman’s narration), illuminate injurious medical theories that pathologize trans* 
women as parasitic homosexual men or sex-craved heterosexual women. According to 
Ray Blanchard and J. Michael Bailey, trans* women fall into one of two categories: the 
homosexual, who seeks GRS to attract heterosexual men’s desire, and the autogynephilic, 
who seeks GRS because ze is supposedly aroused at the idea of occupying (and touching 
hir own) normatively feminine body.16 Reinscribing sexological ideologies, Blanchard 
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and Bailey render trans* women as sexually deviant and perverse males whose bodies 
“betray” their true selves. Let Me Die similarly imagines trans* women as exhibiting 
sexual abnormalities, which are literally written on and through their bodies as they touch 
themselves and are touched by men. In another alarming scene, Wollman examines a 
black trans* woman’s body (whom he calls Angela) using a pointer stick. He points to 
Angela’s body parts—her small breasts, genitals, and buttocks—while commenting on 
how her body has changed due to hormone therapy (see Image 2.11). Again, the camera 
lingers on Angela’s genitals as Wollman uses the pointer to touch her penis, pushing it to 
one side to reveal her testicles (see Image 2.12). The camera remains as Wollman 
explains that her “scrotum is normal in size” though she is “clearly not circumcised.” Not 
once in this scene does the camera show Angela’s face and Angela never speaks. She is 
simply a black trans* body that exists for Wollman’s objectification. This scene is 
completely unnecessary; not only does it reference sexology’s extensive racist history 
(tellingly, in a similar scene with a white trans* woman, Wollman does not use a pointer 
stick nor emphasize the white trans* woman’s testicles), it also reinforces the notion that 
nonwhite trans* bodies are incapable of subjectivity without expert explanation.  
 
 
Image 2.11: In Let Me Die a Woman, Wollman examines Angela’s developing breasts. 
  
82 
 
 
Image 2.12: In the same scene in Let Me Die a Woman, Wollman examines Angela’s 
penis and testicles. 
 
 
At the same time, Wollman refers to his patients as “his girls and boys” and 
consistently emphasizes his empathic desires to “help” them in any way he can. In these 
contradictory ways, the film places Wollman as both the caretaker and gatekeeper of 
trans* lives; he is the ultimate good Samaritan who must “rectify” God’s mistakes, which 
are literally written on the body of his infantilized patients. Because he later performs 
GRS onscreen, the film suggests that Wollman saves his patients from ultimate doom by 
correcting their abnormal and pathological bodies. Let Me Die encourages viewers to 
celebrate Wollman rather than his trans* patients. 
Unfortunately, I do not highlight this film as an exception to the contemporary 
rule or as an outdated paradigm. Though trans* politics became an increasingly common 
issue within documentary films post-1978, many of Let Me Die’s themes continue to 
flourish. Subsequent documentaries use similar tactics of medical narration, situation re-
enactment (in which doctors but not patients speak), and cinema verité-style 
representation to pathologize yet universalize trans* experience. As polyvocal as trans* 
representations in documentary films are, a majority of the more than seventy-five films 
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produced after 1978 tell a conservative, medical story that emphasizes trans* bodies over 
trans* epistemologies or narratives. For example, the independently produced film 100% 
Woman: The Story of Michelle Dumaresq (2005) focuses on Dumaresq’s struggles to 
become Canada’s fastest downhill mountain biker. The documentary effectively expands 
the wrong body narrative to focus on issues other than Dumaresq’s status as a trans* 
woman, includes interviews with her supportive friends, and shows her parents as 
knowledgeable allies who talk about how proud they are her achievements. Dumaresq 
discusses her biking techniques and upcoming races with no attention to the added strain 
of being visible as trans* in the women’s biking world.  
Nevertheless, the film’s narrator, a voice that is not Dumaresq’s, uses a wrong 
body explanation for her trans* identity to show how her outraged competitors are 
incorrect in their argument that she is not “really” a woman. As the DVD’s back cover 
clarifies, the interviewees express a range of emotions, “from confused ambivalence to a 
belief that Dumaresq is male and should be barred from competing.” This emphasis on 
Dumaresq’s sex and body (which her competitors argue is male) reinforces the notion 
that her “original” body contradicts her identification as a woman. The transphobic 
tirades her competitors eschew force a response from Dumaresq: after explaining that she 
has “always felt female,” she goes on to say, “how do you describe identity? You just 
know.” While this documentary complicates medical legitimation discourses, like most 
other contemporary representations of trans* people, it nevertheless reinforces the wrong 
body narrative’s normalizing tenets. The detrimental filmic depictions in Let Me Die and 
100% Woman, among dozens of others, suggest that trans* individuals (particularly 
trans* women) are medical objects of study who are not allowed to speak for themselves.  
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Reconceptualizing Dominant Discourses  
Two key systems—the medical model and popular media—contextualize the 
horizon of possibilities open to trans* people who wish to write, film, and represent their 
lives. As Kate Bornstein reasons, trans* life narratives may represent “capitulation” to 
these systems, since autobiography is the “only genre” trans* people are able to write 
“and get published” (Gender Outlaw 12). To be sure, trans* life writers who do not 
acknowledge medical and media discourses—in subversive or promotional ways—risk 
unintelligibility. At the same time, “individuals rely on institutions…to exercise self-
determination with respect to what body and what gender to have and maintain, so that 
self-determination becomes a plausible concept only in the context of a social world that 
supports and enables that exercise of agency” (Butler, Undoing Gender 7). Calling 
attention to dominant epistemologies does not necessarily mean that trans* life writers 
relinquish power over their narratives; instead, by acknowledging how dominant 
narratives influence their lives, trans* writers undermine the control these governing 
systems can have and create new ways to narrate a trans* life. Addressing yet subverting 
dominant epistemologies, contemporary trans* life writers begin to articulate radical 
understandings of gender. In Chapters III, IV, and V, I analyze how trans* life narratives 
reconceptualize yet rely on the medical and media narratives I discuss above.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Jorgenson’s autobiography clarifies that she loathed her public existence; her 
autobiography, in a sense, encourages scholars and journalists to stop sensationalizing her 
story, to discontinue representing her as the representative transsexual woman. In her 
words, Jorgenson saw her gender change as a “transition to normalcy,” rather than an 
identification with trans* politics or even trans* identity (72). Reporters, doctors, and 
scholars, in their continual outing of her, did not allow that reality to come to fruition. 
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2 Many other languages do not rely on gendered pronouns; for instance, Korean speakers 
do not use gendered pronouns but instead rely on meaning based on context. Finnish 
lacks gendered pronouns and any discernible “grammatical gender” (Wikipedia 2014).  
 
3 The definitions Roen uses are the most common definitions in trans* theory even 
though they may not be the most productive. Roen describes transgenderism as “referring 
to a political positioning that draws from postmodern notions of fluidity (for both bodies 
and genders)” (501). Transsexuality, then, can be understood “in more modernist terms, 
as a (psychiatrically defined) state of being that assumes the preexistence of two sexes 
between which one may transition” (Roen 502). These definitions are confining and 
problematic to historical and contemporary negotiations of gender. 
 
4 Though I admit that it is not possible to reject the gender binary altogether (specifically 
for those of us who identify as transsexual or as men or women post-transition), it is 
imperative that I stress the fact that transsexual and transgender identities are both viable 
and political in and of the fact that they resist normative understandings of gender; to 
reroute these debates, as I outline in Chapter I, I use trans* to bridge divides between 
identity terms and develop broad-based solidarity projects, not to flatten out the lived 
realities of individuals who adopt these varying identities. 
 
5 However, though Stryker offers transgender as “phenomena,” she goes on to illuminate 
how trans* lives are not “abstract” (“Transgender Feminism” 67). Through transgender, 
Stryker “articulates” many gender-diverse lived realities: “misogyny, homophobia, 
racism, looksism, disability, medical colonization, coercive psychiatrization, 
undocumented labor, border control, state surveillance, population profiling, the prison-
industrial complex, employment discrimination, housing discrimination, lack of health 
care, denial of access to social services, and violent hate crimes” (“Transgender 
Feminism” 67). Trans* topics are everyone’s topics, Stryker argues: “It is one of your 
issues” no matter who you are (“Transgender Feminism” 67). 
 
6 “Ideal,” in contrast, which was in use since at least the seventeenth century, connoted 
“divine” properties or “unreachable” bodies—in other words, ones that “can never be 
found in this world” (Davis 10). In modern conceptions, “normal” falls more to 
connotations of “average” whereas “ideals” are traits we imagine as reachable and, in 
fact, must be reachable for our economy to continue. With the advent of modern 
technology, heightened beauty ideals, and individualization of neoliberal ideals, perhaps 
the “ideal” was marketed, in a sense, as the new normal.  
 
7 Because trans* people fell outside “normal” constructions, sexologists concluded that 
gender-diverse people were in need of both help and extermination. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, early statisticians were also eugenicists who used their data to pinpoint 
those they considered to be “evolutionary defectives” (Davis 15). Ruth Hubbard explains 
the scientific underpinnings of the eugenics movement, which later helped justify the 
mass extermination of all “undesirables” in Germany, including those who were gender 
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or sexual “abnormals” (188-92). Eugenics, as a school of thought, sought justification for 
racial, sexual, criminal, and ability-related discrimination and extermination. Constructed 
in positive language, early movements appealed to the importance of the “social good” 
and the “alleviation” of suffering (Hubbard 189). In Europe, scientists developed the 
“selection and eradication” process for the “destruction of lives not worth living,” a 
category which included those who did not fit standards of gender conformity or 
reproductive capacity (Hubbard 194). Doctors were forced to turn in the names of their 
disabled and/or gender-diverse patients so that they could be forcibly removed from their 
homes, bussed to extermination centers or mental institutes, and killed (Hubbard 194). 
These horrific historical realities were made possible through social constructions of 
gender-diverse people as sinful, deviant, and inhuman. 
 
8 These arguments are consistent with other sexology texts of the era, which relied on 
binary conceptions of bodies and identities, and concurrently understood females as 
incapable and unimportant. In this dual understanding, those who fall outside of 
normative sex or gender constructs threaten the entire system upon which these norms 
exist. Individuals whose bodies have a vagina, uterus, and breasts yet whose gender roles 
do not correspond with the category “woman,” in Weinengen’s understanding, are worse 
than passively nonexistent entities—they are deviant and must be eradicated through 
pathological indictments and criminal rhetoric.  
 
9 Following several court cases such as the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 in 
Britain and the “sensational trials of Oscar Wilde” in 1895, sexologists attempted to 
counter claims that homosexuality between men was a depraved choice that an immoral 
or unreasonable person makes but rather “an innate, congenital condition over which the 
individual had little control” (Doan and Waters 42). 
 
10 A new alternative to this type of “traditional” care is becoming more available 
throughout the U.S., though it is not yet recognized by WPATH. Alternative care clinics 
like Chicago’s Howard Brown use “Transgender Hormone Informed Consent” models. 
According to Shay O’Reilly, at these clinics trans* patients can obtain a hormone 
prescription after “basic laboratory tests, a consultation about hormonal effects, and 
signing a waiver stating that they know the risks of treatment.” Cutting out the 
“gatekeeper,” these clinics offer self-actualization for many patients who would not 
otherwise be able to receive hormones or who would feel victimized by a process that 
forces them to jump through “medical hoops” (O’Reilly). Though Informed Consent 
clinics and providers represent a new and exciting moment in trans* health care, this 
model is still not the dominant nor suggested model. Nevertheless, I am incredibly 
excited to see how future narratives written by trans* people who experience Informed 
Consent care might change in even more radical ways. 
 
11 Further, clients must also receive recommendations from current therapists. In granting 
permission, therapists must assess the individual’s ability to hold a job or go to school, 
function in the community, and adequately “pass” as the new gender. To get one’s sex 
changed on a birth certificate or social security card (and also be seen this way in the eyes 
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of the law and judicial system), one has to live as the “opposite” sex for a period of two 
years and receive hormone therapy. 
 
12 See, for example, these well researched arguments surrounding the inclusion of Gender 
Dysphoria in the DSM-V: Randall D. Ehrbar’s “Consensus from Differences: Lack of 
Professional Consensus on the Retention of the Gender Identity Disorder Diagnosis” and 
Jack Drescher’s “Conference Proceedings ‘In or Out?’: A Discussion about Gender 
Identity Diagnoses and the DSM.”  
 
13 Anti-medical discourse tends to have a clear-cut outcome: the APA should abandon 
GD as a disorder, health care practitioners should support all individuals who desire 
trans* care no matter what the patients’ “symptoms,” and cultural narratives should 
stringently separate trans* identity from historical, medical models that label trans* 
people as abnormal. These are procedural and political outcomes, which can be 
measured. It is no surprise, then, that many trans* individuals oppose medical 
legitimation discourses created by WPATH. 
 
14 At the same time, Let Me Die was the first of its kind – not only was transsexuality a 
controversial topic to cover in a documentary format in 1978, the film also addressed the 
lack of medical care trans* individuals experience, which dozens of documentaries 
subsequently took up. Though its use of pronouns, categories, and images are erroneous, 
if not downright ridiculous, it nevertheless sets the tone for observational trans* 
representation in documentary film, which I analyze in depth in Chapter III.  
 
15 The idea of psychiatrists and doctors as “gatekeepers” has been a long-established idea 
in trans* people’s responses to health care. Gatekeepers are individuals, as specified in 
the SOC and DSM, who have the ability to decide which trans* people receive access to 
hormone therapy, surgery, and other desired bodywork and which trans* people do not. 
Those who successfully represent their life stories in line with the SOC and DSM’s 
mandates are much more likely to receive care than those whose life stories radically or 
even slightly deviate from prescribed norms. Though some individuals are using 
Informed Consent clinics and providers, as I mentioned in a previous note, most trans* 
patients experience “gatekeeping” at every stage of their transition. Wollman’s role in Let 
Me Die can be imagined as the first filmic representation of an expert “gatekeeper.” 
 
16 In many of his articles, Blanchard discusses the fact that early medical texts provide the 
foundation for his studies. Blanchard cites Havelock Ellis, among others, as having 
influenced his work. Widely criticized by gender theorists and trans* activists alike, these 
theories have largely been debunked and are not supported by WPATH or most health 
care providers. Nevertheless, Blanchard and Bailey’s arguments gained traction within 
select circles to the detriment of trans* people seeking bodywork. Let Me Die reinforces 
these theories by referring to a trans* woman as a “man who thinks he is a woman.” The 
film also reinforces these theories in other scenes, which depict trans* women disrobing, 
in the shower, or visually receiving pleasure from touching their own bodies. 
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CHAPTER III 
AGAINST A SINGLE TRANS* STORY: 
DESTABILIZING DOMINANT NARRATIVES THROUGH DOCUMENTARY 
The idealized narrative of what it means to be trans has become so 
pervasive um that like we’re all we’re all in process to get to a certain end 
point and that certain end point is to be passable and read as a man or a 
woman in the world. And that if you’re not passable or read as a man or 
woman in the world, then you clearly haven’t finished yet…Like I wish I 
could be recognized as trans, you know, I mean I wish that it were 
possible for me to pass as trans. 
      -Participant in Against a Trans Narrative  
 
 
In opposition to the sensational, simplified, and pathological ideologies in 
twentieth and early twenty-first century documentary—representative in my analysis of 
Let Me Die a Woman—several recent autobiographical documentaries expand 
representational horizons for trans* images and narratives. Rather than risking their 
stories’ re-appropriation by nontrans* editors and directors, trans* documentarians are 
increasingly telling their own gender stories. Falling in the “new wave” category of 
documentary, these narratives “eschew the obsession with etiology and causation and 
take trans* lives as a reality that does not need explanation or rationalization” (Ryan 11). 
Recent documentarians—for instance, Jules Rosskam in Against a Trans Narrative 
(2008) and as editor of Sam Feder’s Boy I Am (2006), Gwen Haworth in She’s a Boy I 
Knew (2008), Sam Berliner’s GenderBusters (2010), Kimberly Reed’s Prodigal Sons 
(2008), and Laura Jane Grace in True Trans (2014)—employ experimental modes of 
story-telling, combining techniques of the confessional documentary with scripted 
scenes, animation, slam poetry, photography, and a host of other non-traditional choices. 
These genre-blending films produce what they promote: they deny neoliberal logics of 
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individual transgression, highlight more than one narrative, allow individuals to speak for 
themselves, connect those stories to larger social systems, resist pathological definition, 
and question what it means to claim a trans* identity.1 
An analysis of the genre of documentary highlights how historical and political 
factors influence visual representations of trans* people. In her review of recent 
documentaries featuring trans* individuals, Joelle Ruby Ryan argues that “while not 
solely or even primarily responsible for cultural and systemic transphobia, [the media] 
plays a serious role in the perpetuation of prejudice and discrimination against gender-
variant people” (10). Dominant epistemologies filter in to all documentary depictions of 
trans* people and illuminate who holds cultural and political power. According to Stuart 
Hall, power should be understood   
not only in terms of economic exploitation and physical coercion, but also 
in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to represent 
someone or something in a certain way—within a certain “regime of 
representation.” It includes the exercise of symbolic power through 
representational practices. (259)  
Until recently, trans* individuals have not had access to the kind of “power” to which 
Hall refers. Individuals who identify or are identified by others as trans* have historically 
not been able to create self-representations. The trans* reel is saddled with stereotypes 
and misinformation, which negatively affects real trans* individuals.  
In this chapter, I contextually analyze Against a Trans Narrative and She’s a Boy 
I Knew. Against a Trans Narrative is an experimental film that explodes conventional 
notions of identity, community, and visibility. She’s a Boy I Knew is an autobiographical, 
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look at one trans* woman’s experiences and negotiations in relation to her white, 
conservative, Canadian family members’ ideologies of gender. In terms of narrative, 
genre, and focus, one might imagine that these two films have contradictory goals. 
However, these films exemplify different but complementary tactics trans* filmmakers 
employ to radicalize trans* knowledge and reject male-centered, heteronormative, and 
racist accounts of gender diversity. Rather than focusing on how someone might come to 
identify as trans* or what procedures and tactics one uses to transition—though “medical 
issues and transition may be included”—the stories and lives these films represent reject 
the medical model as the “be-all and end-all of the narrative” (Ryan, “Diversifying” 11). 
Offering diverse and complex trans* stories, Against a Trans Narrative and She’s a Boy I 
Knew illuminate how individual trans* people have the ability to shift dominant 
understandings of gender.  
With an emphasis on embodiment and its capacity for collective legitimation, 
documentary puts forth an understanding of identity not possible through printed, first 
person media. Though all trans* representations are “historically situated, politically 
strategic and connected to the operations of race, class, gender, sexuality, and ability that 
govern all bodies” (Heaney 17), documentary visually represents the relationship 
between body and epistemology. What’s more, documentary offers a glimpse of what 
Susanna Egan calls “alternating subjectivities,” which emphasize identity processes and 
communities that share in the production of meaning rather than a finished or closed-off 
product (85). The documentary form, as Egan explains, is best equipped to “dramatize the 
intersubjective qualities of experience,” by “grounding representation in some prior 
reality” and displaying the “intimate expression of subjective experience” (85-88). 
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Highlighting “alternating subjectivities,” Rosskam and Haworth question what it means 
to live a trans* life within a culture whose dominant narratives demand that trans* people 
exist within or at least in relation to medical legitimation discourse.  
These radical representations are possible because of the genre’s history and 
conventions. In light of this fact, I begin this chapter by exploring the forms, functions, 
and techniques of documentary to contextualize the epistemologies contemporary films 
employ. First, using scholarship by Michael Rabiger, Christopher Pullen, and Rebecca 
Swender, I track how documentary film has changed over time in light of political, 
cultural, and technological shifts. Second, I use Bill Nichols’ work, which classifies 
documentary into six “modes,” to explore how a range of films produced within the last 
fifty years represent trans* people in limiting, sensational, and pathological ways. Third, I 
develop the seventh documentary “mode,” the autobiographical, which blurs boundaries 
between subjective and objective knowledge and retell familiar stories. Because the 
filmmaker’s identity, body, and agency are inseparable, the autobiographical mode 
returns interpretive voice to those who have not previously been able to speak for 
themselves within a genre that was initially created to visually document the “Other.” 
Finally, I closely analyze Against a Trans Narrative and She’s a Boy I Knew, paying 
particular attention to the ways that Rosskam and Haworth represent their life narratives 
through embodiment, epistemology, and storytelling.  
 
Documentary: What Is It and What Can It Do? 
 Filmmakers have used documentary films for various purposes—ranging from 
nationalist propaganda to experimental representations of lived reality—for at least ninety 
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years.2 In 1925, John Grierson coined the term in his review of Robert Flaherty’s film 
Moana: A Romance of the South Seas, which documents Flaherty’s time living with and 
“studying” a group of Samoan people. Grierson used “documentary” to indicate “the 
ability of the medium to literally produce a visual ‘document’ of a particular event” 
(Wells 169). In the 1920s and ‘30s, documentary footage captured event-centered, 
episodic, and mostly “disjointed” images (Rabiger 9) of “everyday” humanity: going to 
work, feeding a family, and other “mundane” activities (Wells 169). Not only were these 
early films short and “disjointed,” they were also mostly silent, relying on the power of 
the visual image to make a nuanced argument about the world and its inhabitants. 
Specifically, early documentarians captured the everyday lives of people they 
subjectively viewed as oppressed: poor, working class white people in Europe and 
America as well as non-white “others” who survived in non-Western cultures. For 
example, the “salvage ethnographic” film Nanook of the North: A Story of Life and Love 
in the Actual Arctic (1921), which scholars consider to be the first feature-length 
documentary, records an Inuk family battling the elements in the Canadian Arctic as a 
white British filmmaker looks on.  
Whether intended for pro-nationalist sentiment or anti-government radicalism (as 
well as a host of other goals, from exploration and travel to ethnographic field study), 
early filmmakers employed the documentary to tell a visual story about “reality” from a 
particular point of view. As film and sound technology developed, corresponding with 
the onset of World War I and lasting well into World War II, government-sponsored 
documentary films propagandized nationalism, recorded politicians’ speeches and rallies, 
and re-created historical events from a politically efficacious perspective. For example, 
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Triumph of the Will (1935)—“the greatest advertising film ever made,” according to 
Rabiger—rocketed Adolph Hitler to infamy by declaring the health and power of the 
Weimar Republic (16). At the same time, several 1940s independent filmmakers recorded 
the destruction and horror of war in opposition to the nationalist propaganda in Triumph 
of the Will. Attesting to its powerful and collective nature, some of this independent 
footage was used to aid in the fall of Nazi Germany and, subsequently, to rebuild Europe 
(Rabiger 16-17). Documentary films both reflect and influence the social and political 
realities of their time. 
Early conceptions of documentary, which strongly continue today, place the genre 
in a “privileged relationship with the idea of reality (or truth)” (Pullen 57). According to 
Pullen, the assumed truthful function of the genre “may be partially due to the idea of 
documentation, which implies some official authorized function, a corollary of which 
would be that documentation possesses some license to convey reality” (57). If one can 
visually (and later, aurally) represent an event, idea, or narrative at the moment it is 
happening, so the story goes, then it must have actually occurred. In his seminal essay, 
“A Manifest on the Subject of Documentaries,” Stefan Jarl elaborates on the history of 
documentary to show that filmmakers originally believed it to be “objective and accurate. 
What we see is the truth, filmed by the filmmaker in a certain sequence” (149). 
Documentarians were not supposed to be seen or heard, films were not to be scripted, and 
an “objective” perspective should frame the film’s sequence of images and sound. 
Because documentary images hold an “indexical relationship” to some prior reality, it is 
easy to imagine that they are authentic rather than subjective (Swender 4). This view 
permeated until well into the 1960s, when Civil Rights leaders, lesbian and gay activists, 
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and other social pioneers employed the form to deliberately disrupt notions of objective 
reality and truth. Later films aimed to clarify Jarl’s argument that: “there is no such thing 
as an accurate and objective documentary” (149).  
In other words, documentaries are not “constative” in J.L. Austin’s use of the 
term: they do not make true or false claims about the world but, instead, performatively 
show an “alternative ‘honesty’” (Bruzzi 155). Documentary footage is iconic rather than 
factual. Though “actuality footage,” as Swender calls it, “provides trace evidence of the 
existence of some segment of reality,” documentary films feature a tenuous and 
“mediated rather than pure relationship to the real” (3). Unlike literature, which has the 
capacity to transport the reader to the past or future, documentary films situate the 
spectator in a “constantly advancing present tense” (Rabiger 9). In this way, the “reality” 
represented in documentary film functions synecdochically in that it “stands in for the 
larger truth claim that the image’s original emplotment served to evidence” (Swender 5).  
Because documentary footage does not literally represent the world as it is, 
documentaries must be “deciphered” by viewers (Swender 4). This social element is an 
important part of the genre’s function: though unable to objectively represent “reality” in 
any literal sense, documentary films nevertheless have a “profound respect for actuality, 
[which] invites the spectator to draw socially critical conclusions” of their own making 
(Rabiger 4). Documentaries affirm and encourage social, dialectic interaction between 
screen and viewer, knowledge and interpretation. 
In the 1960s and ‘70s, with the advent of lighter, less cumbersome video 
technology and handheld cameras, more individuals—both amateur and professional—
were able to film their and others’ lives. Documentary filming no longer had to occur in a 
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studio or at a pre-planned location; interviews, scene documentation, and other tactics 
could happen anywhere at anytime. Smaller cameras transformed documentary 
filmmaking, aiding in the capacity for what scholars call Cinema Verité or “truthful 
cinema,” where the camera unveils a part of reality previously hidden or misunderstood. 
These advancements were significant changes “in the relationship of the camera to the 
subject” wherein the camera now had the potential to be both a “fly-on-the-wall” 
presence as well as an “active observer” (Rabiger 18). Hidden cameras could be used to 
film unaware individuals and, at the same time, filmmakers could more actively become 
a part of the landscape of the film, since they were unencumbered by heavy, burdensome 
technology. Not only were more individuals able to produce documentaries, more 
individuals were able to access, discuss, and collectively think about them, essentially 
“democratizing the hands at the controls” and in the audience (Rabiger 23-4). With the 
introduction and widespread popularity of television sets in the late 1960s and ‘70s, 
documentaries were brought in to the comfort of middle class people’s homes, and 
producers such as the British Broadcasting Company and Public Broadcasting Service 
quickly created hundreds of made-for-TV films on a range of subjects (Rabiger 23-4). 
Popular documentaries of the ’80s tended to focus on individual people and groups as 
well as identity movements, using documentary’s form and clout to spread new 
epistemologies and ways to see U.S. culture. 
At the same time, the growing neoliberal political trend in the U.S. fueled 
documentary’s cultural move towards “exceptional” subjectivity and away from 
objectivity. Neoliberal economics, characterized by “pro-business activism,” aims to 
dismantle the limited U.S. welfare state, open and deregulate markets, and reduce 
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government spending “to enhance corporate profit rates” (Duggan xi). To increase 
corporate profit, money must be “diverted from other social uses,” which inevitably 
increases “overall economic inequality” (Duggan xi). However, neoliberalism is not just 
an economic ideology that affects corporate markets and regulation; in actuality, 
neoliberalism filters down to social realms by encouraging individuals to dismiss race, 
gender, and sexual inequalities “as merely cultural, private, or trivial” (Duggan xiv). 
Neoliberal discourses in the U.S. disenfranchise poor, working class people of color, and 
all trans* individuals, though politicians couch these ideals in progressive logics that 
seemingly support difference, equality, and acceptance. In other words, though they play 
out on a macro level, neoliberal ideals are deeply felt at a micro level. For example, 
neoliberalism breeds an individualized understanding of success wherein those in power 
assume poor people are poor because they do not work hard enough or make bad choices, 
not because the economic, political, and social system institutionally disadvantages most 
citizens for the benefit of a privileged few.3  
Though neoliberal ideals heightened the U.S. government’s ability to regulate its 
citizens, in a Foucauldian sense, neoliberalism also made it more possible for individuals 
to reclaim power. Neoliberal ideologies that are embedded in media formations open up a 
space for what Nick Couldry calls “more voice”: “more ‘reality’-based presentations of 
social processes, more intense media monitoring of how government works at every 
level,” and more diverse representations of trans* lives (74). If we consider Michel 
Foucault’s notion of power, that it is “everywhere; not because it embraces everything, 
but because it comes from everywhere” (93), creating new epistemologies through media 
allow some disenfranchised individuals the ability to engage in a process of what Andrea 
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Smith calls “taking power by making power” (6). In other words, resistance to power is 
viable because of the shifting nature of power. Individuals do not necessarily “acquir[e], 
seiz[e], or shar[e]” power through media-making, but making new media (particularly 
forms that are autobiographical) allows filmmakers the ability to resist top-down political 
control (Foucault 94-5). 
Based on the relatively low-budget cost of making a documentary, as well as the 
heightened ability to share films through online and televisual platforms, documentary 
films are widely distributed at fairly low costs and thus have the ability to produce a 
substantial amount of collective change. What’s more, documentary has profound 
ramifications for social change “since a film may speak in the first-person singular but 
imply a first-person plural” (Chanan 7). Moving towards a “first-person plural,” 
according to Michael Chanan, becomes less about flattening out identity categories and 
more about accessing communal power through recognizing shared experience. 
Rabinowitz confirms this idea in her claim that social justice documentaries—what 
Nichols calls “performative” documentaries—of the 1980s and ‘90s illuminate “the 
varied ways in which cultural representations can have political agency” (2). New images 
and narratives dynamically resist neoliberal logics and collectively call for social and 
political movement. 
Identity-based films are thus performative in more than one way—not only do 
they feature individuals who perform certain identities in ways that bring those identities 
to fruition, the films themselves perform a certain conception of community, which 
heightens real world experiences. As Zygmunt Baumann explains, communities are 
always “imagined” and actualized in a metaphorical arena that does not necessarily rely 
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on physical proximity or national borders (qtd. in Pullen 34). At the same time, “the 
potential of the imagined community is not that it provides a multivalent context of 
identification” but, rather, a “platform for a congregation of different voices, if not 
always singing in harmony” (Pullen 36). In some ways, documentary “carries on the oral 
tradition” by spreading stories and subjective realities to those who would not otherwise 
learn about such issues or who find the issues relevant to their lives (Rabiger 117). 
Michael Renov argues that contemporary documentary films emphasize “open-
endedness, empathy and receptivity” (130). In other words, documentaries have the 
capacity to offer personal legitimation and collective knowledge growth.  
The development of communal storytelling and autobiographical practices 
situates the viewer in unique ways; the viewer becomes “one of the ‘us’ who are pictured 
on screen,” and thus is directly included in the film’s shared identity claims (Renov 130). 
Viewers recognize their stories in the voices of others, or “as the other from whom this 
‘we’ wishes to differentiate itself” (Renov 130). Interestingly, in many contemporary 
documentaries, trans* interviewees discuss how various documentary films were the first 
form of media that helped them link personal experience and desire to a trans* identity.4 
Trans* participants comment on having a “light bulb” moment of shared experience with 
individuals in documentary films—both in terms of sharing a similar story or experience 
as well as in visual representation and embodiment. Documentary participants, in other 
words, are sometimes the first individuals viewers know who identify as trans* or who 
have non-binary bodies. Family members of trans* people also cite documentary as a 
media form that helped to convince or educate them about their loved one’s identity. In 
I’m Just Anneke (2010), for example, Anneke’s mother explains that watching Middle 
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Sexes: Redefining He and She (2006) aided her understanding of Anneke’s desire to take 
puberty inhibitors, which she then helped Anneke acquire.  
Because documentaries have the capacity to change individual and collective 
understandings of trans* identity, the genre is an important form to analyze. As I move 
now to consider Nichols’ six modes, which produce different trans* epistemologies, I 
will keep these essential questions in mind: what do documentary films say about trans* 
people? Which narratives are told and which are denied? Who is allowed to make these 
claims? Who benefits or fails to benefit from the trans* perspectives embedded in 
contemporary documentary film? 
 
Documentary Modes and Their Political Potential 
Bill Nichols, one of the founding scholars of documentary theory, shows that 
there are six distinguishable types of documentary, which filmmakers have developed 
over time when one method became obsolete or when new foci demanded new tactics. 
Though Nichols’ six types could be imagined as a linear progression of storytelling 
modes, filmmakers typically use tactics from more than one “type” in a given film and 
categories overlap significantly, destabilizing this linearity. Though Nichols’ modes may 
break down when analyzing contemporary documentary film, they are still helpful when 
thinking about the tactics filmmakers use to highlight certain epistemologies or ways of 
seeing the world over others. The modes Nichols outlines are the poetic, expository, 
observational, participatory, reflexive, and performative. In this section, I briefly define 
each mode, paying particular attention to the final three, which will be useful for my 
analyses of Against a Trans Narrative and She’s a Boy I Knew.  
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The earliest forms of documentary, the poetic and expository, are contradictory in 
nature. In poetic films, filmmakers display non-linear, puzzling, ambiguous, and avant-
garde themes by stressing “mood, tone, and affect much more than displays of knowledge 
or acts of persuasion” (Nichols 103). As a form, the poetic documentary could be 
compared to experimental literature and modernist poetry where “alternative forms of 
knowledge” displace one “particular argument or point of view” (Nichols 103). Poetic 
filmmakers represent reality “in terms of a series of fragments, subjective impressions, 
incoherent acts, and loose associations” (Nichols 103). These documentaries accentuate 
how “the filmmaker’s voice gives fragments of the historical world” rather than an 
objective or argumentative view of a given reality (Nichols 105). In contrast, the 
expository mode assembles the “fragments” the poetic mode might use in “a more 
rhetorical or argumentative frame” (Nichols 105). This mode is most consistent with 
PBS, BBC, National Geographic, and other educational platforms, which adopt an 
omniscient narrator to explain what is happening in the images onscreen and what the 
viewer should understand from the film as a whole. Where the poetic mode may reject an 
outside narrator and emphasize contradiction and a fracturing of knowledge, the 
expository mode uses “commentary” that is “above” the fray of the film (Nichols 107). 
This type of “large-scale argumentation” is an ideal mode for “conveying information or 
mobilizing support within a framework that pre-exists the film” (Nichols 107-9). Where 
the poetic mode artfully shows alternative realities and open-ended understandings of 
social systems, the expository mode makes claims about those realities and systems.  
In contemporary trans* documentaries, the poetic and expository modes offer 
limited trans* understandings; poetic films may feature progressive representations of 
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trans* subjectivity and identity (as in, for example, the 2003 experimental, dialogue-free 
film, P[l]ain Truth: A Film from [Female] to [Male]) but without any appeal to changing 
those social structures. Striking and emotionally intense, this type of film produces a 
plethora of interpretations. The expository mode, on the other hand, offers partial 
understandings of trans* individuals in its appeal to objectivity through the use of voice-
over commentary by medical, scientific, and academic “experts.” In this way, expository 
documentary demands only one interpretation. 
In the third mode, the observational, which was made possible by 1960s and ‘70s 
advances in technology, filmmakers try to witness lived experience at the moment it 
occurs. Observational films—which Jane Chapman calls “visual journalism”—do not 
employ voice-over narration, music, sound effects, or reenactments, which the camera 
could not originally capture. In their “spontaneity,” these films document events, rituals, 
and cultures to which the viewer may not otherwise have access (Nichols 109). The 
observational filmmaker takes on the position of quiet bystander, which “calls on the 
viewer to take a more active role in determining the significance of what is said and 
done” (Nichols 111). Though productive in its capacity to capture raw experience as it 
occurs, the observational mode is nevertheless “ethically ambiguous” (Nichols 111). 
Though the aim is to visually capture reality, observational films are produced by 
“outsiders” who film something they imagine as “unknown” or “exotic” (Nichols 112). 
Observational filmmakers create arbitrary and limiting boundaries of representation and 
often do not let the participants speak for themselves. The culture or individuals the 
filmmaker captures on screen become “objects” of study rather than viable subjects who 
speak their own truths.  
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Observational and expository documentaries use trans* individuals and their 
narratives as case studies, regularly incorporate sensational stories of trans* “others,” and 
appropriate trans* voices to center “expert” opinion about what it means to be or identify 
as trans*. Academic and journalistic voice-overs deny the complexity of gender diversity 
so as to tell a single story that explicates or legitimates trans* people. Traditional 
documentary films, which use expository and observational modes, tend to be 
“exploitative” and do not ethically represent the variability of trans* lives (Ruby Ryan 
10). Rather than expanding epistemologies of gender, expository and observational films 
fix trans* identity in detrimental ways. In these films, several of which I analyze below, 
trans* identities are “otherized, exoticized, fetishized, and cast as deviant, bizarre, and 
pathological” (Ruby Ryan 10-11). For example, Middle Sexes includes interviews with 
trans* people, which the film frames and introduces with “scientific and academic 
experts” (as the back cover explains) who etiologically trace the “cause” of trans* and 
intersex desires to physiology and biology. Narrated by Gore Vidal—who authored Myra 
Breckenridge (1968), a satirical novel about a sadistic trans* woman who premeditates 
and carries out the humiliating rape of her male student—this confusing and dramatic 
documentary reduces trans* identity to a “mistake” that occurs during fetal development 
as well as an “imbalance” in brain chemistry. Vidal’s voice explains that intersex scholar 
Milton Diamond understands trans* identity as a disorder of the body. Instead of showing 
Diamond as he explicates his research, some of which actually argues the opposite, the 
onscreen image that parallels Diamond’s aural justifications is of a surgeon removing the 
brain from what appears to be a middle-aged, white, male corpse. Not only does this 
scene blur the lines between intersex (which is biological) and trans* (which is cultural), 
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it also eschews the need for trans* individuals to tell their own stories by reducing trans* 
people to bodies; in fact, this scene reduces trans* individuals to dead bodies, which must 
be taken apart and studied by “experts” to understand the “truth.”  
In other observational and expository films, filmmakers and editors emphasize 
trans* bodies through the notion of “putting on” gender, self-transformation, and 
bodywork. In these films, trans* peoples’ narratives and epistemologies become 
secondary. For instance, Monika Treut’s Female Misbehavior (1992) features five stories 
that, according to the DVD’s front cover, “explore the outer limits of female sexuality 
and behavior.” In one of the five stories, Max Wolf Valerio, a self-identified Native 
American transsexual man (and future author of The Testosterone Files: My Hormonal 
and Sexual Transformation from FEMALE to MALE (2006)), talks at length about his 
male identity and trans* experience. The fact that his story is included within this 
collection of short films is confusing; Treut’s emphasis on “female” embodiment and 
resistance to normative ideals renders Valerio as the sensational and fetishistic addition to 
an otherwise woman-identified cast. Including his story renders his male identity as 
inauthentic, and draws attention to the ways that he is “really” a misbehaving female.  
Apart from this problem, Treut represents Valerio’s story as the quintessential wrong 
body narrative, which she emphasizes by overlaying his interview with still images of 
him as a little girl, disgruntled young adult, and later, self-identified lesbian. As these 
images progress onscreen, Valerio explains that he has always thought of himself as a 
boy and would cry himself to sleep at night because he was forced to wear dresses and 
engage in feminine activities. He was a rebellious teen who never found his place in life 
and was constantly in trouble with his parents and school (see Image 3.1). Later, upon 
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finding a comfortable space in a lesbian feminist community, he was able to play with 
gender through sadomasochistic sex where he took on the “masculine” role with lesbian 
women. Through sexual acceptance, he became more comfortable with the idea of full-
time social transition and, soon after, he began taking testosterone. At no point in 
Valerio’s narrative does Treut display images of a masculine Valerio. Instead, once 
Valerio begins to talk about medical intervention—taking hormones and later undergoing 
surgery to remove his breasts—Valerio’s body appears onscreen. The camera pans out 
and then back in, focusing on his rough hands and then his face as he describes 
testosterone’s effects (see Image 3.2). Treut pays more attention to Valerio’s body than 
his narrative and identity. 
 
 
Image 3.1: In Female Misbehavior, Treut includes an image of Valerio during his 
rebellious teen years. 
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Image 3.2: In Female Misbehavior, Valerio explains his decision to transition to a male 
subject position. 
 
At the same time, underscoring the fact that his female-typical body was the 
problem rather than his inability to find a place as a masculine-identified lesbian, Valerio 
goes on to explain that “the moment” he injected his first shot of testosterone (or “T” as 
he calls it) he no longer cried and, after being on T for two years, he now understands 
“why a lot of men watch porn and why prostitution exists.” Valerio characterizes 
maleness as both biological and cultural; he becomes a man through the act of T injection 
rather than its consequences or bodily changes. Once this epistemological shift occurs, 
and he begins to view his body as male, he is more likely to see his masculine behavior as 
a “natural” offshoot or product of his newfound maleness. Nevertheless, despite what 
common cultural narratives suggest, men are not biologically more likely to watch porn 
or seek paid sex work. Because Valerio refuses to question the implicit link between men 
and hypersexuality, he reinscribes the notion that one’s biology changes one’s behavior 
and identity. He suggests that “normal” men (whom he assumes have more testosterone 
than “normal” women) naturally desire sex and, particularly in relation to the two 
examples he gives, that normal men naturally desire to engage in sex acts, which 
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objectify and potentially exploit women. Valerio’s trans* identity, then, depends on his 
ability to control female-typical bodies (others’ bodies as well as his own). Valerio’s 
narrative does more than link trans* identity to a particular kind of body—his body, 
featured in Treut’s recording and editing techniques, becomes the marker of a legitimate 
trans* politics.  
As polyvocal as current trans* representations in documentary films are, a 
majority of the more than sixty-five films produced since 1990 craft a conservative, 
simplified, wrong body story, most often explaining trans* participants as having a 
female brain but a male body (or vice versa). Emphasizing one narrative as the trans* 
narrative—and emphasizing trans* bodies over trans* stories—fails to take into account 
the variability and diversity of trans* lives. Nevertheless, as I discuss in Chapters I and II, 
many trans* people find the wrong body narrative compelling or closest to their 
experiences and represent their body-biographies using the rhetorical tropes of this 
narrative, much as Valerio does. The danger in representing only one explanation for 
trans* identity—and the desire to explain away or rationalize trans* existence in the first 
place—is that it is disingenuous and harmful to many trans* people. It is, ultimately, a 
comfort tactic for nontrans* viewers’ understanding of the issue. Instead of offering 
multiple interpretations of trans* identity (by featuring trans* people who do not narrate 
their lives through wrong body discourses, for example), expository films take the wrong 
body narrative as the only trans* story and thus seek trans* participants who identify with 
this narrative. 
Several documentaries foreground the wrong body narrative by beginning with 
hyperbolic statements of trans* identity: Let Me Die a Woman (1978) begins with Dr. 
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Leo Wollman asking, “what does it mean to be trapped in the wrong body?” Becoming 
Ayden (2008), produced thirty years later, similarly launches into what it means to be 
trans* with a voice-over narrator who explains, “those who feel they were born into the 
wrong body are called transsexuals. They may feel like men but look like women. And 
they will go to great lengths to alter their bodies to correspond with their self-image.” The 
emphasis in Becoming Ayden on trans* individuals as the “they” to the filmmaker’s “we,” 
as well as the narrator’s use of passive syntax (they “are called transsexuals”), distances 
the viewer from trans* subjectivity and emphasizes a nontrans* perspective. This 
narrative also groups all “transsexuals” into one category and locates the feeling of 
having the “wrong body” as the universal trans* experience.  
The wrong body narrative implies that trans* existence relies on external 
verification and physical change; those who do not want or cannot afford surgery and 
hormones are represented as not fully men or women and thus unrecognizable in any 
political, social, or medical logic. Joelle Ruby Ryan clearly articulates how this emphasis 
on trans* bodies and the medical model fails to represent that which it seeks to document: 
focusing on the medical model “helps to contain gender-variance to the unfortunate 
experiences of a fringe, socially marginal, minority population, rather than to promote 
understandings of gender identity and expression that illuminate the ways in which all 
people are policed by oppressive social norms” (11). For example, Changing Sexes: 
Female to Male (2003) represents all trans* people as having been born in the wrong 
body, particularly in its emphasis on Ryan, a trans* man who is just beginning to take 
testosterone, and his nontrans* identical twin, Rachel, who feels like she is losing her 
“sister.” Not only does this film consistently use incorrect pronouns—calling Ryan “she” 
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until he begins to look more masculine—it emphasizes trans* bodies and surgery over 
identity and experience. Nevertheless, it is important to note the ways that this film 
exemplifies the cultural moment in which it was produced; in 2003, it was a common 
practice to refer to transitioning individuals with the “original” gender pronoun. It was 
also a common tactic to focus on how the body changes during transition; at this time, 
trans* issues revolved around medical procedures and access to bodywork. Keeping the 
film’s historical moment in mind, Changing Sexes still reinscribes the notion that trans* 
individuals’ brains and bodies are antithetical and must be “changed,” as the title 
reinforces. The film—and title—emphasizes changing one’s sex rather than gender, 
which reinforces trans* bodies rather than individual conceptions of a gendered self. 
What’s more, observational films like Middle Sexes and Changing Sexes focus 
mostly on white, middle class, able-bodied, heterosexual trans* individuals and when 
nonwhite trans* participants are featured, the stories consistently focus on prostitution, 
drug use, poverty, violence, and incarceration. Though these issues are certainly linked to 
both trans* and nonwhite identities (particularly in relation to the spectrum of trans*-
feminine experience), filmmakers often do not politically analyze or represent these 
individuals’ experiences as intersectional or systemic. For example, in Transgender 
Tuesdays: A Clinic in the Tenderloin (2012), which focuses on the first full-care trans* 
clinic in San Francisco, interviewees who are mostly black trans* women confess their 
extensive experiences of pain, violence, harassment, and loneliness. Though these 
confessions productively come from the mouths of trans* people, the film’s editors pair 
these confessions with images of trans* women of color engaging in prostitution on the 
streets of San Francisco. Though some of these women’s stories do not include survival 
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sex work, the images nevertheless display survival sex work as participants talk about 
experiences of unhappiness. Not only does this narrative and visual pairing connect 
trans* women of color with prostitution, it also disregards the many other reasons trans* 
women experience pain and harassment in finding housing, employment, and social 
support. Furthermore, the grainy, blurry quality of the film’s images of sex survival work 
suggests the use of low-quality videography in direct contrast to the high-quality 
technology used in interviews. These low-quality images further underscore the film’s 
emphasis on the individual failure and regret of trans* women of color. By using images 
that show trans* women soliciting sex on the street, rather than the men who seek them 
out or who potentially perpetrate violence against them, Transgender Tuesdays simplifies 
the systemic nature of gender and racial violence while, at the same time, skewing and 
appropriating its participants’ narratives.  
In simplifying the systemic nature of gender and racial discrimination, expository 
documentaries tend to put forward a rights- and policy-based politic. This tactic 
reinscribes capitalism as valuable by arguing that some trans* people are “productive” 
and should be given the same rights as “normal” individuals. Rather than questioning 
social structures, filmmakers rely on neoliberal logics of the individual, which reinscribes 
trans* participants as “others” who do not (and potentially cannot) fit within the current 
system. In and of itself, a rights-based politic is not counter-productive. Trans* people 
should have access to economic and political institutions, protections, and rights, which 
the average cisgender person might have. Trans* individuals absolutely deserve access to 
employment, education, and housing. Still, in expository films that emphasize objective 
knowledge, the problem with focusing on trans* rights is that nontrans* filmmakers 
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fetishize and exploit trans* people (the “they” to the filmmaker’s “we”), use trans* 
people as consumable objects of study, and simplify trans* stories.  
For instance, in Rachel Nusbaum’s Transcending Gender: Portraits from Inside 
the Movement (2009), which features Mara Keisling (acting Director for the National 
Center for Gender Equality), trans* individuals share their stories of the “transgendered 
lifestyle” (back cover). Interspersed with these stories is a repeated emphasis on trans* 
rights; as the omniscient narrator iterates, trans* individuals are merely trying to become 
“whole people” just like “everyone else.” This statement again divides nontrans* and 
trans* people as fully human and “other,” respectively. The film does not question or 
complicate issues of class, race, sexuality, ability, or other intersectional factors in these 
participants’ lives. Rather, it foregrounds trans* individuals who have, on the one hand, 
successfully “made it” in society despite their trans* identities and, on the other, those 
who struggle to receive employment, education, and housing because they are trans*. 
These films suggest that trans* people who do not have adequate access or “rights” to 
employment, education, and housing, are partially at fault for not passing as one gender 
or the other. In opposition to the title’s emphasis on “transcending” gender, Nusbaum 
pushes for the incorporation of binary trans* realities into an already-hostile and 
discriminatory system of control.  
Though these representations show trans* identity as an issue of feeling “trapped” 
in a body one was not meant to have, which works to reinscribe punitive divisions 
between what it means to be male and female, I do not mean to denigrate individuals who 
believe that they were, in fact, born in the wrong body. Above all else, I take individuals’ 
explanations and identity choices at face value. As Jules Rosskam argues, “if people are 
111 
 
 
merely articulating the terms of their own identities, then we must take caution in how we 
address our grievances” (“The Ties that Bind” 341). As a subjective, phenomenological 
understanding of one’s experience, the wrong body framework is a viable and potentially 
liberating rationale for many trans* people. To ethically read wrong body trans* 
representations, one must tease out how the reliance on a comfortable or “easy” 
explanation can be detrimental to a collective project, rather than to target individual 
trans* people who use this narrative. That said, I draw attention to the consequential 
limitations in documentary film, which only represent trans* people who use wrong body 
narratives because many trans* people simply do not identify in this way. At the same 
time, the overuse of this narrative within documentary speaks to the genre’s tendency to 
equate the individual with the collective. As Rosskam succinctly puts it, within 
documentary, “representation of the individual and representation of the group are often 
confused” (“The Ties that Bind” 341). When filmmakers subsume or confuse individual 
and group narratives, it becomes too easy for nontrans* viewers to imagine that one 
trans* person’s story stands in for all trans* individuals’ stories, especially when medical 
and academic experts reinforce this belief. Ethical trans* representations should 
illuminate the diversity of trans* lives so that individual stories do not become 
homogenous group narratives.  
In contrast to expository and observational films, many contemporary 
documentaries incorporate more realistic and productive tactics. The fourth mode, which 
Nichols’ names the “participatory,” uses similar methods as observational films in that 
participatory films intend to represent a portion of reality in a given context (19); unlike 
the observational, however, participatory films show the filmmaker reflecting on hir 
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experiences and relationship to what ze is filming. The filmmaker or camera is no longer 
a fly-on-the-wall observer and thus the film is shaped precisely by an epistemology that 
blurs the line between knower and known. Though participatory filmmakers maintain “a 
certain degree of potential power and control over events” in that they continue to wield 
the camera, participatory filmmakers are prominent social actors within the filmic 
landscape – hir understanding explicitly becomes the film’s understanding, which 
deemphasizes an objective or universalizing framework (Nichols 118). Though no less 
subjective than expository films, participatory documentaries allow individuals to speak 
for themselves with little to no outside influence in terms of scene production, lighting, 
editing, music, and narration. Using open-ended interviews—“a distinct form of social 
encounter”—participatory filmmakers “bring different accounts together in a single 
story” (Nichols 121-22). The documentarian no longer relies on expert opinion or 
objective claims; instead, ze creates a “personal testimony” of what ze films (Nichols 
119).  
In the fifth mode, which Nichols names “the reflexive,” filmmakers directly 
address the audience and attend to the ways that documentary tries but habitually fails to 
represent “reality.” The focus of reflexive films is the problem of representation itself: 
filmmakers question “how we represent the historical world” as well as “what gets 
represented” (Nichols 126). Challenging documentary’s conventions, reflexive 
filmmakers refuse to “seamlessly provide an account of ‘reality’” (Nichols 126). Instead, 
they highlight multiple stories and open-ended interpretations. Because of these factors, 
this form offers an exciting opportunity for filmmakers to expand epistemologies and 
encourage viewers to contemplate social change. Because the viewer already experiences 
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a form of “heightened consciousness,” reflexive films have the opportunity to not only 
acknowledge the way things are but also “invoke the way they might become” (Nichols 
130). Politically reflexive documentaries “point to us as viewers and social actors, not to 
films, as the agents who can bridge this gap between what exists and the new forms we 
can make from it” (Nichols 130). Instead of asking, “what is the truth this documentary 
aims to bring to light?” the question becomes, “what is the truth this documentary reveals 
about the self and about me?” (Nichols 130). Reflexive documentaries force viewers to 
question their assumptions and to engage with the film’s material as if they are implicit 
within rather than outside the film’s frame of reference.  
Lastly, the sixth mode emphasizes how individuals perform identity. The 
“performative” endorses the position that knowledge is best described as “concrete and 
embodied, based on the specificities of personal experience” (Nichols 131). These films 
might emphasize the bodies of the individuals it films, but the point does not end there. 
Instead, the film also questions how our bodies contribute to our understanding of the 
world. In other words, performative films emphasize the standpoint epistemologies of 
participants in relation to their social locations. Performative documentaries “se[t] out to 
demonstrate how embodied knowledge provides entry into an understanding of the more 
general processes at work in society” (Nichols 131). Instead of only focusing on personal 
experience, performative documentary links the personal to the political and the 
individual to the collective, which works to “embrace a social, or shared, form of 
subjective response” (Nichols 133). As is true of the participatory mode, the performative 
represents the personal as the “port of entry” to the social systems that govern all 
individuals, rather than merely a subjective representation or way to think about the 
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social world (Nichols 137).  
Christopher Pullen deepens the concept of performative film in relation to 
performance: the performance of self “resists conclusions, just as it resists sorts of 
definitions, boundaries, and limits” (55). Drawing from epistemological theory, Pullen 
argues that performative documentary “privileges the ‘body as site of knowing’” (55). 
Performance, then, is a tool individuals use to express agency. Performing one’s body 
challenges dominant meanings in visual ways. Stella Bruzzi echoes Pullen’s argument, 
maintaining that performative documentaries “function as utterances that simultaneously 
both describe and perform an action” (154). In other words, a performative documentary 
that focuses on trans* subjectivity “describes” the multifarious understandings and uses 
of the term while, at the same time, it “performs” trans* identity and subjectivity in ways 
that bring it into existence onscreen.  
Based on Nichols’ schema, many contemporary documentaries productively 
blend participatory, reflexive, and performative tactics. Contemporary trans* 
documentarians share their stories and express identification with a queer and trans* 
audience. They emphasize issues of visibility, community, voice, history, and politics and 
recognize the potential in foregrounding “dissenting voices and counter-cultural 
ideology” (Pullen 86). However, performative documentaries are still often observational 
in nature; though they focus on individual experience, they are not autobiographical in 
that the filmmaker and subject are not the same. In the following section, I explain a 
seventh mode, the “autobiographical,” which uses tactics of the performative yet is 
created from a particular, grounded perspective. Similarly offering collective notions of 
social change, autobiographical documentaries locate radical trans* representation in 
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first-person experience, thereby retelling familiar stories in new ways.  
 
Autobiographical Storytelling in Trans* Documentary  
Turning the camera on themselves, autobiographical filmmakers expand notions 
of trans* subjectivity and create new forms of selfhood. “In an age of intensified and 
shifting psycho-social identities,” Renov reasons, it should surprise no one that 
documentation of U.S. culture and the individuals who exist within it “should be deeply 
suffused with the performance of subjectivities” (177). According to Michele A. Willson, 
subjectivity  
refers to the ontological and phenomenal consequences of being an active 
social being within a particular body, a being who interacts and is 
interacted with, and who is positioned temporally and spatially. Therefore, 
a person’s subjectivity is shaped by the historical, structural, and 
cultural/social settings into which s/he is born and lives…This 
understanding emphasizes the agency, the sociality, the historicity and the 
particularity of the subject. (7) 
As a display of subjectivity, the autobiographical documentarian’s identity, body, and 
political agency are inseparable, which returns voice to those who have not previously 
been able to speak for and about themselves (as in expository and observational modes, 
for instance). Representing subjectivity through autobiographical processes is a “strategy 
determined to resist the limiting ideology of universal identities,” which emphasizes the 
“historical, structural, and cultural/social settings” Willson analyzes (Lane 21-2). 
Autobiographical documentarians evince how the idea of the subject is dynamic 
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depending on socially viable possibilities for self-narration. Because narratives hold the 
potential to locate the subject in a particular context, autobiographical films have the 
radical potential to develop more diverse understandings of trans* identity. 
Autobiographical filmmakers not only perform but also narrate subjectivity. As 
Pullen contends, a move towards the telling of personal stories—“tales of ‘who I am’, 
‘what I want to be,’ or ‘what troubles me’”—can be seen as a move towards self-
consciously collective practices and more realistic representations of trans* lives (5). At 
the same time, narrative is not merely expressive of identity but is an identity content in 
and of itself, which forms and shapes the subject. Narrative is a “mode of 
phenomenological and cognitive self-experience” (Eakin, How Our Lives 100). In 
autobiographical films, the filmmaker’s use of narration physically connects the 
cinematic sound and image to the “real thing that they represent” while also narrating a 
new self into existence (Lane 5). 
Moreover, context-specific narration is extremely effective in building productive 
communities. For example, in Eli S. Clare’s keynote speech for a 2007 trans*-masculine 
conference, he remarks, “I’m reminded of the incredible importance of community, how 
bodily difference means one thing in isolation and quite another when we come together, 
finding ourselves reflected in each other’s stories” (261). In other words, embodied 
storytelling can bond people through shared experience as well as visually link one’s 
body with another. Collective storytelling encourages public recognition, the realization 
that one is not alone or exceptional, and the discursive potential of personal agency.  
At the same time, autobiographical practices that link what Foucault calls 
“regimes of truth” with the display of bodies can be problematic and occasionally 
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impossible for trans* people who don’t locate the truth of their bodies in sexual 
characteristics or who, rightly so, do not feel safe revealing their bodies. Throughout 
history, as Emma Heaney posits, trans* people have been made to legitimate their lives 
with an “added incitement to show” and not just to speak (Heaney 18). To effectively 
analyze autobiographical trans* identity in relation to visible bodies, I incorporate Ellen 
Rees’ argument on contemporary Norwegian cinema: she writes, the “notion of the body 
not only in a situation but also the body as a situation is a particularly useful tool in 
examining the spectacle of the gendered and/or transgendered body in film” (76). Rees’ 
concept is helpful in distinguishing between context-specific understandings of identity 
and the ways that bodies figure within those conceptions. I explore this tension by 
analyzing how Rosskam and Haworth mitigate this issue – how they visually represent 
their bodies in relation to the stories they tell. 
Notable trans* documentaries effectively blend Nichols’ final three modes and 
incorporate autobiographical tactics, which feature trans* bodies as a situation rather than 
merely in a situation – participants existing within trans* bodies rather than as trans* 
bodies. These films include (but are not limited to) Almost Myself: Reflections on 
Mending and Transcending Gender (2007), in which Tom Murray weaves a context-
specific narrative through extensive interviews with trans* women who are over forty 
years of age, white, and live in the rural U.S.; Transparent (2005), a moving film that 
features trans* people who had children before deciding to medically transition; Kate 
Bornstein’s Adventures in the Gender Trade (1993), which presents her “frank account of 
her personal journey from unhappy boy child into liberated transsexual lesbian” (back 
cover); Paul Hill’s Myth of Father (2003), in which Hill reflects on his father’s transition 
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to become Jodie; Beautiful Daughters (2006), which documents the first all-trans* cast as 
they prepare to debut their version of The Vagina Monologues; Call me Malcolm (2006), 
a meditation of trans*-identified Malcolm’s transition as he maintains a Christian 
identity; the compilation film Boy I Am (2006), which emphasizes trans* men’s stories; 
and the two films to which I now turn: Rosskam’s reflexive and autobiographical Against 
a Trans Narrative (2008) and Haworth’s autobiographical and participatory She’s a Boy I 
Knew (2008). 
 
Against a Trans Narrative  
In Against a Trans Narrative, Rosskam—a trans*-masculine identified filmmaker 
and activist—destabilizes what it means to claim, discuss, and share a personal trans* 
narrative. Against a Trans Narrative’s filming process occurs in several steps, which the 
viewer witnesses onscreen: Rosskam records himself narrating a personal trans* 
epistemology and conversations between himself and his partner as they discuss his 
identity in relation to their lesbian relationship. He then asks actors to recreate these 
scenes, taking on his narratives as their own. Finally, Rosskam shows these recreated 
scenes to several groups of queer, feminist, lesbian, and trans*-identified people, who he 
asks to discuss the scenes in relation to questions he provides. These representational 
layers are explicit, and thus Rosskam’s autobiographical narrative reflexively plays with 
the documentary’s form while simultaneously calling his own story into question in light 
of collective epistemologies of trans*-masculine identity. Evident in the film’s title, 
Rosskam is critical of having one narrative for such a diverse population, including his 
own. Particularly, Rosskam opposes narratives that are conventional, sensational, and 
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uninterrogated, even if they are narratives he uses and quite literally forces others to use 
as well. Because of this contradiction, Against a Trans Narrative forces the viewer to 
question the politics of a shared narrative.  
Including diverse and multilayered footage, Rosskam tells a complicated story of 
relational trans* identity. The recreations he inserts are clearly not “real” in any sense of 
the documentary term: actors hold scripts, mess up lines, and repeat one movement or 
phrase several times (see Image 3.3). In one scene, the actress who plays Rosskam’s 
partner continues to mistakenly say “You’re worse than other real women!” when the line 
should be, as Rosskam interjects, “You’re worse than other real men!” In this and other 
scenes, Rosskam is a part of the filming process, also holding a script and directing the 
actors in how they should behave, interact, and say their lines. This scene highlights the 
performativity of identity as well as the tricky nature of language itself. At no point does 
the viewer see a “finished” product of Rosskam’s narratives, subsequent recreations, or 
group conversations. In fact, the film suggests that there is no such thing as a “finished” 
product—from identity formations to use of language to collective understanding, 
nothing can ever be made whole or allowed to stand in as objective truth. Against a Trans 
Narrative probes whether personal understanding and language use can effectively show 
the heterogeneity of identity. At the same time, the film argues that even narratives that 
are true for an individual must sometimes incorporate dominant vocabulary and discourse 
to gain recognition.  
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Image 3.3: In Against a Trans Narrative, Rosskam (above right) directs the actress who 
plays his partner as she rehearses.  
 
Throughout the film, Rosskam shatters the constructed nature of documentary as 
well as the constructed nature of all narratives, identities, and embodiments. Like other 
reflexive documentaries that draw attention to how documentary itself is constructed, 
Against a Trans Narrative uses scripted scenes, actors, and non-spontaneous footage to 
call into question the film’s “documentary” label. Candace Moore argues in her review 
for Curve magazine that the film “adapts the conventions of the documentary in order to 
better critique stabilized notions of identity.” Instead of asking, “what is the truth this 
documentary aims to bring to light?” the question becomes, “what is the truth this 
documentary reveals about the self and about me?” (Nichols 130). The question the film 
also asks is, what is the truth this documentary reveals about the dangers of a shared 
trans* narrative?  
Nevertheless, the constructed nature of this documentary only becomes clear as it 
progresses; in other words, the film requires a certain amount of work from its viewers. 
At first, many of the participants seem to be interviewees: they position the camera 
directly across from themselves, sit down, and divulge information about themselves in a 
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typical confessional manner. Microphones and simple scenery reinforce the idea that 
these individuals are “real” participants taking part in the development of a trans* 
production. However, as the language of Rosskam’s scenes and the language of the 
participants begin to overlap, the reflexive aspects of the documentary become clear. In 
one scene, Rosskam talks directly into the camera about how it is “weird” to divulge 
information to an object when no one else is around and when he is usually “on the other 
side” (see Image 3.4). Rosskam says, “I said I would do this every day, but…”, implying 
that he set out to document his transition as it happens yet has not followed through with 
his intention. Immediately thereafter, the scene transitions to another individual sitting 
behind a microphone, reporting that ze has been on testosterone “for seven weeks, so, it’s 
been seven weeks” (see Image 3.5). Ze goes on to say, somewhat despondently, “But 
today I’m feeling pretty shitty, so maybe today isn’t the day to talk about it. Or maybe it 
is.” With this switch in scene and speaker, Rosskam draws attention to the ways that 
documentary filmmaking produces “rote” narratives from participants.  
 
 
Image 3.4: In Against a Trans Narrative, Rosskam speaks directly to the camera about 
his decision to transition. 
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Image 3.5: In Against a Trans Narrative, a participant discusses hir transition, though it 
soon becomes clear that ze actually restates Rosskam’s narrative. 
 
 
At the same time, the scenes overlap in such a way that the viewer realizes that 
the second speaker finishes Rosskam’s line and thus coopts his narrative as hir own. This 
sequence stresses the conventional aspects of shared storytelling and yet locates these 
narratives within a particular embodiment – that is, within Rosskam’s embodiment. This 
overlapping narrative and explicit attention to the constructed nature of interviews further 
blurs the lines of “truth” and “reality”—these tactics force the viewer to question what 
changes concerning the reception of a narrative when the conversation or story takes 
place in a “real” moment of confession as opposed to when it is acted out or recreated. 
If the viewer has not yet caught on, the final scene clearly draws attention to the 
performative and reflexive tactics of the rest of the film and suggests that all narratives, 
reflexive or otherwise, are mediated. The final scene features the same individual who 
previously overlaps with Rosskam’s narratives: the camera zooms in as ze puts hir head 
in hir hands. The camera then pans out as ze perks up and asks, “Did I say it how you 
wanted it?” In the background, Rosskam’s muffled voice replies affirmatively: “Yeah, it 
was good.” As the rest of the film intimates, this final interaction suggests that identities 
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themselves can be imagined as fictional realities. Identities require narratives and are 
therefore always re-conceptualized at the moment of confession. Identities also require 
collective recognition and are therefore always relational in nature. This ending leaves 
the viewer with several questions: can we separate an individual’s story from the 
community in which ze exists? How are idealized narratives written on the body in ways 
that one cannot easily shed? How do certain narratives become dominant and how can 
individuals subvert these narratives for personal, political, and collective change? 
In her review, Moore takes up and yet simplifies some of these questions. She 
writes, “this super smart film presents the quandary of gathering a group of individuals to 
represent trans identity (when trans is about destroying categories) and exposes how other 
members of the queer community often project onto the trans-gender experience.” 
Though the notion that “trans is about destroying categories” is simplistic and only true 
for certain individuals, particularly those who are white, young, able-bodied, and middle 
class—Moore is spot on with her attention to the “projections” the film illuminates. If 
one imagines each re-enactment or scene in which an individual confesses a trans* 
identity using Rosskam’s words as a “projection,” one can begin to see how the film 
pushes against normative identity politics. These “projections” force the viewer to 
question if one can ever represent someone else’s story, even if ze shares identity 
categories and experiences. Tellingly, Against a Trans Narrative does not put forward a 
definitive answer to this question. Instead, the film encourages the viewer to draw hir 
own conclusions. In exciting yet complicated ways, Against a Trans Narrative 
deconstructs the notion of individual choice in relation to communal goals. Rosskam 
questions how one can exist within a medical logic without “buying into the system,” 
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which privileges some and discriminates against others. How do you, as Rosskam 
explicitly asks, “make your body exist more comfortably in social interaction without 
playing into disordered language and pathologizing narratives?”  
Rejecting narratives that rely on binary and simple explanations, Rosskam 
nevertheless illuminates how individuals strategically employ certain narratives for life-
saving and life-affirming purposes. He acknowledges throughout the film that certain 
situations—the doctor’s office, coming out to friends and family, and in conversations 
with others who may not share one’s identity—inspire and sometimes require the use of 
these stories. In one scene, a young African-American trans*-masculine person enters a 
doctor’s office and sits in front of a nurse (see Image 3.6). He nervously inquires about 
receiving testosterone, but the white nurse continues to ask her routine questions, not 
looking up from her clipboard. Three other trans* people of color enter, though neither 
the trans*-masculine person nor the nurse acknowledges them (see Image 3.7). They 
appear as “specters”—or what Moore might call “projections”—of societal pressures, 
who tell him which narratives to use to get what he wants: “Tell her you’ve always felt 
that way, tell her you’re over 18, don’t look away, you need this!” These haunts and the 
nurse exit the room and the boy remains, staring despondently at the floor. This scene 
suggests either that he did not tell the right narrative and will not be receiving 
testosterone or that he told the right narrative and is waiting for a prescription. Either 
way, outside voices have eclipsed his confession and rendered him invisible. As is 
apparent in this sequence, Against a Trans Narrative idealizes the belief that visibility 
equals possibility and yet the visibility the film creates is never fully actualized. 
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Image 3.6: In Against a Trans Narrative, a participant plays out a scene in a doctor’s 
office in which he must tell a particular narrative in order to receive testosterone. 
 
 
 
Image 3.7: In Against a Trans Narrative, actors enter to give the patient tips on what to 
say to receive testosterone. 
 
 
Emphasizing how others—particularly, medical professionals—encourage rote a 
narrative, another scene shows this young boy with his primary care provider. She 
explains, “when you go to the doctor, she’s going to ask you all sorts of questions to, to 
make sure you know all the consequences of your actions. But also to make sure you fit 
what they consider the profile of a transsexual.” The doctor gives him the “Standards of 
Care” to peruse before his appointment: “You should go over it just so you,” she begins. 
The young boy responds, “so I know what they want me to say.” After his response, the 
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scene fades to black. Later, Rosskam places his handheld camera within inches of his 
face. He explains that it is the night before his double mastectomy surgery and that he has 
been looking at the mirror for hours, contemplating whether he is making the right 
choice. He whispers, “I’m doing what I need to do to face my reflection in the mirror, but 
what if that’s different from what I need to do to face my reflection in society?” Rosskam 
makes a distinction between his body as it exists for him and his body as part of a lesbian 
culture that may or may not support his decision. The “pressure” here, a similar though in 
this case invisible “haunt,” reinforces the notion that though his narrative belongs to him, 
it also belongs to others who identify in similar ways, including individuals he may 
potentially “abandon”—lesbians and feminists, for instance—in becoming a socially 
recognizable white man. 
Because others may coopt narratives that enforce or perpetuate trans* people’s 
perspectives, openly communicating the dangers of this practice becomes imperative to 
the structure of the film. Emphasizing the collective nature of trans* identity, the film 
includes several scenes in which multiple generations of queer and trans* individuals of 
varying races and classes discuss feminism, language, sexuality, masculinity, and future 
realities of a feminist, trans* movement. Underscoring how narratives and stories travel, 
these groups watch the recreated scenes I discussed earlier and react to questions, which 
Rosskam provides. In responding to the previous scenes, which feature the trans*-
masculine boy in his doctor and nurse’s offices, participants question the danger of 
idealized or dominant narratives. One respondent replies,  
there’s certain narratives about trans* men that are surfacing. So people on 
the periphery are saying, ‘no isn’t this great, you have visibility’ like 
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visibility necessarily equals possibility…It’s adding one more narrative 
that I have to negotiate with. And so I feel like we’re so at the beginning 
of even talking to each other that I don’t feel that people really feel 
comfortable talking about the diversity of their experiences, and how they 
don’t fit in…these ideal versions of trans* people…there’s a lot of sway 
that they can have because we’re not actually talking. 
This participant illuminates the inherent tensions of identity: how can we identify in a 
particular way through a recognizable vocabulary and yet not downplay differences 
within categories, whose constituents we imagine share a prescribed way of thinking? 
This participant also draws attention to how narratives become conventional when only 
one narrative is seen as somehow more “real” or authentic than others. For this person, 
more trans* representations do not allow for more ways of being trans* or even more 
societal acceptance. Instead, because communication does not yet exist within trans* 
communities in any widespread way, new trans* representations layer one upon another, 
creating a kind of cage for individuals who identify as trans*. With open dialogue, 
however, perhaps these trans* representations and narratives could create a web or galaxy 
of possibility, wherein one narrative is not more valuable or recognizable. Teasing out 
these ideas, Rosskam suggests that all trans* narratives are mediated, whether or not they 
are subsumed by other categories or erased at the expense of dominant narratives. 
 Throughout all of the conversation scenes, language continues to be of utmost 
importance. Participants discuss the categories butch and lesbian, the importance of self-
identification, and whether or not naming hinders community building. Through strategic 
editing that shifts between conversations, one sequence noticeably shows the disparities 
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in group and generational understanding: one young Asian-American participant begins 
by saying that naming clearly “limits” and alienates individuals (see Image 3.8). Next, a 
mid-60s, black, self-identified lesbian says that she “loves” to label herself a lesbian 
because it is her choice and no one else’s (see Image 3.9). Immediately after, a young 
black trans* man in a different group discusses the fact that groups should “try to do 
community different,” arguing that certain individuals unfortunately “might not even be 
recognized as part of a community” depending on what narratives and identity terms they 
use. Finally, an Asian-American woman and Latina lesbian discuss how the idea of 
community has changed, which reinforces the inevitable problems in having to “think the 
same way” and the impossibility of being recognized as part of two different groups.  
 
 
Image 3.8: In one of many conversation scenes in Against a Trans Narrative, a group of 
participants discuss issues of visibility, privilege, and language. 
 
129 
 
 
 
Image 3.9: In the same scene in Against a Trans Narrative, a second set of participants 
discuss lesbian and trans* identity. 
 
 
 
This sequence shows several important issues: first, it highlights how younger 
generations perceive notions of community and identity in ways that may not connect 
self-naming with survival or self-constitution. Second, it stresses how identity categories 
often do not take into account variation within groups, rendering intersectional 
experiences one-dimensional. These shifting scenes emphasize how gender- and 
sexuality-based social movements dismiss and sometimes explicitly erase the experiences 
of nonwhite, working class individuals and individuals with disabilities, as well as 
individuals who simply do not share a common narrative. Finally, this sequence questions 
the meaning of an “authentic” trans* or feminist identity and stresses how strict 
boundaries and group policing can damage social movements. Individuals with similar 
identifications but different experiences can both reinforce and deny one another’s 
legitimacy—though these individuals share similar goals, how they go about achieving 
those goals is different. If individuals across generations and identity categories cannot 
recognize one another as allies in the same social project, the radical potential for growth 
and transformation evaporates.  
130 
 
 
In the following scene, Willy Wilkerson performs a poem that echoes these 
sentiments. Facing the camera directly, Wilkerson glows from the backlighting the scene 
employs (see Image 3.10). In hir poem, Wilkerson connects the younger generation’s 
“privilege” with gender transition: “had I been born twenty years later, I would have 
transitioned, no doubt. But that collective journey of feminism as survival stayed with 
me,” ze explains. In Wilkerson’s understanding, the new generation seems to have 
abandoned feminism: “they look at me like I am truly crazy. Have we come so far that we 
really can’t remember?” Though new generations of queer and trans* youth employ a 
“different language” and have “different options,” they discuss the “same ideas: biology 
is not destiny” and yet they do not call what they believe in “feminist.”  
 
 
Image 3.10: In Against a Trans Narrative, Willy Wilkerson performs a poem in an all-
black room with back and top lighting. 
 
 
 
Connecting non-normative ethnicity and gender, ze goes on to say, “I found peace 
with my mixed heritage, mixed gender, ambiguity. Fought too hard, too long to change 
this body now.” Wilkinson makes visible how white skin and unambiguous “heritage” 
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might allow some youth the ability to transition. In becoming someone “new,” some 
white trans* youth abandon the feminist, queer, nonwhite warriors and social movements, 
which allowed them to transition in the first place. At the same time, these white trans* 
youth do not see their privilege (in terms of race and ability to transition) and thus do not 
understand why previous generations proudly cling to lesbian and butch identities. 
Instead, they see their trans* identities as a rejection of hegemonic norms and limiting 
identity categories and, in turn, erroneously see their lesbian, butch, and aggressive 
predecessors as competitors rather than allies. Though the previous conversation 
sequence—paired with Wilkerson’s performance—reflects generational and identity 
differences, there is clearly more at stake here than identifying as trans* versus butch or 
growing up in the 1950s as opposed to the ‘90s; Wilkerson and the film’s participants 
also connect whiteness with privilege and nonwhiteness with survival. Those who are not 
white more often talk about the limitations of identifying as trans* and thus “leaving” the 
feminist and lesbian communities they worked so hard to create. In opposition, those who 
are white more often talk about the restrictions of being trans* and being perceived in a 
way that doesn’t reflect self-understanding.  
In many contemporary texts written by and about trans* people, authors connect 
whiteness with non-binary identity and nonwhiteness with binary gender or identity 
conceptions that fall outside of dominant frameworks entirely. Perhaps nonwhite people 
who are already on the margins of society are able to create more radical forms of viable 
existence through communities and identity forms that do not exist within the category of 
trans* at all. Recall that Wilkerson’s acceptance of hir ambiguous gender, which did not 
require hir to medically transition, depended on hir acceptance of a “mixed” ethnic 
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identity as well. At the same time, perhaps white trans* people are more able to live and 
exist as non-binary because of the privilege their skin color affords them. Or maybe it is 
more an issue of access: white people are more likely to have the option to pay for and 
access bodywork if they so choose (based on class status, income, and access to health 
insurance) and thus white individuals might be more likely to transition physically and 
reject previous generations of lesbian feminists and separatists who believe transition is a 
“way out” of oppression. Whatever the explanation, Against a Trans Narrative highlights 
how race and gender are co-productive and co-dependent identity categories and ways of 
being. Trans* identity does not merely illuminate one’s gender identity or community 
affiliation; trans* identity also constructs and is constructed by whiteness. 
Finally, throughout Against a Trans Narrative, Rosskam draws attention to the 
“rub” that exists between having a broad, theoretical understanding of gender, akin to 
what one might learn from a Gender Studies course or expository documentary, and 
having a personal identity based on the desire for gender transition. In one constructed 
interview, a participant sets up a camera, turns it on, and sits a few feet away. He begins, 
“I’m dating a girl now, but I’m worried that my transition is going to have a negative 
effect on our relationship. I think she’s really upset about my having surgery, but it’s 
weird, it’s not like she’s known me any other way. She met me like this—me as male 
and, I don’t know, she acts like I haven’t thought of male privilege or something.” 
Instead of interrogating the potentially real reservations this “girl” has about his desire to 
transition and whether or not he has considered the “male privilege” he will gain, the 
interviewee continues: “maybe she took a Gender Studies class or something. I’ve never 
met anyone with such radical views of feminism as she has, and by radical I don’t mean 
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progressive, I just mean radical. I like her though…She’ll get over it.”5  
This scene indicates that claiming a trans* identity—being trans* and living in a 
trans* body—is very different than understanding and accepting what it might be like to 
transition. These scenes draw attention to the disconnect that can occur between those 
with trans* experience and those who may not comprehend gender diversity. The 
interviewee flippantly suggests that his girlfriend does not—and perhaps cannot—grasp 
what he is going through. Denying the complex and difficult emotions one feels 
throughout the process of finding acceptance with a partner’s transition, this narrative 
shows the danger in assuming that others will immediately cognize and accept trans* 
experience and identity. At the same time, this narrative claims trans* agency in a 
personal rather than relational way, which doesn’t rely on others for acknowledgement.  
Against a Trans Narrative does not shy away from the difficult and tense issues 
involved in working out a productive and radical trans* politics. Instead, it forces 
participants and viewers to face these questions head on, which insinuates that through 
open dialogue, we might begin to forge alliances across identity categories. But it won’t 
be easy, and it certainly won’t be a quick or painless process. Nevertheless, as Rosskam 
implies, the process is what matters. In his article, “Community, Identity Politics, and the 
Limits of Representation,” Rosskam clarifies these issues: “we cannot keep expecting one 
person to represent an entire community, [and] as a community, we need to recognize the 
limits of representation” (337). Narratives are always multiple in that they demand 
recognition from others. At the same time, representations always fall short in illustrating 
trans* realities. As a film that visually employs what Rosskam explores in his article, 
Against a Trans Narrative expands trans* knowledges, questions collective organizing, 
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and pleads for dialectical social change.  
She’s a Boy I Knew 
On an individual level, Gwen Tara Haworth’s She’s a Boy I Knew concretizes 
Rosskam’s attentiveness to visibility, community, and intergroup communication. The 
experimental aspects of Against a Trans Narrative magnify social understanding of 
trans* identity and embodiment, whereas She’s a Boy I Knew locates the expansive 
capacity of trans* identity in a particular body through one woman’s experience. Using 
one-on-one interviews, photographs, home videos, letters, phone conversations, quirky 
animations, and voice-over narration, Haworth intimately confesses a relational trans* 
identity. Haworth interviews her family and friends and documents her pre-transition life 
in Canada as Steve, a rough-and-tumble boy who grew up to marry his college sweetheart 
and first romantic partner, Malgosia. She documents her physical, mental transformation 
through Malgosia’s realization that she cannot love the woman Haworth has become, as 
well as her family’s recounting of their emotions during her ongoing transition. 
Haworth tells her own story through polyvocal narratives, which produces a 
radical understanding of gender not unlike Against a Trans Narrative’s. Tellingly, in a 
review of the film, Jane Chapman defines She’s a Boy I Knew’s genre as “domestic 
ethnography with an authorial subjectivity” (36). Chapman points to the underlying 
transgressive nature of the film; though it is clearly about Haworth’s life story, how we 
understand her story is mostly through the interviews she conducts. Haworth is both 
subject and outsider: she embodies the role of the objective, expository filmmaker 
looking in on her family and friends’ innermost thoughts as well as the role of the subject 
about which they reflect. Chapman goes on to argue that this film’s “deeply personal 
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account of self-empowerment through self-representation” allows the viewer to more 
fully understand and question “the difficulties involved in conforming to society’s 
expectations” (36). As a performative documentary, Haworth brings her trans* identity 
and body into being onscreen, displaying what Pullen calls the “discursive potential” of 
personal agency (54).  
Haworth sets up the film as a meditation of trans* identity and kinship. Tellingly, 
the title itself draws attention to the importance of other people’s experiences in relation 
to her changing identity and body—She’s a Boy I Knew implies that Haworth is the “she” 
about whom others will speak. In the opening sequence, Haworth incorporates family 
home videos of her young parents: a smiling white woman next to a Christmas tree, a 
smiling white man playing with his children (see Images 3.11 and 3.12). These images 
then slow down and become blurry, and Haworth’s voice cuts in, stating, “my nightmares 
are about being ostracized, being purposefully left behind…rejection and abandonment, 
those were my nightmares.” Immediately afterward, Haworth’s older sister, Kim, states, 
“I struggled with, is it necessary?...Why not just be a feminine male?” Her father’s voice 
interjects, “I guess we’re looking at what benefit is this, what is he going to be going 
through, what if it’s all for naught?” Finally, Malgosia’s voice enters the landscape of the 
film: “I really didn’t want to love what you didn’t want to be.” This montage of images 
and voices—the happy images of a white, middle class, Christian, family clouded by 
ominous and discordant voice-overs—sets up the film as a narrative of inter-personal 
communication and relational identity. Her sister and father’s use of male pronouns and 
third-person perspective paired with Malgosia’s direct address to Gwen as “you” 
destabilizes Haworth’s identification as female and initially precludes her voice as the 
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authorial subject position of the film. At the same time, Haworth’s attentiveness to her 
“nightmares” of “rejection and abandonment” centers her fear of “loss” and chosen 
identity. 
 
 
Image 3.11: Haworth’s childhood home videos in She’s a Boy I Knew. 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.12: Haworth’s childhood home videos in She’s a Boy I Knew. 
 
 
Haworth’s consistent use of archival material throughout She’s a Boy emphasizes 
her masculine past while underscoring the inherent instability of both history and 
memory. Using childhood videos as well as videos of her father as a child and young 
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adult, Haworth connects Thomas and Gwen as gendered beings with a similarly 
embodied history. Visually, Haworth places side-by-side images of her father as a boy 
with images of herself as a child (see Images 3.13 and 3.14). By incorporating home 
movies as “evidence” of a “shared memory,” Haworth claims these videos as historical 
artifacts, which are “complex, sedimentary, active and contradictory” (Cuevas 18). 
Haworth makes all the footage from the past look grainy and ephemeral, which, in effect, 
disallows the viewer from differentiating these videos. In this way, the archive is “where 
social memory has been and is constructed” (Cuevas 18). Including home movies 
produces an intense identification between Haworth and her family, which cannot be 
reduced to individual explanations of the past.  
 
 
Image 3.13: Haworth’s father as a young boy in She’s a Boy I Knew. 
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Image 3.14: Haworth as a young boy in She’s a Boy I Knew. 
At the same time, Haworth does not deny or erase her family’s negative and 
potentially hurtful reactions to her transition but, instead, features their stories as equally 
valuable to her own life narrative. Haworth’s parents’ interviews, more so than others, 
shed light on Haworth’s transition. Her father, Thomas, is a stoic, furrow-browed man 
who confesses discriminatory thoughts towards his son, now “daughter,” as he 
begrudgingly corrects. Thomas looks at the camera—at Haworth—and away, refusing to 
make eye contact, silently shedding tears as Haworth’s narration describes her 
relationship with her father as warm but deadly silent (see Image 3.15). As the film 
moves from the interview to photographs and videos of Haworth as a child, Haworth’s 
voiceover explains that masculinity coopted her grandfather’s, father’s, and then her own 
life; it rendered her relationships shallow and her voice silent. Though Haworth doesn’t 
return to the idea that masculinity, as a force and filial lineage, was the confining factor 
against which she repositions herself, the film claims an authentically feminine voice in 
opposition to the quiet solitude masculinity demanded of her. 
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Image 3.15: In She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth’s father discusses the loss of Steven. 
 
Interestingly, instead of coping with Haworth’s change by re-thinking their 
memories, Haworth’s family members claim that Steven is now somehow “dead” or 
“gone.” Her mother, Colleen, explains, “Now I see you as not the same person at all. My 
son is dead, and I mourned my son. I have a new daughter who has some of my son’s 
personality. It may not be so much change as you’ve just come out…but this is not the 
person I knew before.” Kim has a similar response: “Steven is gone, I know that’s kind of 
silly, but Steven is gone and who Steven was but, you know, you always have your 
memories.” In response to Steven changing her name to Gwen Tara, Thomas confesses: 
“that was devastating for me, it really hit hard…I guess that was the first moment I 
realized I had lost my son.” These narratives of mourning suggest that the little boy 
featured throughout Haworth’s film does not become the filmmaker. Instead, her family 
members represent Haworth as a different re-iteration of a person who no longer exists. 
In this way, Haworth’s family imagines Gwen as a facsimile or simulacrum of Steven. At 
the same time, the boy the Haworths fondly remember, the boy who no longer exists, is 
memorialized through the film itself.  
Throughout the film, Haworth illuminates how trans* narratives are always 
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contextual, mediated, and constantly changing. At the end of the opening sequence of the 
film, Haworth appears in a mirror, naked from the waist up. Her face is hidden behind the 
camera and her breasts are partially blocked (see Image 3.16). Haworth looks at herself 
through the lens of the camera, seeing herself in the camera rather than in the mirror. As 
this image appears onscreen, Haworth’s voice explains, “I’m a woman trapped in a man’s 
body…I hate that fucking statement.” She goes on to clarify that she hates this statement 
because though it is the closest narrative she has for her own story, it only exists because 
it is safe and understandable from a nontrans* perspective. It is conventionally 
comforting but restrictive. By invoking the wrong body narrative and then calling 
attention to its detrimental standards, Haworth shows how an individual’s narrative must 
be understandable for hir intended audience—family, friends, partners, doctors, and 
others who hold claim on and over hir subjectivity and livelihood. At the same time, 
Haworth invokes and then subverts the wrong body narrative while filming her naked 
body—which appears both masculine and feminine—in a mirror. Haworth thus 
reinscribes embodiment—and her surgically altered trans* body—as the defining factor 
of a trans* identity with or without reliance on medical legitimation.  
 
 
Image 3.16: In She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth films herself naked in the mirror. 
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Immediately after, while home videos silently play out in the background—young 
Gwen and her sisters on vacation, a family picnic, and newer footage of a family 
dinner—Haworth justifies her earlier statement: “granted, I couldn’t explain it back then. 
I didn’t learn the term transsexual until I was in my teens, which is around the time I saw 
films like Psycho, Dressed to Kill, Silence of the Lambs. I don’t think society and I were 
ready to take each other seriously at that point.” These references to popular 
representations of sadistic trans* characters—in relation to her original narrative that she 
is “trapped” in the wrong body—works to produce visual and epistemological discord. 
Though she experienced herself as a girl from a very young age, she did not have any 
viable explanations of what that meant outside of popular culture’s consistently negative 
view of trans* people. What this sequence suggests is that if she had laid claim to a trans* 
identity from a younger age, society might have forced her in more aggressively hostile 
ways to identify as defective, abnormal, or illegitimate. But by evoking these narratives 
and undermining them in that she could never “take them seriously,” Haworth refuses to 
capitulate to popular misconceptions of trans* identity. Still, as she explains, society 
refused to “take her seriously” as well, which highlights how non-conformist goals are 
often erased and denied on a social scale.  
Throughout the rest of the film, Haworth continues to employ and upend the 
wrong body narrative. In one scene, images of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual’s 
medical jargon concerning Gender Dysphoria float by (see Image 3.17). In the 
background, Haworth’s voice explains: “I saw myself as female, not transsexual. And 
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from the little I knew about trans women, society didn’t accept them as female but 
considered them as gender deviant men.” Haworth differentiates her experiences of 
gender from dominant conceptions of trans* identity. In using but contextualizing this 
pathological narrative, Haworth represents herself as “trapped” not only by her body, but 
also by popular representations of trans* people and medical legitimation discourse. 
Haworth acknowledges the hold medical discourse has over trans* individuals who must 
capitulate to its standards in order to fully self-actualize.  
 
Image 3.17: Language from the DSM appears onscreen. 
 
 
 
Haworth’s family members similarly explain that Haworth’s trans* identity is 
both abnormal as well as understandable. For instance, Haworth’s mother, Colleen, 
recounts her initial response to Haworth’s trans* confession: “I couldn’t think of anything 
in your past that gave us any clue…You were a regular BC boy …This was so out of left 
field, I mean we have all these hockey medals and stuff of yours!” The camera lingers on 
Colleen’s face looking directly back, wide-eyed and excited, as if she expects some sort 
of response or explanation from Haworth (see Image 3.18). Colleen calls into question 
what gender really is—perhaps it is a “feeling,” as Haworth previously expresses, or 
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maybe a role, set of behaviors, or even a regional sense of self. Whatever it is, it is not 
something Colleen expected based on Haworth’s normatively masculine past. 
 
Image 3.18: Haworth’s mother, Colleen, during one of her interviews in She’s a Boy I 
Knew. 
 
 
 
As Haworth becomes a woman in both conventional and radical ways, Colleen is 
more able to accept that because Gwen’s body is changing, who Gwen is understandably 
changes as well. To highlight Colleen’s ability to both pathologize and accept Haworth’s 
trans* identity, Haworth emphasizes Colleen’s reaction to her younger sister’s 
performance of femininity. Haworth’s sister, Nikki, grows up throughout the filming of 
the documentary, which spans several years – she leaves for college, joins an 
environmental commune, cuts her hair short, and begins to express resistance to 
pathological views of trans* identity. Haworth explains that Nikki’s gendered 
performances of self cause Colleen distress: “to my mom’s repulsion, [Nikki’s new life] 
involves showering less than once per day, long armpit hair, and dumpster diving for 
food.” Their mother’s “repulsion” seems to be more about Nikki not fitting into 
conventional roles of femininity than about her anti-capitalist goals. Because Nikki has 
always been identified as (and identifies with being) female, Colleen does not as 
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purposefully accept her daughter’s nonconventional behavior. Though Colleen comes to 
accept Gwen’s trans* identity because it is something that Gwen cannot control or 
change—in Colleen’s understanding—Colleen rationalizes Nikki’s behavior as a choice 
and thus explicitly rejects it. Tellingly, in the final few moments of the film, Colleen tells 
Gwen, “You’ll always be in my life, because I want you in my life…I’d like you to have 
long hair, but [laughs]…” Though presented in a light-hearted and joking manner, 
Colleen’s emphasis on conventional performances of gender underscore her reliance on 
binary gender norms rather than her inability to believe that one can move across the 
gender spectrum. In these instances, Colleen’s understanding of trans* identity is more 
expansive than her understanding of gender itself.  
These notions of conventional femininity and conformity also play out in the short 
animated portion of the documentary, which Haworth labels “How To Be a Girl.” “How 
To Be a Girl” clearly represents how individual bodies change depending on the way 
others read and police them. Suggestions for how to perform femininity appear onscreen, 
as the camera follows a pretty, young, blonde and blue-eyed girl: “Call your mom more, 
always ask advice, family events are not optional, grow your hair long, highlight your 
best features with makeup, don’t unzip until you’re in the stall, always wipe from front to 
back, and for god’s sake, shave your armpits!” Presumably, these are all suggestions 
Haworth (and Nikki) has received. Though many of these suggestions are performative 
iterations of gender roles, they also speak to how our bodies figure differently in the 
world depending on how others “read” us. Subsequently, an image of Haworth as a 
femme lesbian appears after her male form is zipped open, as she continues to discuss 
how gender norms influenced her to imagine that being and becoming a woman could 
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only happen in prescribed ways (see Image 3.19). Finally, the femme lesbian persona also 
unzips to reveal an image of how Haworth sees herself today – as both feminine and 
masculine and as someone who no longer feels compelled to conform to social standards 
of femininity (see Image 3.20).  
 
 
Image 3.19: In She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth includes an animated section, which 
features this cartoon image of Haworth as a femme lesbian. 
 
 
 
Image 3.20: In She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth includes an animated section, which 
features this cartoon image of Haworth as she sees herself today. 
 
 
 
Haworth emphasizes how we are all constantly implicated in a system that 
demands conformity and yet resistance to heteronormative, sexist ideologies might be 
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made visible by performing one’s body in a different way. Immediately following “How 
To Be a Girl,” Nikki appears onscreen saying, “I love my armpit hair!” This discrepancy 
between what “girls” are supposed to be and what Nikki and Gwen actually are produces 
a humorous though important deviation from conventional narratives. Gwen lays claim to 
a feminine identity, and yet cuts her hair short, does not wear makeup, and continues to 
be attracted to women. Nikki similarly identifies as a woman and yet does not shave her 
armpits, wear makeup, or dress in a stereotypically feminine way. These simple choices, 
which Haworth stresses throughout the film, draw attention to the artificiality of gender 
rather than the artificiality of trans* gender.  
Nevertheless, by pairing her and her family’s confessions with the DSM, as well 
as images of herself as a young boy, Haworth associates her sense of loss, isolation, and 
resistance with medical legitimation. This choice returns the “truth” of her gender to the 
level of the body—a body that must be “fixed” by surgery, hormones, and technology. 
After “How To Be a Girl,” Haworth recounts various body modifications she has 
endured: a chin reduction, nose job, breast enlargement, and extensive electrolysis, as 
well as weekly and then monthly hormone injections. Though Haworth represents these 
surgical alterations as an inevitable part of becoming a woman, she emphasizes that these 
body modifications are “necessary” not so she can become a woman but so she can 
“convince the medical establishment that [she] could pass for their idea of a transsexual 
woman.” As she voices this opinion, images appear of her in her home, pulling up and 
buttoning baggy, faded jeans with chains on the sides, putting on a t-shirt over a black 
sports bra, and lacing up black combat boots. This juxtaposition suggests that the 
extensive body modification practices she endures are “necessary” in that they allow her 
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to be the woman she wants to be—to be her own self-actualized version of “woman.” 
Haworth capitulates to and resists medical mandates of trans* legibility.  
Through body modification, Haworth expands what it means to be and perform 
femininity, which allows her to question gender itself. Haworth explains that after her 
vaginoplasty, she “didn’t feel the need for further medical intervention,” though she had 
“intended to have another surgery to remove [her] Adam’s apple.” Feeling total 
“congruency” between body and mind allows her to choose to keep her Adam’s apple as 
a “souvenir to remind [her] of where [she’d] once been.” As she reasons, “I didn’t jump 
out of one closet just to jump into another.” Haworth connects the “feeling” of gender to 
the body she inhabits, a body that bears traces of her past as Steven. At the same time, 
Haworth shows how medical legitimation through surgery did not necessarily give her a 
new sense of self but simply a new body. Haworth states, “it took my mind a few weeks 
before it successfully remapped its understanding of my skin’s geographical position in 
relation to the contours of my body.” Her bodily change allows the viewer to see how 
everyone, in their own ways, negotiates institutionalized understandings of gender.  
Haworth underscores embodiment while nevertheless calling into question what it 
means to live in a body rather than as a body. This radical emphasis allows her voice—its 
sound and story—to take precedence as her “self” and thus the arbiter of identity. Once 
Haworth’s feminine body enters the landscape of the film, she appears only a few times, 
laughing and joking with friends, with her parents, and then completely naked in the 
bathtub and in bed. In these final moments, Haworth shows the viewers her vagina, 
explaining that she will need to dilate it to aid in the “recovery” of “normal, working” 
genitals (see Images 3.21 and 3.22). In this sequence, Haworth strategically uses and 
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subverts confessional practices: she allows viewers in to her personal space, her 
bathroom and bed, and yet describes her vagina and its “healing process” using medical 
language. Haworth uses the language of a doctor’s office—a space that demands 
confession—to claim a feminine existence through her female-typical naked body.  
 
 
Image 3.21: At the end of She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth reveals her post-operative 
vagina in the bathtub. In this and the following scene, she frames the shots with a pink 
background. 
 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.22: In the final scene of She’s a Boy I knew, Haworth reveals her vagina in the 
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bathroom mirror. 
 
 
  
Conclusion: Reimagining the Wrong Body Narrative 
As conventional and institutionalized as Haworth’s bodily reveal is, perhaps we 
should consider its useful dimensions, particularly for those who are dependent on 
familial and social ties for survival. As previously noted, the wrong body narrative 
fortifies the notion that trans* identity is a medical phenomenon, demanding that one’s 
body be “fixed” rather than society’s view of a strict gender binary being expanded. At 
the same time, if we were to incorporate a Disability Studies politics into this analysis, as 
Eli S. Clare does, we could greatly expand what it means to live in a body that is “wrong” 
rather than being a body that is incorrect. In this way, those of us who identify as trans* 
could understand trans* identity as a “diagnosis…without being defined by it, all the 
while resisting the institutions that hold power over us” (Clare 265). If we imagine the 
wrong body narrative as simultaneously limiting and liberating for those who employ it, 
“we could frame bodily difference as neither good nor bad, but as profoundly familiar” 
(Clare 265). Haworth gestures toward this radical conception by using the conventional 
language of feeling “trapped,” and of “always” being trans*, while at the same time 
acknowledging this ideology’s detrimental consequences.  
Further, rather than understanding the wrong body narrative as a “hopeless” 
refusal to acknowledge a “way out,” Julian Carter encourages us to take into account the 
multiple meanings of the word “trapped” (130). The wrong body trans* narrative is a 
“potent form of truth-telling” that is “claimed and resisted in many ways” (Carter 130). 
Such descriptions can feel politically and culturally detrimental in that they “mobilize a 
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troubling vision of embodiment as a form of constraint” (Carter 130). However, as Carter 
shows, “inclusa,” the Latin word that translates to “trapped,” can also mean “to enclose” 
or “include”—not necessarily a trap “but rather the condition of possibility for 
movement” (131). In other words, “do away with the trap, and we can begin to explore 
the range of motion inherent in the dynamic prefix ‘trans’” (Carter 131). We may more 
productively understand this metaphor as an individual’s desire to embody one’s 
intention, rather than to escape or physically change into something else. Bodies do not 
“trap” trans* people, then; bodies offer new possibilities. In actuality, we cannot escape 
the bodies we occupy, but we can learn to “include” new forms of being.  
Haworth and Rosskam illuminate the notion that transitioning is never a linear or 
predetermined process: “a forward movement becomes a sideways step, or a slowly 
moving body accelerates” (Carter 131). In this conception, to “transition” or to be trans* 
is a finite and infinite process in that the present is not the past’s future so much as its re-
embodiment. This understanding of gender transition forces us to re-think time itself: 
“transition pleats time, and in so doing transforms our relational capacities” (Carter 133). 
In other words, individuals who choose to change their bodies do not refuse the past but, 
instead, re-imagine the past as a productive landscape for radical future movement. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 Nevertheless, these texts are “open to multiple interpretations” and thus determining 
one “answer” to the way individuals should use or understand these texts would be futile 
(Couldry 375). As Nick Couldry maintains, “we should not expect a single answer to the 
question of how media transform the social, since media themselves are always at least 
doubly articulated, as both transmission technology and representational content” (375). 
Furthermore, several earlier documentaries and films produced in the twentieth century 
resist and challenge normative understandings of the gender binary. For instance, Paris is 
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Burning, Ma Vie En Rose, and Hedwig and the Angry Inch all incorporate radical gender 
frameworks. 
 
2 See, for example, Stella Bruzzi’s The New Documentary: A Critical Introduction, 
Michael Chanon’s The Politics of Documentary, Jane Chapman’s Issues in 
Contemporary Documentary, Bill Nichols’ Introduction to Documentary, Paula 
Rabinowitz’s They Must Be Represented: The Politics of Documentary, and Michael 
Renov’s The Subject of Documentary.  
 
3 To be sure, as a political and social trend, neoliberal ideals dominate the media (both in 
terms of production and distribution), including documentary. As Axel Honneth asserts, 
neoliberal ideologies work to “sprea[d] standardization and mak[e] lives into fiction,” 
particularly in media representations of identity (474).  
 
4 Though documentary is the form participants cite, I believe that in the future, new 
media (in the form of web forums, blogs, video diaries, and websites) will be more often 
attributed to “light bulb” moments as documentarians interview younger participants and 
as trans* filmmakers born after 1990 begin to make their own films. Nevertheless, 
documentaries are widely accessible online and so the reach of the genre may certainly 
continue. 
 
5 In another constructed interview, a participant similarly sets up the camera and sits 
down, stating, “When I told my best friend that I was coming out as trans*, she told me 
she was politically opposed to my identity. And we haven’t spoken since.” This interview 
draws attention to how seemingly progressive views of trans* identity—often taken by 
nontrans* people who identify as feminist—view trans* identity as counterintuitive or 
inauthentic. In this conception, trans* identity is not an inherent part of one’s sense of 
self but a political issue others can choose to oppose. 
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CHAPTER IV 
“BEAR WITNESS AND BUILD LEGACIES”: 
TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TRANS* AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
 Stories are told, and each of these expands our understanding of 
identity a little more and better. Every one of them—every new story, 
every new word—creates a kind of opportunity to see ourselves anew.  
-S. Bear Bergman, The Nearest Exit May Be Behind You 
 
 
This chapter argues that a significant and rapid shift has occurred in trans* 
autobiographies written post-2000. This shift illuminates a distinct cultural moment, in 
which individuals are more and more able to break from and rework traditional beliefs 
concerning trans* lives. By focusing on how trans* individuals narrate their life stories in 
relation to dominant ideals and institutions, I contend that twenty-first century 
autobiographies reveal epistemological changes on both macro and micro levels of 
society. To make this argument, I incorporate two distinct but interconnected discussions: 
first, I examine autobiographies written by transsexual-identified people, which were 
published between 1954 and 1999. Reflecting the historical ideologies of their time, 
twentieth century transsexual autobiographers similarly justify and legitimate trans* 
existence. Written for a white, straight, cisgender, and privileged readership, “traditional” 
trans* autobiographies complicate and expand what it means to live a normatively 
gendered life at the same time as they medicalize and constrain trans* identity.  
Second, I investigate contemporary autobiographies by transgender and trans*-
identified writers published between 2000 and 2014, which stray from the previous 
century’s normalizing framework. Specifically, I analyze Alex Drummond’s 2012 
theoretical autobiography, Grrl Alex: A Personal Journey to a Transgender Identity, and 
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Jennifer Finley Boylan’s 2008 literary autobiography, I’m Looking Through You: 
Growing Up Haunted. In contrast to earlier memoirs, these texts show a new era of trans* 
epistemology, which does not rely on the “wrong body” model as the foundation of 
trans* existence. Boylan remembers her “haunting” past, which inevitably leads her to 
seek personal and social acceptance through medical transition while Drummond firmly 
situates her identity in opposition to medical discourses. Though their stories are 
different, their embedded assumptions reflect similarly radical conceptions of gender.  
Because Boylan and Drummond narrate a continuous subject rather than a subject 
split between past and present, they put forth a new way to understand trans* identity: it 
does not demand one narrative (for instance, the wrong body narrative of most twentieth 
century autobiographies), nor does it require that individuals feel disturbed by their prior 
selves. Instead, I’m Looking Through You and Grrl Alex illuminate how gender is never 
stable but rather “an identity tenuously constituted in time” (Butler, Gender Trouble 519). 
Drummond and Boylan do not rationalize a past that legitimates a future transition. 
Instead, their life narratives explore rather than explicate trans* identity and experience.  
Like documentary, literary autobiography offers an incredible amount of power 
for those who write and are able to publish. In penning an autobiography, ze is able to 
control hir narrative. Autobiography is thus a meaningful tool for individuals who are and 
have been historically silenced and whose stories others have skewed, manipulated, or 
simply erased. Similar to how contemporary theorists think about gender categories, 
scholars such as Susanna Egan and Sidonie Smith smartly show that definitions of 
autobiography change over time as individuals narrate new and different life stories—in 
other words, as cultural knowledge evolves. Because autobiography “creates and 
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reinvents the self through writing” in relation to an imagined community (Hall 96-7), 
personal narratives have the capacity to “provide witness for others, create a community 
of affirmation, and encourage social transformation” (Hall 104). Trans* life narratives 
resituate trans* individuals as active subjects rather than consumable objects, which 
directly counters American culture’s tendency to sensationalize trans* people.  
Articulating visions of difference, Boylan and Drummond resist dominant 
understandings of trans* selfhood through radical storytelling tactics. Throughout this 
chapter, I follow Margo Perkins’ argument that identity-focused autobiography can “give 
voice to oppositional or counterhegemonic ways of knowing that repeatedly invite 
readers to challenge their own assumptions and level of comfort with the status quo” 
(xii).1 Similar to how Perkins addresses black women’s writings within the Black Power 
era, I address trans* autobiography within contemporary trans* movements as “tied to 
impending struggle” in ways that “bear witness” to historical realities and “build 
legacies” for future generations (xiii).  
 
Rethinking Vocabulary and “Traditional” Trans* Narratives 
As I show in Chapters I and II, identity terms are powerful tools trans* writers use 
to break out of conventional categories, combat transphobia, and take control of their life 
stories. Echoing the political and social moments in which authors first felt discriminated 
against or called out based on their gender identity, trans* writers consistently identify 
with one of three terms: transsexual, transgender, and trans*. However, it would be 
incorrect to imagine that these identity terms divide trans* authors into corresponding 
“waves” or time periods, where the use of transsexual comes first, then the widespread 
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use of transgender, and finally trans*. Rather, these terminologies reflect the historically 
available ideologies in the author’s lifetime.  
Counter to how medical models and popular culture understands these terms, life 
writers incorporate them in different ways and with diverse goals. Within medical 
discourse, for example, someone who is transsexual feels persistent, long-term 
discomfort with hir anatomical sex. Transsexual individuals do not identify as the gender 
associated with their sex as assigned at birth and thus transsexual people tend to engage 
in bodywork, which may involve hormone injections or pills, electrolysis, behavior and 
speech therapy, and surgery. Medical practitioners consistently link transsexual identity 
with the gender binary wherein one begins in one category and transitions to the “other.” 
However, this simplified understanding does not ring true for many transsexual people. 
Some authors who identify as transsexual do not subscribe to a particular gender or 
choose to engage in bodywork. More often than not, these individuals grew up in 1950s 
and ‘60s America. In this historical moment, transsexual was the only available term, 
which encompassed a variety of gender-diverse bodies and experiences. At the same 
time, individuals born as late as the 1970s and ‘80s continue to adopt this term whether or 
not they seek bodywork. We should be wary of any argument that seeks to pin down 
these identity terms by time period or behavior and, instead, look to the author’s 
explanations and cultural position for answers.  
Though authors’ identities and politics do not align in consistent ways, there are 
narrative patterns that link historical realities with identification. My emphasis on 
“narrative” is deliberate: individuals who identify as transsexual do not necessarily share 
one perspective or social location and yet transsexual-identified autobiographers tend to 
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use similar narrative tropes. Transsexual autobiographers tend to focus on how their sex 
or body-biography (rather than gender) changes throughout their lives. Authors who 
adopt transsexual tend to structure their life narratives around what Jonathan Ames calls 
a “basic outline,” which consists of three “acts” (xii). Ames describes these three “acts”: 
a “gender-dysphoric childhood,” followed by a “move to the big city and the 
transformation,” concluded by “the aftermath of the sex change” (xii). The final act, 
which features the author’s “self-acceptance and peace,” emphasizes the individual’s 
surgically transformed body as now being in line with hir “true” sex (Ames xii). In his 
anthology, Ames chooses excerpts that follow this bildungsroman schema: he includes 
passages from early twentieth century sexologist Richard von Krafft-Ebing, who 
associated transsexuality with perversion, endocrinologist Harry Benjamin, who helped 
medicalize transsexuality by regulating the field’s common practices, and celebrities such 
as Jan Morris—a Welsh historian and travel writer—and Renée Richards—a tennis 
player and coach—whose stories follow Ames’ three act model.2  Intriguingly, Ames 
chooses excerpts written almost exclusively by transsexual women and male doctors, all 
of whom imagine gender reassignment surgery (GRS) as a necessary requirement for 
“curing” the dysphoria caused by a transsexual identity. Though Ames describes the three 
act model as representative of a universal trans* story, the model only applies to white, 
able-bodied, straight, middle and upper class transsexual women whose identities 
depended on medical legitimation. 
Unlike Ames, who imagines that these universal patterns connect trans* 
individuals through similar experience, I argue that these patterns say more about the 
culture in which authors came to consciousness than about their transsexual identity. 
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Cultural ideologies become embedded within our identities and bodies in ways that we 
don’t fully realize; at the same time, cultural ideologies continuously change as new ideas 
replace or overlap with the old. Because twentieth century media representations, medical 
ideologies, and cultural narratives introduced and explained transsexuality through 
negative, individual-based rhetoric, many transsexual authors who began to understand 
themselves through these discourses did so as well. Though no less political than current 
discourses, these frameworks offered a generation of trans* authors the vocabulary and 
understanding to newly cognize their experiences, albeit through a limiting, “three act” 
model. In the following section, I explore these patterns in autobiographies published 
between 1954 and 1999.  
 
Traditional Trans* Autobiography and Discourses of Medical Legitimation 
One of the most common explanations concerning trans* identity—a variation of 
which medical systems require—is what I’ve referred to in previous chapters as the 
“wrong body” narrative. In this explanation, one’s physical body does not match one’s 
internal gender identity; often, individuals who use this narrative explain how they feel 
“trapped” or isolated because of their bodies. Because this narrative is so widespread, 
contemporary trans* authors continue to reference it, whether or not they believe it to be 
true in their own lives. For example, Aaron Raz Link and Hilda Raz resist and reinforce 
the wrong body narrative in their co-authored autobiography, What Becomes You (2007): 
“I am trapped within my body only as little and as much as every other human being” 
(13). By universalizing the trope of being trapped, Link and Raz suggest that everyone, 
not just trans* people, exist within ideologically limiting bodies. In contrast, in her 1974 
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autobiography, Conundrum, Jan Morris theorizes what gender can and cannot be: 
“gender is not physical at all, but is altogether insubstantial. It is soul…[and] more truly 
life and love than any combination of genitals, ovaries, and hormones” (qtd. in Ames 89). 
As Morris reflects, a transsexual framework explains not the “apparatus” but the “self” 
(qtd. in Ames 86). Nevertheless, Morris complicates these sentiments by hierarchizing 
individuals who experience “lifelong” discomfort and who are “driven blindly and 
helplessly towards the operating table”—individuals who would most likely use a 
variation of the wrong body narrative—as the only trans* people who “can really achieve 
happiness” (qtd. in Ames 97). Morris paradoxically argues that gender is neither purely 
physical nor purely soul but rather some combination, which legitimates wrong body 
experience through medical intervention at the same time as it challenges intervention, 
which cannot change one’s soul. 
Working within available twentieth century medical discourse, many transsexual 
writers cast their identity as a serious problem in need of fixing; in this conception, the 
fix becomes synonymous with sex confirmation. For example, Roberta Cowell prefaces 
Roberta Cowell’s Story (1954) by explaining her intention to “furnish material for the 
medical psychologist and the geneticist” so that they may determine “a new answer to an 
old problem” (viii). Similarly, Mona Joslin Cross and Mark Rees (writing in 1984 and 
1996, respectively) suggest that transsexuality is a “birth disorder[r] involving sexual 
abnormalities” (Cross ix), which means that “it would be absolute medical ignorance, 
medical incompetence, even abuse, NOT to rehabilitate a person with a sex error of the 
body” (Rees x). Transsexual narrators explain how they change their bodies to be in line 
with their identities through an emphasis on surgery as the defining moment of 
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transformation. Understandably, many life writers who use this framework report feeling 
limited happiness until after surgery is complete: as Rhonda Hoyman reflects in Rhonda: 
The Woman in Me (1999), “It was not until the body image everyone knew and loved as 
Ron was allowed to be skillfully reshaped by surgeons, that the bonding of body, mind 
and spirit finally formed Rhonda and the total person she was always meant to be” (x). 
Twentieth century transsexual life writers (who are almost all women, for whom surgery 
was available) and medical experts see GRS as the sign of a successful trans* story 
largely because GRS was supposed to create “normal” women out of disordered men.  
In one of the first autobiographies written by a transsexual person, My Unique 
Change (1965), Hedy Jo Star chronicles her experiences as someone who knew from a 
young age that she was not a boy and could not fit into cultural norms of masculinity. 
Fortunately for Star, her femininity allows others to regularly view her as a girl and, later, 
a young woman. Others in her community see her so consistently as female that her 
mother decides to take her to a doctor, convinced that something is wrong. Upon 
examination, the doctor explains that Star will “probably go insane” if she is able to live 
“past 35” (23). Before the appointment, Star does not view her body as incorrect; after, 
however, Star imagines the doctor’s sentiments as indicative of her inability to fit cultural 
ideologies and, subsequently, Star understands herself as “a woman…trapped inside the 
body of a man” (23). As she matures, Star searches for a doctor who can “change” her 
into the normal, heterosexual woman she knows herself to be. Star recounts being seen as 
a girl repeatedly when she was younger, which suggests that her body communicated 
“girlness” socially and culturally even before surgery. At the same time, she emphasizes 
the fact that what “counts” in terms of gender recognition is genital rather than bodily in a 
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generalized sense. 
Star spends a good portion of her memoirs recounting her medical transition to 
successful womanhood, which destabilizes 1950s and ‘60s ideals of sex as immutable. 
After the appointment and her rationalizations of it, she determines that GRS is the only 
viable option: “The only thing that kept me going was the hope that one day I would find 
a doctor who could and would do the operation” (Star 79). After more than a decade, and 
dozens of rejections from shocked and inexperienced American surgeons, Star finds a 
doctor who will perform the operation. The final, brief pages of My Unique Change, 
which Star pens after her surgery is complete, accentuate GRS as the moment of closure: 
“now, suddenly, this fear was gone. The fear that clung to me for over thirty years was 
suddenly removed. I was a different person because I had a different image of myself” 
(126). Ending her narrative in this way, Star underscores her belief that changing her 
body—her sex—changes her identity. This notion upholds medical discourse, which 
tends to imagine that surgery produces a different person who must adopt new identities 
and ways of being in the world.3 At the same time, like other twentieth century 
transsexual authors, because Star always knew she was a heterosexual woman, GRS also 
confirms her identity. Her life narrative suggests that GRS both creates a new identity 
and reinforces an identity she already had. 
 Similarly, though he does not associate GRS with becoming a man (since genital 
surgery for trans* men did not yet exist), Mario Martino uses his story to create and 
legitimate a male identity. In Emergence: A Transsexual Autobiography (1977), Martino 
mourns his female history to move forward as male. In part, his explicit attention to 
mourning a female past requires that any remaining traces of a feminine personhood 
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perish or at least not take center stage. Aware of this fact, Martino goes to great lengths to 
write short, direct sentences, which do not include flowery language or overly 
sentimental memories. In his preface, he explains that he writes his memoirs to “lay [his] 
own ghosts to rest and to help others exorcise their demons” (Martino xi). For Martino, 
these two projects are inseparable. In laying his ghosts to rest, he opens up a space where 
other transsexual readers may find comfort and may see his story as their own, his 
mourning as their mourning, and his transition as their transition. At the same time, 
because of his desire to help others “exorcise their demons,” Martino consciously offers a 
model for successful trans* masculinity, which depends on overly exaggerating a 
masculine persona. Collective notions of resistance become possible through Martino’s 
specific articulation of his transsexual experience.4  
Texts that document identity through bodily changes exemplify what Jay Prosser 
calls the “conjunction of body and narrative” (103). In this genre, one’s life story 
becomes so entwined with one’s body-biography that they cannot be differentiated. 
Prosser offers “the clinician’s office” as the origination site of transsexual identity and 
thus of transsexual narratives (103-4). In the clinician’s office, a psychiatrist diagnoses an 
individual as transsexual and, subsequently, the individual becomes transsexual; ze must 
then begin to reflect on hir life in relation to this pathologized subjectivity. Though it is 
clear that many transsexual writers of the twentieth century recount experiences in which 
psychiatrists, doctors, and other mental health professionals name their identity before 
they are able to (as Star does in My Unique Change), this common pattern does not 
necessarily identify the site of trans* origination. Instead, twentieth century transsexual 
writers who include these moments do so because medical understandings, however 
162 
 
 
limiting or normalizing they may be, give voice and perspective to previously 
misunderstood or unrecognizable identities. To say that the clinician creates the 
transsexual identity of the author is an overstatement, which takes agency away from 
trans* authors who document their diverse life stories. Though it is my contention that 
trans* identity is not a disorder or pathology, it is nevertheless reasonable that some 
trans* people find validation in having a fixed medical narrative through which their non-
normative feelings and experiences become clear.  
Furthermore, there are other reasons why so many twentieth century transsexual 
writers frame their life stories through medical intervention; most importantly, this model 
was the only one available for authors who came of age or sought treatment before the 
late 1990s. According to sex historian Joanne Meyerowitz, trans* subjects—like all 
subjects—consistently use “available cultural forms to construct, describe, and 
reconfigure their own identities” (35). Meyerowitz defines the “available cultural forms” 
of the mid-twentieth century as the pathological ideologies put forth by mass media: 
twentieth century popular press tended to “provid[e] certain readers, who already had a 
general sense of crossgender identification, with new and particular ways to describe who 
they were and new and specific fantasies about what they might become” (35). As 
readers saw themselves in the media’s stories, they also began to “reframe” their 
identities and self-understandings “with a newly available language” (Meyerowitz 35). 
Because popular press outlets tended to feature stories that sensationalized developing 
surgical technologies, which journalists claimed could “create” women out of men, 
individual trans* narratives similarly followed suit by focusing on surgery as the defining 
factor of a successful transition (Meyerowitz 37-40).  
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For instance, as I discuss at length in Chapter II, journalists who reported 
Christine Jorgenson’s 1952 transition imagined surgery as the determining factor of her 
status as a woman. Jorgenson herself initially suggested that surgery was what made her a 
woman both in terms of identification as well as recognition. Later in life, Jorgenson took 
up her endocrinologist Harry Benjamin’s argument that no one is 100% male or female 
and that everyone embodies characteristics of both masculinity and femininity, a theory 
which she strategically employed to “humanize herself” and “to suggest that 
transsexuality was only one version of a normal, universal mixed-sex condition” 
(Meyerowitz 101). Despite her attempt to “humanize” her trans* experience, journalists 
continued to speculate for years on end whether she was still “really a man,” while others 
harped on her masculine bone structure, large hands, and the occasional moments when 
she teetered in heels or wore too much lipstick (Meyerowitz 65-8). In these ways, the 
popular press of the 1950s reincorporated early twentieth century sexology tenets, which 
understood trans* people as pathological and abnormal. These tenets both hierarchize sex 
over gender (where anatomical sex reveals the “truth” about one’s being) and conflate 
sex and gender – to be a woman, one must first and foremost have a female body.  
In Jorgenson’s historical moment, transsexuality was understood through anatomy 
rather than psychiatry. Transsexuality was a bodily condition rather than a pathological 
disorder of the mind, as it was later described in the 1960s once psychiatry gained 
traction in American culture. Transsexual identity moved from the realm of physical sex 
to “psychological sex” through psychoanalyst Robert J. Stoller’s 1964 invention of the 
term “gender identity” (Meyerowitz 115). These contested medical frameworks greatly 
influenced cultural understandings of transsexuality and, perhaps more so, individual 
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trans* people who had no prior framework or language to describe themselves. 
Psychological validation through surgery became the component of transsexuality, and 
autobiographers reflected this notion in their life narratives. Trans* people who requested 
surgery in the 1950s-1980s displayed an “active form of self-expression” by claiming an 
“authentic inner self” that was in tension with their bodies (Meyerowitz 138). Though 
contemporary authors tend to shy away from concepts of identity rootedness or “core 
identity,” late twentieth century transsexual people widely used the metaphor of an 
“inner” or “trapped” true self. Many individuals understood their trans* identities through 
religious or psychiatric discourses but a majority of trans* individuals who wrote about 
their lives or who sought bodywork conceived of their identities through biological 
approaches, which inevitably led to surgical intervention.5  
Though debates have moved away from deciding whether transsexuality 
originates in the body or the brain, the medicalization of trans* identity has only slightly 
lessened since the 1970s. Medical legitimation continues to be a powerfully influential 
discourse, permeating all realms of U.S. culture from first-person narratives to media 
representations and journalistic treatments of trans* issues to judicial guidelines, health 
care mandates, and much more. As I will explore in Chapter V, some trans* youth who 
document their gender transitions through videos they post on YouTube continue to 
frame their identities through medical legitimation discourse. Sixty years later, aligning 
with the medical model continues to afford some trans* people a certain amount of 
cultural, familial, and individual acceptance, which is perhaps still unlikely through other 
types of legitimation discourses.6  
To be fair, some twentieth century transsexual writers opposed the medical 
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institution, declaring independence from such a racist, sexist, and classist establishment. 
In one key example, Erica Rutherford’s 1993 autobiography details her experiences of 
disrespect and denial within medical spaces. In her preface, she recounts several moments 
when she explained to the “professionals, the doctors and psychiatrists” that her identity 
did not necessitate intervention (Rutherford 2). These professionals refuse to believe 
Rutherford, relying instead on scientific “data” that proves otherwise (2). Rutherford 
accepts that her transsexual identity may not find a place in the medical world: “I cannot 
reject what I have experienced, and if I do accept it, I accept the contradictions of life and 
accept the dichotomy as a constant reality” (5). Rather than representing her narrative 
through the “corrective” lens of medical legitimation discourse, Rutherford rejects the 
narrative altogether. Her refusal points to a shift in epistemology wherein diverse trans* 
experiences become visible in a culture that previously relied on medical explanations.  
In the following sections, I turn to twenty-first century autobiographies written by 
Alex Drummond and Jennifer Finley Boylan. In light of this section’s findings, 
Drummond and Boylan strategically expand what it means to identify as trans* by 
referencing yet resisting traditional narrative tropes concerning medical legitimation and 
dysphoria. Specific to their historical context, Drummond celebrates rather than laments 
her trans* identity while Boylan expands what it means to narrate a trans* life.  
 
 
I’m Looking Through You: Growing up Haunted  
As a sequel to She’s Not There: A Life in Two Genders (2003), in which Boylan 
recounts her psychological changes as she transitions from a masculine to feminine 
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subject position in adulthood, I’m Looking Through You (2008) takes the reader back to 
Boylan’s childhood.7 In her second autobiography, Boylan remembers when her parents 
move from their urban home and relocate her and her sister, Lydia, to a rural Maryland 
mansion they name “the Coffin House.” In this residence, Boylan grows from ten year 
old boy to college-aged young man; during this time, as her gender identity becomes 
clearer, she experiences and tries to communicate with otherworldly spirits. Throughout 
I’m Looking Through You, Boylan incorporates brief yet complicated reflections of her 
changing gender identity in relation to these uncanny occurrences. In linking haunting 
and trans* experiences, Boylan compares the capability of connecting with other 
realms—which contemporary understanding typically brushes aside or denigrates—with 
the capability of seeing past gender binaries. In this way, Boylan’s ghostly experiences 
foreshadow and yet trouble her subsequent gender transition.  
At the same time, Boylan’s narrative is ambiguous concerning who is being 
haunted – the text suggests that young Jimmy is haunted by spirits in the Coffin House as 
well as by the realization that she is not masculine and thus must change for her own 
survival. I’m Looking Through You also suggests that present day Jenny, who writes the 
memoirs, is haunted by a masculine past, with which she comes to terms by rewriting her 
history. These open-ended hauntings allow for multiple readings of the text and blur the 
lines between fiction and autobiography, past and present, and male and female.  
Rather than use personal experience to enlighten the (assumedly nontrans*) reader 
or add to the growing body of literature on transsexuality, Boylan documents gender-
diverse experiences to theorize what it means to narrate a differently gendered life. 
Boylan’s narrative makes sense of her past through a lens she did not at the time have 
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access to—a lens that may or may not actually speak to how she currently feels. In the 
“Author’s Note,” which precedes her stories, Boylan writes, “a memoir is meant to be an 
impression of a life, and not a photograph.” This pithy statement prepares the reader for 
stories that comprise who Boylan becomes rather than stories that exemplify or 
rationalize her trans* identity as a white, middle class professor, husband, and father of 
two. I’m Looking Through You gives voice to her perspective and yet doesn’t exactly 
recreate her lived realities.  
Reconciling her past, Boylan’s stories stand in for the theoretical explanations 
others use to try to legitimate her life. Boylan explains,  
I don’t find gender theory especially helpful, in terms of explaining the 
thing I felt. I resent, to no small degree, the idea that a theory should even 
be necessary. To be honest, just about the only theory I trust is story, and 
I’m hoping that, before all is said and done, the tale I am trying to tell can 
stand in for the theory. In the meantime, I am sustained by a saying of my 
mother’s: “It is impossible to hate anyone whose story you know.” (25) 
It is unimportant in this regard for Boylan to legitimate or “explain” why she decides to 
transition into womanhood; it needs no rationalization because it is simply her life’s truth. 
Boylan suggests that trans* identity, and self-transformation in general, is a viable life 
path bogged down by our cultural need to categorize and explain. Instead of convincing 
her reader that what she writes is representative of a trans* existence, Boylan figures her 
trans* identity as only one of the theories—one of the “stories”—that explains her life.  
Keeping with this theme, in the opening scene, Boylan recounts a present day 
experience in which she travels to a biker bar in Astrid, Maine to perform with her R&B 
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band. At the Astrid Hotel, Boylan sees the ghost of a young Victorian girl who lost her 
life by falling over the edge of nearby Carrabec falls; the young specter floats silently on 
the stairs that lead up to the defunct second floor. In this moment, Boylan compares her 
life to this apparition’s: “Just like the girl…I’d lost my father and my sister, too. Hello? I 
said, looking down the long, empty hall. Is anybody there?” (13). In trying to directly 
communicate with the young ghost, Boylan addresses both her imagined reader and 
herself as a character within her history. This experience brings back a flood of childhood 
memories, which forces her to reflect on who she has become. Boylan questions what it 
means for others to define her as what she “Used To Be” and whether it is human nature 
to be “unwilling, even irritated, by the prospect of seeing [others] As They Are Now” 
(12). “How do we let go of the past?” she wonders (Boylan 12). A few lines later, she 
contemplates whether “trying to tell [her] ridiculous and incomprehensible story” might 
be one way to live triumphantly “As She Is Now” (Boylan 12). Setting up her memoirs as 
both an impression of a life as well as a way to find her present self anew, Boylan 
explains to the reader that what follows will be “ridiculous and incomprehensible” and 
yet, by telling her story, she will bring her previously unrecognizable identity into view 
by expanding what it means to transition.  
Importantly, Boylan’s “Author’s Note” contrasts with the prefaces many 
autobiographers of the twentieth century incorporate: while Boylan foregrounds her 
memoirs as  “incomprehensible,” many transsexual life writers prefaced their 
autobiographies by characterizing their stories as normal and banal. In effect, traditional 
trans* stories reinforce the notion that comprehensibility is the reason to write 
autobiography in the first place. In Wrapped in Blue: A Journey to Discovery (2003), for 
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instance, transsexual-identified Donna Rose prefaces her story by explaining, “It’s just 
my life…My typical days are the normal routine that most people tend to take for 
granted. Normal is all I ever really wanted” (9). Rose’s appeal on the first page of her 
memoirs assumes that her reader will not share her story or will distrust her precisely 
because of her trans* identity. Boylan’s autobiography, however, emphasizes her 
difference rather than her similarity; her memories are entirely not “normal,” even for the 
very person who experienced them. Boylan draws attention to the ways that trans* 
identity does not have to make itself comprehensible; instead, incomprehensibility can be 
one theme around which a legible trans* history forms.  
Throughout the rest of her autobiography, Boylan recounts moments that connect 
being afraid of spirits with fear of transforming the self. For example, she remembers a 
time when her grandmother (whom she calls “Gammie”) is pretending to read her and her 
friends’ fortunes. Calling herself Madame Casbah, Gammie eerily looks about the room 
and asks who wants their fortune told, supposedly through the spirits Gammie will 
contact. All of the young children in the room turn their gaze down, afraid of what she 
might tell them; they giggle uncomfortably at the thought that something not quite alive 
could know more about them than they do. Gammie’s gaze settles on young Jimmy and 
she demands: “Let’s ask the spirits for your future” (Boylan 22). Jimmy responds 
defensively: “No, please…Don’t” and yet Gammie is incredulous: “What’s the matter?” 
she asks. “Are you scared?” (Boylan 22). After this interaction, the text breaks and 
Boylan’s memory ends. Boylan’s recollection and then abrupt ending suggests that, as a 
child, she was in fact scared to know her future—scared to know how (and if) she would 
be able to live happily as Jimmy and yet also scared that others might find out that she 
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wanted to live as a differently gendered person. Boylan represents herself as consistently 
worried about coming to terms with the ghosts of her past who know more about her 
future than she wants to admit.  
Nevertheless, Boylan’s ironic humor disrupts a coherent reading of the fortune-
telling scene: in what follows, she recounts being “terrorized by a paint-by-numbers 
portrait of a German shepherd,” which hung on the wall of her bedroom (23). She is also 
deathly afraid of “an advertising jingle for tanning butter” as well as one for “Windsong 
perfume,” not to mention the “illusion produced when two mirrors were held face to face, 
creating an endless regression of mirror faces” (Boylan 24). By pitting these seemingly 
incoherent fears against one another, Boylan retrospectively makes light of admitting her 
fear of the future, her terror of becoming the feminine person who writes these 
memoirs. At the same time, Boylan also humanizes and trivializes the difficulties of 
trans* identity, which, in these juxtapositions, are no more important than the annoyance 
one feels when the Windsong perfume commercial comes on the radio for the tenth time 
in a day.8 Nonetheless, these fears are actually not incoherent at all in that each one—the 
Windsong ad, mirror reflections, and her mother’s painting—are all recreations of an 
original that might not exist. Each fear forces Boylan to re-remember something painful 
rather than to learn to forget her past. While one might argue that Boylan is making light 
of her identity, it seems, rather, that she wishes to prevent its presence from becoming the 
be-all and end-all of the narrative. For, as a young boy, perfume ads and mirrors also 
produced existential crises along the same lines as imagining herself as someone who 
could not peacefully exist as herself for much longer. Perfume ads and infinite mirrors, 
which both repeat over and over again, produce a similarly macabre feeling: memories, 
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like objects, which build one upon another in such a way as to frighten a person might as 
well be turned off and tuned out, unless one wishes to question why the memory exists as 
fearful in the first place.  
In all of the memories in which Boylan experiences and communicates with 
spirits, she connects her identity with those of the ghosts, thereby theorizing her trans* 
identity through them. In connecting her trans* identity with the undead, it is no mistake 
that the ghosts who visit her are all femininely gendered. Throughout her time at the 
Coffin House, Boylan sees mysterious forms of all kinds: a blue mist follows her when 
she goes into the basement and, later, into her room on the third floor. She consistently 
feels bouts of electricity, all the while knowing that someone or something is there that 
she cannot see and that presumably cannot see her. Spirits pass through her and try to 
speak to her, and she is convinced that the ghosts of a young girl and old woman visit her 
room at night. Outside her bedroom door, the floor creaks with inexplicable footsteps 
and, almost nightly, her bedroom door opens by itself as her dog, Sausage, growls at the 
noises and raises his back fur in response. One night, Boylan recalls the first time a ghost 
looked her in the eyes when she had suddenly woken up at two in the morning. Creeping 
into the hallway and down to the bathroom, Boylan catches sight of herself in the mirror. 
Behind her image is “an older woman with long blond hair, wearing a white garment like 
a nightgown” (Boylan 47). In Boylan’s retelling, the ghost “seemed surprised to see [her], 
and raised one hand to her mouth, as if [Boylan was] the ghost, as if [Boylan was] the one 
floating, translucently, in the mirror” (47). The ghost appeared to have a “curious, 
regretful expression” as if she “wanted to warn” Boylan that “something terrible” was 
about to happen but, “being translucent, was powerless to stop it” (47). Connecting 
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herself to the ghost of a woman, and later suggesting that she might be the ghost haunting 
the Coffin House, Boylan implies that it is her own transformation that will be the 
“terrible thing” about to happen but, as a then-translucent ghost haunting a male body, 
she is “powerless to stop it.” Boylan figures trans* identity as external—something 
happening to her and in spite of her willing it to go away—rather than something she 
chooses. At the same time, instead of detailing an irreconcilable past, Boylan rewrites 
these “hauntings” to be more in line with how she presently sees herself.  
Throughout her memoirs, Boylan interjects theoretical and reflective musings 
about life, which both clarify and complicate her experiences. Because of these 
interjections, Boylan is a more complex narrator than most transsexual authors of the 
twentieth century. Rather than incorporating academic or medical explanation, however, 
Boylan takes over as theoretician and authority of her own life story. In one scene, 
Boylan reflects on the ways that her childhood trans* feelings were less about clothes and 
sexuality than about “spirit” (24). It is as if there is something inside of her – or 
something alongside of her – which knows her secrets from the beginning. Only when 
she begins to listen to this “something” does she realize what she’s known all along. 
Boylan implies that becoming a woman brings a coherent identity into fruition that had 
always existed, however “incomprehensible” or ephemeral it had been. As a child, she 
doesn’t understand her desires, let alone know what a trans* identity is, and yet she 
knows that “in order to survive,” she will have to “become something like a ghost 
[her]self, and keep the nature of [her] true self hidden” (Boylan 25). Haunting her “young 
body,” Boylan’s trans* self is a latent presence, which she can only truly inspect as she 
brings this identity to the forefront – as she allows it to no longer “haunt” her life but to 
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control it (25). 
Though most of Boylan’s autobiography focuses on her experiences between the 
ages of two and twenty-five, the final scene fast forwards thirty years to when Boylan 
returns to the Coffin House as an adult who has medically and legally transitioned to 
womanhood. As she walks through her old home and up to her bedroom, she feels the 
familiar pull of prior memories and apparitions. Because her memories of childhood so 
far have consistently involved her now-estranged older sister, Lydia (who refuses to 
recognize her transition) and her late father (who did not live long enough to witness it), 
Boylan’s final story theorizes her trans* identity in relation to her now empty familial 
home. She reflects on Lydia’s abandonment as she gazes at her sister’s bedroom: “There 
was one reaction I had no response for, though, and it was the one belonging to my sister. 
It would have been better, she suggested, if you had died…And so, after all these years, 
when I entered the doors of the Coffin House, it was I who had become, at long last, a 
ghost, and she a ghost to me” (Boylan 234-35). At this point, it is unclear who or what is 
haunting Jenny. Is Jenny (or, perhaps more likely, her previous self as Jimmy) now the 
ghost who haunts the house and her sister’s memory? Or is it her trans* identity that 
haunts Lydia? Leaving this question open-ended, Boylan allows for many interpretations. 
In the final scene, Boylan continues to blur the lines between her childhood ghosts 
and her trans* experience. While she reflects on Lydia’s rejection, Boylan feels the 
sensation of a spirit in the room:  
Electricity sizzled on the back of my neck…I looked up, and there she 
was, just as in days long past. Floating in the mirror was the translucent 
old woman in the white clothes…Except that, as I stared at her, I realized 
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that it was no ghost. After all this time, I was only looking at my own 
reflection. Against all odds, I had become solid. (249) 
In this moment, Boylan ostensibly unravels the focus of her autobiography, suggesting 
that the previously iterated experiences of being “haunted” were, in fact, experiences of 
feeling like a woman in a world that recognized her as a boy and then a man. Whether or 
not her experiences of feeling haunted were “real”—a photograph rather than an 
impression—Boylan’s conclusion brings up more questions than it answers: does her 
autobiography tell a childhood story of a home frequented by long-dead spirits or a story 
of a childhood haunted by trans* experience? Is there any real difference, according to 
Boylan? Though it would be easy, in light of this last scene, to write off her otherworldly 
experience as a metaphor for a burgeoning trans* identity, the “hauntings” Boylan 
recounts do not end once she transitions to womanhood: the book’s opening scene, in 
which Boylan, on her break from playing with her R&B band, sees the shade of a little 
girl who “drifted up to the top step, and dissolved into the door” prove otherwise (11). 
Though perhaps “incomprehensible,” the hauntings Boylan experiences are certainly real, 
however one may try to explain them away.  
As Boylan compares the ghost’s mirror image to her own, she implies that both 
the houses and the bodies we occupy tell a more complicated story than dominant and 
traditional knowledge suggests: “Surely whoever it is we become,” she speculates, “is the 
result, in part, of the houses in which we live” (52). Who we become is also the result, in 
part, of the bodies in which we live – bodies that become “solid” through our ability to 
theorize the self. Instead of representing her identity as one that revolves around 
transitioning from one gender to another, Boylan lauds her own ability to live in the gray 
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area. As she transitions, she acknowledges that she cannot and does not want to shed her 
masculine past: “what about that kid I used to be?” Boylan asks her therapist, Shell: 
“What about all those memories? That’s the one thing they can’t give you in surgery: a 
new history” (256). In response, Shell looks incredulously at her; “You know how many 
people wish they could see the world the way you see it?”, Shell asks (Boylan 257). 
Boylan clearly maintains that a new history is not what she seeks; instead of disregarding 
her past as a disruption that haunts her current identity, she reincorporates it as merely 
one part of who she has become.  
Because she narrates a continuous subject, rather than a subject split between past 
and present, Boylan creates a new trans* epistemology. She was not trapped in the wrong 
body and is not presently disturbed by her prior sense of self. She does not explicate a 
past that legitimates a future transition but, instead, clarifies her transition through past 
experience. Boylan represents herself as someone who has always been on a path towards 
becoming someone new. Though her history may limit the possibilities of who she can 
become, it nevertheless reflects who she has been all along: a gendered spirit inhabiting 
and haunting a body that must change and transform.  
Grrl Alex: A Personal Journey to a Transgender Identity  
 
Like Boylan’s exemplary text, Drummond’s autobiography radically expands 
current trans* knowledges through narrative and theoretical forms. By celebrating what 
medical models largely regard as pathological, Drummond reimagines trans* identity. In 
her final memoir, Drummond proclaims:  
I’m excited by a whole new vibe that is emerging – gender fluidity is 
starting to take hold as a nation, as a countermovement, as a new zeitgeist 
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for the next generation. These creative ways of floating between genders, 
blending genders, queering genders is going to offer new possibilities for 
everyone…This is a new language, a new identity, a new possibility. (125-
26) 
Drummond celebrates an identity that falls outside dominant conceptions of binary 
gender as well as typical ideations of trans* existence. As a “nation,” trans* identity 
destabilizes cultural values that rely on recognition, congruence, and fixed boundaries 
between categories. At the same time, by emphasizing “floating…blending…[and] 
queering genders,” Drummond visually maps gender as a spectrum rather than a binary. 
In this prospect, there would be no stable “sides” against which trans* existence would be 
compared. As a “countermovement” and “new zeitgeist,” Drummond imagines trans* 
identity as both revolutionary and commonplace. Throughout Grrl Alex, Drummond 
exemplifies these claims: by retelling her life story, she bears witness for others who may 
share her narratives and, at the same time, by reimagining trans* identity as celebratory, 
Drummond offers new possibilities for the future.  
Drummond’s text is divided into two sections, the first of which features memoirs 
that explore the concept of “doing gender” through themes related to clothing, sexuality, 
bullying, family, parenting, and activism. This section, titled “Doing Transgender” (a riff 
on the iconic 1997 article “Doing Gender” by Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman), 
incorporates yet reimagines a canonical gender studies framework. In the second section, 
“Transgender Theory,” Drummond outlines her research as a social scientist who studies 
trans* people across historical time periods and cultures. By foregrounding her memoirs, 
Drummond encourages readers to approach the secondary material in light of her life 
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story rather than the other way around. By flipping the order (since many transsexual 
autobiographers prefaced their stories with “expert” opinion), Drummond encourages 
readers to view subjective and objective knowledge as mutually reinforcing. At the same 
time, her memoirs are theoretical and her theory section is autobiographical, and thus 
Grrl Alex blurs epistemological lines between personal and collective knowledge in both 
content and form.  
As her title insinuates, Drummond does not identify as a woman but as a “trans* 
grrl,” a moniker which Drummond offers up as a newly viable trans*-feminine 
standpoint. Drummond’s identification with a “grrl” persona integrates the punk rock, 
feminist characteristics associated with “riot grrrl” culture as articulated by all-female 
bands in the 1990s. Riot grrrl culture famously made headlines in 1991 as an 
underground music phenomenon, which began in Washington D.C. and the Pacific 
Northwest and featured all-female bands such as Bikini Kill and Bratmobile (Leonard 
115). According to music scholar Marion Leonard, riot grrrl music reflects third wave 
feminism, which highlights gender inequality, sexual assault, and intersectional analyses 
of women’s oppression. Riot grrrl musicians created widespread collective organizations 
to “promot[e] sexual awareness and feminism” (Leonard 116). Riot grrrl musicians 
critiqued rock music, which exemplified a “masculinist culture,” at the same time as they 
performed in stereotypically masculine ways (Leonard 1). What’s more, riot grrrl bands 
experimented formally as well as stylistically in their songs – they are most often known 
for their vocal styles—which included “shouting and screaming”—as well as their songs’ 
content, which rejected “mainstream values and trends” (Leonard 4). In these ways, the 
passionate energy, explicit lyrics, and activist leanings associated with riot grrrl culture 
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easily map onto Drummond’s sense of self. Identifying as a “grrl” rather than a “grrrl” 
(notice the use of two ‘r’ letters instead of three), Drummond gestures to this culture and 
yet differentiates herself from it.  
Building on her grrl identity, Drummond resists common narratives associated 
with both female and trans* identities; as a consistent trope, Drummond uses clothing as 
a symbol for internal rather than external gender. When Drummond remembers her 
childhood and young adulthood, the types of clothing she was not allowed to wear and 
yet coveted become symbols for her history: for pages at a time, she describes the “A-
line” and “stitched down box-pleat” skirts of the late 1970s (9), as well as the “adorable 
long flared corduroy” skirts of the ‘80s (14). Drummond recalls how she was “deeply 
jealous” and longed for the “identifiers of girl-world,” which she imagined would free her 
“from the constraints of hegemonic masculinity tied up in boy-world” (9-10). Feminine 
clothing takes on a “unique excitement” of its own, which stands in for her queer and 
trans* desire “at both a sexual and an identificatory level” (Drummond 10). Because of 
the masculine standards with which Drummond was implicitly and explicitly forced to 
comply, these A-line, box-pleat, and corduroy skirts come to define a way of being and 
an identity, which she is unable to inhabit until much later in life.  
Before she has the ability to make her own clothing (and thus gender) choices—
prior to attending “Uni,” for example—Drummond’s inability to put feminine symbols on 
her male-typical body becomes a heartbreaking realization that she is not, in fact, part of 
the “girl-world.” Though feminine clothing is off-limits to her as a child, Drummond 
recalls several moments in which she secretively tries on her girlfriends’ or Mum’s 
clothing. In one example, Drummond remembers her first girlfriend, Sally-Ann, a “brill” 
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girl whose sheer presence granted Drummond “status” among the boys in her middle 
school (13). Through Sally-Ann, Drummond’s masculinity is maintained by her 
classmates’ assumption of her heterosexuality. One afternoon, Drummond finds herself 
alone in her girlfriend’s room as Sally-Ann heads to the kitchen to get a drink. 
Drummond notices a skirt on the floor and “a combination of curiosity and temptation” 
overwhelms her (14). Suddenly, she is “picking it up off the floor and nervously fumbling 
to try it on” (Drummond 14). Rather than finding comfort or happiness by being able to 
“try on” femininity, so to speak, Drummond feels “a combination of shame and terror and 
guilt” and hurriedly takes off the skirt (14). In later scenarios in which Drummond recalls 
putting on feminine clothing, she at first feels elated at seeing her image in the mirror. 
This feeling of happiness, however, is immediately followed by shame as she is caught 
and admonished in each scenario: first by her Mum, then a High School girlfriend, and 
finally by her daughter.  
Wearing women’s clothing brings Drummond closer to a “true” identity, but it 
doesn’t illuminate the whole story. Drummond experiments with shaving her legs (and 
later, her arms) as well as padding her hips and butt to appear more feminine (24-6). 
Though she appreciates her image in the mirror, imitating stereotypical femininity in all 
its bodily markers does not make Drummond “feel real or comfortable” (26). Instead, she 
recalls feeling like “a trussed chicken” (Drummond 26). Initially, she is perplexed at the 
fact that appearing feminine does not make her feel like “herself” as it does for so many 
trans* people in the newspapers and magazines she consumes. As she begins to realize 
how different women are—“observing the extraordinary range of shapes and profiles” 
they embody—Drummond reimagines her male-typical body as female (26). In 
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retrospect, these experiences come to solidify Drummond’s sense of self as somewhere 
between masculine and feminine. Trying on feminine identities that had previously been 
denied to her, Drummond explains that wearing women’s clothing allows her “to finally 
experience and physically explore the meaning” behind the early images she associates 
with “girl-world” and, at the same time, to pick and choose the elements of femininity 
that make sense for her (21). Wearing women’s clothes, particularly clothes she chooses 
rather than co-opts, Drummond experiences and inhabits her male body as female.  
Identifying somewhere “between male and female,” she theoretically and 
physically plays with what it means to occupy a feminine social position. Drummond 
does not find a “comfortable” gender identity until she abandons the male/female binary 
and begins to explore “new constructs such as gender-fuck, gender blending, and the 
construct of ‘transgender’” (27). Though she desires to be recognized as feminine, she 
does not wish to pass as a nontrans* woman, which she imagines would require hormone 
therapy, surgery, and behavioral changes she is not interested in pursuing. Instead, she 
begins to search for an appearance, which would “communicate…femaleness” to others 
through “queering” gender expression (Drummond 28). Drummond argues that “being 
female is a state of mind” and not an embodied persona (28).  
Even after Drummond discovers a fitting, non-binary trans* grrl identity, clothing 
continues to be an important symbol. She humorously reflects, “I have come to learn that 
a big part of becoming confident in being out as transgender is knowing that an outfit 
works” (Drummond 28). Experimenting with wearing women’s clothing in public spaces, 
Drummond blends “elements of both genders in a coherent and visually-appealing 
aesthetic” (32-3). Once she begins to wear women’s clothing in public and is not met 
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with overt discrimination, she wears feminine clothing at all times. Her favorite pieces 
include skirts, boots, tights, and scarves, and she consistently wears eyeliner, eye shadow, 
and mascara. Though these gendered markers encourage others to read her as a woman, 
she nevertheless refuses to shave her thick beard and does not walk in a feminine manner 
or raise her deep voice. Drummond claims a defiantly phenomenological gender identity: 
“Now I find myself in a space where I can redefine what it feels like to have a female 
body – by simply inhabiting my own as female” (63). For her, women’s clothing (in 
particular, skirts) initially represent unreachable femininity and, later, trans* visibility.  
Because trans* visibility is a key characteristic of her identity, Drummond 
consistently recalls moments when other women and girls read her as more similar to 
them than different. In these moments, others acknowledge her as part of an expansive, 
collective womanhood and yet do not read her as female. In one instance, Drummond is 
walking to the local campus library; she stops at a traffic light alongside another woman 
who “smile[s] briefly” at her before they cross the road (35). This simple form of non-
hostile recognition reinforces her trans*-feminine identity and encourages her to continue 
to present in more “truthful” ways. In another example, Drummond shares a “farewell” 
with a woman on a train whose knowing glance concedes the “shared queering of social 
norms…[and] an affirmation” (55). Later, Drummond observes a little girl in a coffee 
shop, whose mother silently hails her: “Now she gets it. I look up at her and we smile at 
each other in acknowledgement. I continue reading my book” (67). This moment is one 
of “mutual validation,” as Drummond recalls (68).  
Nevertheless, not all of the public interactions Drummond recounts are positive; 
local construction workers catcall her, frat guys mock her, and, in many instances, men 
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aboard the train harass her. In each instance, though she feels threatened, Drummond 
ironically finds comfort in the way men treat her. Above all else, these negative 
interactions reinforce her feminine identity: “If I am to openly inhabit some of the space 
defined as female then perhaps the reality is that the threat of assault and assaulting 
comment by ill-educated and low-intelligence males is part of the ‘real girl’ experience” 
(Drummond 61). Drummond retroactively observes these potentially hurtful experiences 
as comforting; these moments reinforce her sense of self in opposition to “males” who 
see her as either a woman with a beard or as what she is—trans*. At the same time, in 
drawing attention to these common feminine experiences, Drummond locates herself 
within a history of feminist, trans* discourse. 
Drummond’s emphasis on clothing as a way to claim a trans* identity 
depathologizes “transvestism” (more appropriately called cross-dressing) and offers new 
ways of imagining what a trans* identity could be. She explains, “the crossing of 
gendered identities through the adoption of the clothes of the other, is an historically and 
cross-culturally constant phenomenon” (Drummond 138). Nevertheless, cross-dressing 
has historically been imagined as pathological, fetishistic, and perverse, whereas 
transsexuality has been imagined as an unfortunate “mistake” of body/mind alignment 
(Drummond 142). Because sexologists, psychoanalysts, and therapists imagine the 
former identity as behavioral and the latter as biological, medical professionals of the 
early nineteenth century deemed one “chosen” and the other “innate.” As a culture, we 
are much more sympathetic to those who are “born” with non-normative differences 
(those who might identify with the wrong body narrative) than those who we imagine 
“choose” to be different. Dominant U.S. narratives, then, imagine trans* people as 
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tragically sympathetic and cross-dressers as sexually abnormal or sadistic. In this line of 
thinking, to put a dress, blouse, boots, makeup, and earrings on a male-typical body does 
not produce a “woman.” However, Drummond argues that it in fact does produce a 
woman if that person feels it to be the case. Reclaiming a “transvestite” identity and 
stressing the fact that she chooses to be trans*, Drummond embraces fluidity as a way to 
create a new understanding: “being out starts to create a new awareness for others, that 
through a process of familiarisation, a society can become accustomed to difference” 
(31).  
Interestingly, throughout her text, Drummond incorporates several images of 
herself (see Images 4.1 and 4.2), which embody multiplicity and trans* corporeality. 
Using photographs complicates Drummond’s textual self at the same time as it reinforces 
her trans* identity. In a sense, as Susanna Egan argues, this visual presence of the body 
“resists current cultural notions that the self is constituted entirely in language and in 
text” (5). Drummond’s images create new meanings, which multiply her textual identity.  
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Image 4.1: Alex Drummond on the front cover of Grrl Alex. 
 
 
 
 
Image 4.2: Alex Drummond’s headshot in Grrl Alex (128). 
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Unlike many traditional transsexual autobiographies and mainstream news media, 
which include a linear progression of “before and after” images that show movement 
from one gender to the other, the images Drummond includes feature her only as she is 
presently. Traditionally, a transsexual author incorporates images that show hir as a baby, 
an unhappy child engaging in forced gendered behavior, in middle school and high 
school, with partners and children, and finally, in several shots taken after hir physical 
transition is complete, displaying whatever bodywork ze has undergone. Before and after 
pictures emphasize artificiality in relation to gender rather than the legitimacy of one’s 
current identity. According to Julia Serano, who discusses the mainstream use of “before 
and after” images, “the images and experiences of trans people are presented in the media 
in a way that reaffirms, rather than challenges, gender stereotypes” (36). By focusing on 
images of trans* women “in the act of” putting on makeup, painting nails, or engaging in 
other stereotypically feminine behaviors associated with a visual aesthetic, mainstream 
media suggests that “the trans woman’s femaleness is an artificial mask or costume” 
(Serano 41). This obsession with “doing female” as opposed to “being” female devalues 
femininity and renders trans* people as deceptive (Serano 42). However, in Grrl Alex, 
Drummond’s images expand what it means to visually represent a trans*-feminine body. 
Drummond’s photographs refuse the common practices Serano discusses and, embracing 
an identity that emphasizes the “new potential” of self-acceptance – the ability to 
“present a congruent self to the world and in that space let go of much of the inner doubt” 
– Drummond thumbs her nose at the notion that femininity is artificial or inaccessible to 
individuals with male-typical bodies (165). In presenting an aesthetic that harmonizes 
with her sense of self without engaging in bodywork, Drummond rejects medical 
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legitimation discourse and solely relies on self-understanding: “I am me and here I am” 
(165).  
At the same time, Drummond herself is a medical expert who received her 
Master’s of Science degree in cognitive behavioral psychotherapy specializing in trans* 
issues. Drummond, then, uses her personal experience and formal education to expand 
scientific thought. She writes, “scientific truism does not have to imply hierarchical 
disadvantage…Ultimately, a key tenet of this book is that ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ as 
gender-identified traits can exist beyond the genital anatomy” (Drummond 155). 
Drummond uses scientific data to show that gender fluidity is more of a reality than 
medical discourse acknowledges. After her literature review, Drummond remarks: “What 
has ultimately become clear to me as a researcher is that…trans* identity is not a single 
or fixed entity, but one with complex manifestations” (154). The rest of her text shows 
how this complexity is possible. 
Drummond’s autobiography signals a fundamental shift in twenty-first century 
epistemology. Not only does she expand definition and vocabulary concerning gender 
diversity, she also destabilizes traditional conceptions of transsexuality as purely a 
medical problem in need of fixing. By celebrating her trans* existence, Drummond offers 
new possibilities for the future. In hir review, Marilyn Roxie brilliantly sums up the 
inherent potential in Grrl Alex, which signals a contemporary “shift to the present and 
future compilation of more and more narratives of trans* lives that portray a holistic view 
of such lived experience, rather than a strictly medicalized narrative or a trans* person as 
the subject of someone else’s gaze.” By expanding what it means to be, feel, and identify 
as trans*, Drummond concretizes her predictions that trans* will be the “new zeitgeist for 
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the future” (126). Radically reimagining what a trans*-feminine identity and body can be, 
Grrl Alex pronounces the trans* movement as the next riot grrrl revolution. 
 
Conclusion: Seeing Ourselves Anew 
Trans* and autobiography are collectively created categories that are constraining 
and limitless: they each demand recognition by a community and yet what it means for a 
text to be called an autobiography or who is and is not visible as trans* constantly 
changes. The terms themselves likewise morph to meet the needs of the collective. As 
new knowledges develop, and as individuals live differently imagined lives, both trans* 
identity and the genre of autobiography concomitantly transform. As S. Bear Bergman 
succinctly puts it, “stories are told, and each of these expands our understanding of 
identity a little more and better. Every one of them—every new story, every new word—
creates a kind of opportunity to see ourselves anew” (The Nearest Exit 21). Because life 
narratives bring new identities into fruition, trans* autobiography multiplies gender and 
genre possibilities. Because most autobiographers directly engage an imagined reader, 
highlight truthful intentions, and represent their life stories as both unique and 
representative, the genre allows for yet constrains the types of narratives one can write. 
Simultaneously, trans* identity widely includes yet limits those who fit under its 
umbrella’s shade. 
In these ways, Boylan and Drummond’s autobiographies illuminate new and 
viable possibilities for trans* life stories, which no longer solely rely on medical 
legitimation or sensational models of gender diversity. Demanding that their narratives be 
taken seriously outside expert or institutional approval—in fact, that they are the experts 
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and theoreticians of their lives—Boylan and Drummond reposition trans* identity as one 
possibility of many. Subverting the traditional “acts” of trans* maturation, Boylan and 
Drummond reconfigure gender transition as only one part of their complex humanity, 
rather than the defining factor of their lives—and of their autobiographies.
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In 1937, Stuart Bates defined autobiography simply as “first-hand evidence” or as “a 
narrative of the past of a person by the person concerned” (5). Unlike subsequent 
definitions, which require autobiography to be theoretical or phenomenological or linear 
(or some other exclusionary characteristic), Bates’ definition incorporates a variety of 
disparate texts into one useful analytic category. Fifty years after Bates introduced the 
term, Philippe LeJeune redirected autobiography studies with his canonical conception of 
le pacte autobiographique: in his forward to Lejeune’s On Autobiography, John Paul 
Eakin explains, “the autobiographical pact is a form of contract between author and 
reader in which the autobiographer explicitly commits himself or herself not to some 
impossible historical exactitude but rather to the sincere effort to come to terms with and 
to understand his or her own life” (ix). Rather than simply “first-hand evidence,” which 
implies an immediate connection between narrator and narration, Lejeune understands 
autobiography as an author’s sustained, distanced, and deliberate reflections of 
evidentiary life moments: “not simple verisimilitude, but resemblance to the truth. Not 
‘the effect of the real,’ but the image of the real” (22). The autobiographical pact assumes 
that readers depend on autobiography to be truthful until proven otherwise: the pact 
requires that the reader not question the author’s self-representations until breaks, faults, 
or fissures in the text expose the text to be antithetical to the author’s “true” life story.  
 
2 In a bildungsroman or “coming-of-age” maturation story, “the narrator describes the 
progress of life and career, adult success and the development of the sense of self and 
personal philosophy” (Lynch 212). Trans* autobiographies that follow a bildungsroman 
narrative structure document the author’s birth, childhood, young adulthood, school life, 
relationships, parenthood (if applicable), and professional life, all of which culminates or 
is perpetually driven by the desire for GRS. This structure highlights the author’s 
persistent, significant discomfort with hir body and parallels “wrong body” 
representations in mainstream media. 
 
3 Similarly, Rebecca De Havalland assumes a suspicious, cisgender audience and yet 
expands what it means to live a “normal” life. In the preface to her autobiography, His 
Name is Rebecca (2010), De Havalland writes,  
To me my life is simply that: Nothing extraordinary. It is what I wake up to 
each morning and sometimes it is what I cry myself to sleep over at night. I take 
up more or less the same body-space as you. So you see, I am not so very 
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different to you. A slight tweak here, a lift there, a different set of experiences 
and you could be moulded into me, or I into you. (3) 
De Havalland emphasizes the universal experience of taking up space in a body and 
experiencing emotion, which any normative reader shares. De Havalland assumes that the 
normal cis reader has not had a “tweak here” or a “lift there” but rather is normal 
precisely because ze hasn’t felt the need to change hir body. This common appeal to 
normal exceptionalism reinforces dominant ideologies that define trans* people as 
abnormal.  
 
4 Though trans* autobiographers variously frame their narratives as personal or 
collective—written for the benefit of the author or for others—most trans* 
autobiographies are both individually and communally productive. For example, in 
Stephanie: A Girl in a Million (1991), Stephanie Anne Lloyd intends to document her 
changing identity to “help [her] beloved parents, [her] beautiful and loving ex-wife and 
[her] three irreplaceable children truly to understand the complex and wholly untenable 
condition that [she] fought to come to terms with” (6). This intention is collective rather 
than individual. Like Lloyd, Caroline Cossey hopes that her autobiography, My Story 
(1999), might help others “who are in search of unity between body and mind, as they 
struggle to piece together their particular jigsaw in the face of prejudice and ignorance” 
(xii). In He’s My Daughter: A Mother’s Journey to Acceptance (2002), Lynda Langley 
comes to terms with her daughter’s trans* identity so that others will write their own 
narratives: “Maybe if I tell my story, others will follow, or listen and know they are not 
alone. I need to know I am not alone” (ix). Though her intention is collective in that she 
wants to help and hear from others, Langley also specifies that her collective goal will 
bring personal comfort in knowing she isn’t alone. Leslie Townsend also frames her 
memoirs as “a contribution to everyone in the transgender community, their families and 
friends. And also to society, in the hopes that understanding may be gained from my 
story” (x). All of these examples show that explicitly personal or collective intentions 
within trans* autobiography quickly blur, which implies that personal and collective 
ideas of gender cannot be as neatly separated as authors might like. 
 
5 Nevertheless, surgery was often not an option. Not only is it an expensive procedure not 
often covered by insurance companies due to its “elective” nature, doctors’ biases 
extensively determine who has access to GRS. As Meyerowitz and others suggest, in the 
1950s-1980s, doctors tended to choose patients who would likely “pass” as the “other” 
gender after surgery and who would then live heterosexual lives. Those who identified as 
lesbian trans* women or gay trans* men were not generally granted surgery.  
 
6 In “Transgender Feminism: Queering the Woman Question,” Susan Stryker addresses 
this phenomenon by analyzing her own life narrative. She argues that her transsexual 
body “is different from most other bodies, and while this difference does not impair, it 
has been medicalized” (Stryker, “Transgender Feminism” 67). Further, medical 
legitimation discourse claims its ability to “cure” the individual of the “social 
domination, regulation, and control” associated with living in a trans* body (Stryker, 
“Transgender Feminism” 65). In other words, because the medical model encourages 
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trans* people to feel “disabled”, it is no wonder that so many trans* authors frame their 
life narratives through GRS and rhetorics of rehabilitation. 
 
7 In this section, though I don’t consistently specify, all citations that reference Boylan 
come from I’m Looking through You rather than She’s Not There. 
 
8 Though Boylan doesn’t specify which “Windsong perfume” ad she feared as a child, the 
most popular Windsong advertisement in the mid-1970s was a radio jingle that included 
the lyrics “I can’t seem to forget you” and “you’re always on my mind.” In light of her 
autobiography, these lyrics fit quite well. What Boylan seems to fear the most is not 
being able to clear her mind of the ghosts and genders that haunt her.  
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CHAPTER V  
 
COLLECTIVE ARCHIVES OF RESISTANCE:  
TRANS* DIGITAL STORYTELLING ON YOUTUBE 
One of the most important things that I’ve discovered in my life is 
that where I was and where I’m going is inevitably where I will be found. 
          -Skylar Kergil, YouTube vlogger “SkylarkEleven” 
 
 
In Chapters III and IV, I explored how twenty-first century trans* individuals 
produce new discourses of gender through documentary and literary life narratives. 
Trans* individuals no longer solely represent their identities as pathological (which was a 
common practice in the twentieth century) and, in fact, some trans* people now discuss 
how their lives and experiences can be understood as euphoric rather than dysphoric. 
Locating themselves in resistance to the normalizing gaze of the medical-psychiatric 
institution, some trans* people validate their identities through other means. At the same 
time, trans* individuals who engage in bodywork or experience gender dysphoria can 
readily access similar life stories in mainstream media. As more diverse trans* narratives 
proliferate, the sensational and simplified depictions of the twentieth century no longer 
serve as the only viable options. In Chapter V, I build on these arguments yet shift the 
textual focus to digital storytelling, which is a uniquely twenty-first century form.  
On user-generated digital platforms—like LiveJournal in the early 2000s and 
contemporary sites like Tumblr, WordPress, and YouTube—diverse trans* voices, 
narratives, and images proliferate. Trans* digital storytelling, which is a term I use 
throughout this chapter, refers to amateur audio-visual videos, which individuals share 
with a community of online viewers. On YouTube, individuals post video blogs (or 
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“vlogs”) of themselves speaking directly to the camera and viewing audience. Others post 
videos that depict their daily lives—going to school, interacting with friends and family, 
visiting the doctor, receiving hormone therapy, talking with sexual partners, going to the 
DMV, healing after surgery, and more. By documenting seemingly mundane activities 
for strangers to view, trans* digital storytellers (or “vloggers,” as I sometimes refer to 
them) expand traditional conceptions of what it means to live a trans* life. “While 
seemingly mundane,” Tracy Kennedy argues, the personal vlog “provides a useful way to 
express oneself, a place to unload and unpack feelings.” Blurring the boundaries between 
conceptions of individual and collective knowledge of the self, digital storytelling offers 
some trans* youth the possibility of sharing life stories in personally political and 
politically personal ways.  
Based on my continued desire to foreground how trans* individuals narrate their 
life stories, I narrow this chapter’s focus to two trans*-masculine vloggers: 
SkylarkEleven (whom I refer to throughout this chapter as “Skylar” to honor his chosen 
YouTube moniker and name) is a twenty-three year old musician and activist named 
Skylar Kergil who has documented his transition since the age of seventeen by posting 
more than 200 videos; and KyFord23 (whom I refer to as “Ky”) is a twenty-four year old 
white trans* man from rural Iowa whose twenty-four videos similarly document his 
changing identity and body. Specifically, Skylar and Ky use digital storytelling to record 
their changing bodies and resist medical legitimation discourses that pathologize trans* 
individuals (see Chapters II and IV for discussions of medical legitimation discourses). 
Through documentation and resistance, Skylar and Ky use digital storytelling as a 
reflexive survival tool, which helps them negotiate the societal oppression they 
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experience in safe ways. Instead of merely acknowledging the contemporary nightmares 
of transphobia and heterosexism, Skylar and Ky perform new ways of being. As Ky 
reflects in one video, “not only do we have to accept that we are trans*, we have to 
fucking love it” (“RE: Lost and Confused”). Digital storytelling is thus a creative tool 
these and other trans* individuals employ to archive and embody previously 
unrecognizable gender positions. Through these goals, Skylar and Ky’s digital 
storytelling practices illuminate our cultural moment’s changing epistemology of gender. 
Skylar and Ky’s seemingly disparate goals – to document bodywork and resist the 
medical model – illuminate the ways that digital storytelling can be better understood as a 
platform for “unstable, contested, multiple, and often incoherent selves” (Strangelove 
69). Through time-lapse photography, music, interview, theoretical and emotional 
exploration, and confession, Skylar and Ky expand what it means to live as trans* in a 
world that constantly demands that they choose between male and female. Throughout 
these discussions, I will also highlight how other trans* individuals use YouTube to 
celebrate gender identities that fall outside of normative categories. Rather than isolating 
or colonizing their use of creative expression, narrative, and bodily performance to show 
how trans* youth validate or invalidate established academic theory, I recognize these 
vloggers as themselves gender theorists. Trans* youth tell a digital story that insists on its 
own validity outside of academic and medical discourse. 
Furthermore, I argue that trans* digital storytellers incorporate practices typically 
associated with Second Wave feminist consciousness-raising groups. This idea is one I 
will extensively discuss in relation to how trans*-masculine youth on YouTube construct 
and discuss “community.” As I will argue, white trans* digital storytellers implicitly 
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sidestep the exclusionary tendencies commonly associated with Second Wave 
consciousness-raising groups by enacting what Cherríe Moraga calls “a theory in the 
flesh.”  In line with Chela Sandoval’s conception of “differential consciousness,”1 a 
theory in the flesh is “born out of necessity” based on one’s social position as well as 
one’s physicality – one’s skin color, sexual desire, homeplace, and gender, among other 
factors (Moraga 23). A theory in the flesh is an “attempt to bridge the contradictions in 
our experience…by naming ourselves and by telling our stories in our own words” 
(Moraga 23). This “differential” mode depends on fluidity, allowing subjects to move 
“between and among” forms of resistance in tactical ways (Sandoval, Methodology 14).  
Trans* digital storytellers consistently perform theories in the flesh at the same 
time as they perform theories of the flesh: by naming what was unnamed, telling stories 
in their own words, and archiving the physicality of their changing bodies, trans* 
vloggers reimagine Moraga’s important feminist theory and take up Sandoval’s call to 
action. Moraga and Gloria E. Anzaldúa’s explicit intention in putting together This 
Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (1981) was to bring 
together women of color feminists who experienced multiple and interconnecting layers 
of oppression. Similarly, trans* individuals use digital storytelling to shed harmful 
oppressions, forge relationships, and negotiate knowledge. In light of these arguments, 
trans* digital storytelling might be able to change the way U.S. culture understands 
trans* identity—not only for trans* scholars but also for future generations of trans* 
youth, advocates, medical practitioners, teachers, and students.  
In the future, trans* digital storytelling could help foster a multi-vocal 
conversation about gender, which could challenge hierarchically valued “expert” opinion 
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and, instead, focus on individual life stories within a collective medium. In “Telling 
Tales: Brandon Teena, Billy Tipton, and Transgender Biography,” Jack Halberstam 
claims that “the discussions that take place in medical communities about embodiment 
and desire may be way behind the discussions taking place on email lists [and] in support 
groups” (66). In addition to “email lists” and “support groups,” I believe YouTube offers 
another site wherein trans* people’s dialogues about trans* identity illuminate new ways 
to resist and reconceptualize medical discourse. Halberstam’s theory is made visible on 
YouTube – trans*-masculine individuals resist medical mandates and create life 
narratives that do not rely on legitimation discourses.  
Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest that there are no negative aspects to digital 
storytelling; on the contrary, there are significant issues related to privacy, stalking, 
harassment, and cyber-bullying, which contribute to real and sometimes life-threatening 
circumstances. Issues of access also disrupt the positive outcomes I will discuss: one’s 
class, race, and physical ability contribute to whether one has the technology, leisure 
time, and freedom to watch (let alone create and post) videos. Materially speaking, in 
order to create a vlog, one must have access to a video camera or computer, video and 
music editing software, a microphone, the internet, and the space to quietly and 
independently record oneself. Though smartphones and computer software programs 
have reduced the amount of required technology, lighting, and time, not all or even most 
trans* individuals have access to this medium and thus its “collective” nature 
incorporates only a portion of trans* Americans.  
By mapping the terrain of trans*-masculine digital storytelling on YouTube, 
Chapter V documents how trans* individuals reinvent the self through social methods. In 
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the following sections, I explore how trans* digital storytellers expand what it means to 
live a white trans* life in twenty-first century America. First, I investigate the unique 
aspects of the YouTube vlog; I explain what it is, what it does, and how it has grown in 
popularity in the past five years. Second, I discuss the ways that Skylar, Ky, and other 
white, trans*-masculine vloggers document their transitions by taking advantage of the 
diary nature of video posts. In this section, I show how documenting one’s body as it 
changes is interconnected with exploring identity, creating dialogue with others, and 
forging digital consciousness-raising groups, which mimic Second Wave iterations. 
Third, I examine how Skylar and Ky explicitly resist discourses of medical legitimation, 
which pathologize and limit trans* expression. Finally, I analyze how Skylar, Ky, and 
other trans*-masculine digital storytellers collectively negotiate trans* knowledges. 
 
Trans* Digital Storytelling and YouTube 
Digital storytelling is a genre that has become incredibly popular in a short 
amount of time. Not only do millions of people produce and post personal videos each 
day, hundreds of millions of people consume such videos. In his 2010 survey, Michael 
Strangelove found that “Internet users watch more than 1 billion video clips on YouTube 
every day, and much of that viewing time is spent watching amateur videos” (3). 
Similarly, in their study of the most popular YouTube videos, Jean Burgess and Joshua 
Green discovered that vlog entries dominated the sample, “making up nearly 40 percent 
of the videos coded Most Discussed and just over a quarter of the videos coded Most 
Viewed” (94). On an average day, hundreds of millions of individuals from all over the 
globe watch vlogs produced by people they do not know and likely will never meet.  
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To be sure, as Strangelove argues, video diaries have loudly demanded an 
“attention economy on the Internet,” which should not be neglected by autobiography or 
media scholars who might view these posts as obscure or inauthentic (71). In 2010, at the 
time of Strangelove’s study, “a search for the term vlog (video blog) on YouTube renders 
310,000 hits” (70). Since 2010, the searchable number of vlogs has exponentially grown: 
in January of 2015, for example, a search for the term “vlog” renders over twenty million 
videos. In five short years, the number of vlogs posted on YouTube increased by more 
than sixty-four times. This ever-expanding “chorus of voices” illuminates the fact that 
“video confessions yield further video confessions” (Werner 41).  
In the same period of time, the amount of information related to trans* identity 
located a click away powerfully represents a twenty-first century cultural shift. I have 
researched trans* digital storytelling for more than four years, and every few months I 
take note of the upward trend in YouTube and Google’s searchable trans*-related 
material. In November 2012, for example, a YouTube search for “transgender” produced 
137,000 videos, up from 78,000 in May of the same year. In November 2012, a YouTube 
search for “trans” brought up almost half a million videos, up from 300,000 six months 
before. Two years later, in October 2014, the numbers were staggering: searching 
“transgender” brought up more than 679,000 clips and “trans” matched 6 million. Today, 
in January 2015, a Google search for “transgender” brings up 75 million websites, which 
is more than quadruple the number three years ago. Clearly, public discourse related to 
trans* identity is rapidly expanding: in Susan Stryker’s words, American culture and new 
media are “fascinat[ed]” by “all things transgender” (Transgender History 26).  
Nevertheless, though a cultural “fascination” with “all things transgender” does 
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not necessarily produce positive or even realistic representations of trans* lives, trans* 
individuals and allies create much of YouTube’s trans*-related material. Trans* media 
scholar Sonja Vivienne echoes my research when she argues that digital spaces have 
“heralded unprecedented opportunities for trans people who wish to speak their own 
stories in public spaces” (43). For trans* teenagers and tweens who grew up “amid the 
turn-of-the-century digital media and telecommunications revolution,” intuitively using 
new media to constitute or reinforce identity “just makes sense” (Stryker, Transgender 
History 26). According to Mary Gray, an enormous number of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans*, queer, and intersex (LGBTQI) youth turn to the internet as a tool to find others 
who are “like them,” ask questions they couldn’t ask of their parents, teachers, or friends, 
and combat the isolation some experience in small-town America.2 For many queer 
youth, “the Internet has been an important, even vital venue for connecting with others 
and for establishing a sense of identity and community” (Alexander and Losh 39). These 
ideas also apply to the tens of thousands of trans* youth who use YouTube to connect 
with others, share stories, and gain new insights, which the nontrans* people in their 
daily lives cannot or will not give them. As R. Cohn reiterates, “many, if not most, of us 
have no problems dealing with being trans – it’s how we fare at the hands of others who 
are steeped in cultural bigotry which causes distress. In each of these scenarios, it is often 
an Internet connection and support groups that keep us going” (qtd. in Heinz 327). In 
these ways, vlogging is a mode of resistance that quite literally saves lives.  
In their study of “participatory politics,” Cathy J. Cohen and Joseph Kahne 
illuminate how and why youth interact online. Echoing previous findings, Cohen and 
Kahne find that online participation is a popular endeavor. Defining “participatory 
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politics” as “interactive, peer-based acts through which individuals and groups seek to 
exert both voice and influence on issues of public concern,” Cohen and Kahne discover 
that out of the youth they surveyed, a surprisingly high one in six create “original media 
to share online” (vi-vii). Because online contexts “provide a space of connection…where 
trust is built and deliberation happens,” digital spaces allow individuals to “buil[d] and 
mobiliz[e]” collective identities (Cohen and Kahne ix). By engaging in digital 
participatory acts, young social media users “facilitate a renegotiation of political power 
and control” through recognizably personal iterations of identity (Cohen and Kahne vi).  
Interestingly, Cohen and Kahne’s study did not find statistically significant 
differences in how youth of diverse races use the internet: contrary to the assumption that 
nonwhite youth have fewer opportunities to engage in “participatory politics” based on 
access to technology, Cohen and Kahne discovered that “96% of whites, 94% of blacks, 
96% of Latinos and 98% of Asian Americans all have access to a computer that connects 
to the internet” (vii). In fact, “participation is highest among black youth” (Cohen and 
Kahne viii). Even when they took into account their participants’ income and class, 
Cohen and Kahne found no significant differences based on race (x).3 These findings 
show that youth who participate on user-generated sites may not do so because of 
heightened “access” as scholars once imagined. Developing technologies clearly offer 
similar opportunities for youth of all socio-economic and racial backgrounds to interact 
online. Unlike the more traditional genres of documentary and autobiography, digital 
storytelling is an accessible and free way to share life stories. Laurie McNeill, Helen 
Kennedy, Julie Rak, and Marilee Lindemann agree: “bypassing the commercial, 
aesthetic, or political interests that dictate access to traditional print media, and that 
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decide whose life stories deserve to be told,” digital sites like YouTube offer egalitarian 
platforms for subjugated knowledges to flourish (McNeill 26).4 At its core, digital 
storytelling is a radically collective and intensely personal genre.5 
 
Collective Support: Trans* Communities on YouTube 
Without the trans community on YouTube I wouldn’t have known 
that transgender people exist. It’s great for awareness, and support. I 
hope my videos can contribute both of those things in the community. 
-Benton Sorenson, YouTube vlogger 
 
 
The white, trans*-masculine digital storytellers I analyze share at least two goals: 
first, to connect with others who are going through similar experiences or who are 
looking for answers (to foster community); and second, to reclaim agency over their 
bodies, identities, and life stories (to foster individuality). In light of these shared goals, 
this section illustrates how trans*-masculine YouTube vloggers create consciousness-
raising communities and use digital storytelling as an act of personal reclamation. 
Though I discuss the notion of “community,” I want to stress the fact that there is no such 
thing as one monolithic trans* community (on YouTube or otherwise), just as there is no 
such thing as one trans* identity or narrative.6 In reality, there are many different types of 
trans* communities online, and YouTube is only one platform through which trans* 
collectivity is made visible.  
As previously mentioned, trans* digital storytelling offers a contemporary 
example of 1970s and ‘80s Second Wave feminist consciousness-raising groups. 
According to Tracy Kennedy, in consciousness-raising groups, women came together “to 
talk about their experiences of sexism and oppression under a system that traditionally 
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undervalued women.” Fostering the sharing of common experiences, consciousness-
raising groups helped women to see that their feelings could be accredited to a “social 
system laden with cultural and institutional ideologies that dominate and subjugate 
women” (Kennedy, “The Personal is Political”). Women were thus able to find comfort 
and validation while learning how to place blame externally rather than internally. 
Bonnie Moore-Randolph and Clydene Ross-Valliere clarify: “by becoming more aware 
of the reasons behind their behavior,” women who attended consciousness-raising groups 
were encouraged to “explore alternatives in making decisions about their lifestyles” 
(922). Consciousness-raising groups thus offered some women the ability to reclaim 
agency over their lives and relationships. Not only did these groups benefit the women 
who attended meetings, these groups benefited all women who were a part of a culture 
that began to change because of the discussions women were able to have in 
consciousness-raising spaces (Keating, “Building Coalitional Consciousness” 89). 
At the same time, consciousness-raising groups were not intended to be therapy 
sessions where women could simply “get in touch” with their feelings (Scheman 34); 
instead, Second Wave feminists designed these groups to create communities that could 
“collectively advocate for social change” (Kennedy, “The Personal is Political”).7 In 
these meetings, which followed a “three-step method,” women focused on “sharing, 
analysis, and action planning” (Keating, “Building Coalitional Consciousness” 89). 
Kathie Sarachild, who developed consciousness-raising guidelines, suggested that there 
should be no designated leader so that women could freely and more organically engage 
in dialogue (Keating, “Building Coalitional Consciousness” 87-9). Along these lines, the 
assumption at the root of Second Wave feminist consciousness-raising strategies was that 
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“everyone is a theorist” who is capable of critiquing society so as to change society 
(McKinnon 102).  
Nevertheless, consciousness-raising groups have been widely critiqued, 
particularly by feminists of color, lesbians, and women with disabilities, who argue that 
these groups explicitly and implicitly featured exclusionary tendencies. The problems 
associated with Second Wave feminist groups, according to Cricket Keating, stemmed 
from some women’s desire to “searc[h] for commonalities” (91), which can be a 
dangerous and “alienating” practice for women of color (Sandoval, “Feminist and 
Racism” 66). In other words, by searching for unity rather than solidarity, consciousness-
raising groups created “safe spaces” for otherwise privileged white, heterosexual, able-
bodied, middle class American women to share their woes and pontificate about the 
future of feminism rather than to actively seek social justice or search for and validate 
alternative perspectives. 
Moreover, consciousness-raising groups understood the category “woman” as 
coherent rather than contested and multifaceted, which encouraged women to downplay 
“inequitable power relations” among discussion members (Keating, “Building Coalitional 
Consciousness” 91). As Chandra Talpade Mohanty and Elsa Barkely Brown maintain, 
this practice did not take into account the race and class identities women did not share, 
which encouraged Second Wave feminists to view difference as “benign and non-
challenging” (qtd. in Keating, “Building Coalitional Consciousness” 91-3). This 
understanding of difference was, in Brown’s words, “as deadening to coalition-building 
as the erasure of difference itself” as (qtd. in Keating, “Building Coalitional 
Consciousness” 93). Further, consciousness-raising groups did not adequately assess how 
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women co-create oppressive gendered systems. Instead, white, middle class, straight, 
able-bodied, cisgender women understood themselves as somewhat passively inculcated 
within a system that oppresses all women in the same ways. 
Despite the inherent pitfalls associated with consciousness-raising groups, I argue 
that trans* YouTube vloggers incorporate the productive goals of these communities to 
talk about how trans* experience and identity shapes their lives and social positions in a 
widely transphobic culture. Trans* digital storytellers engage in difficult and complex 
discussions about gender, life, relationships, sexuality, health care, politics, and the body, 
which expands cultural epistemologies of gender. Trans* vloggers validate one another’s 
stories by offering comfort to viewers who feel they are alone in their desire to transition 
or who occupy a gender-diverse social position.8 However, in light of these extensive and 
important critiques, we should consider whether trans* digital storytellers replicate 
similar exclusionary tendencies. We should ask, who is included in the trans* 
communities that are visible online? Who might be explicitly or implicitly excluded? If 
YouTube can indeed be an example of a contemporary consciousness-raising platform, 
how might white trans*-masculine vloggers’ stories elide fundamental intersections of 
race, class, sexuality, and ability? How might white trans*-masculine vloggers reify 
trans* as a stable category rather than a contested position many disparate people 
occupy? These and other questions need to be more fully explored. In this section, though 
I touch on these questions, I do not actively search for the exclusionary practices some 
trans* vloggers might exhibit. Instead, I follow what trans* vloggers themselves purport: 
the consciousness-raising communities YouTubers forge are beneficial to those who use 
them. Not only do trans* users consistently maintain that they are beneficial, I have yet to 
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find accounts by trans*-identified individuals who argue that these digital communities 
are in and of themselves oppressive or exclusionary.    
In actuality, trans* individuals who use YouTube consistently discuss the fact that 
there are many positive outcomes to finding friends and confidantes in cyberspace, 
especially when those connections are with others who share social, political, or personal 
goals. FTM Magazine’s October 2014 edition (which features Skylar Kergil on its cover) 
exemplifies this claim: affectionately referred to as “The YouTube Issue,” at least 
seventy percent of the magazine is dedicated to trans*-masculine vloggers discussing 
how and why they use YouTube. Though the vloggers are diverse in terms of race, class, 
sexuality, ability, and location, they all reference YouTube’s communal aspects; all the 
vloggers FTM includes express heartfelt gratitude towards other trans* men who have 
changed their lives by digitally recording their life stories. For instance, Dade Barlow 
(who goes by ElectricDade on YouTube) has been, in his words, “so positively affected 
by the videos that other transmen made,” that he chose to “follow in their footsteps, and 
hopefully make a difference [him]self” (FTM 20). Barlow continues, “While considering 
transition, I could find no other resource that compared to YouTube when it came to real 
life documentation of transitioning. I wanted to add my story to that resource” (FTM 20). 
Similarly, Chase Ross (who goes by uppercaseCHASE1 on YouTube and is a vlogger I 
will later discuss in depth) expresses the notion that he would not be alive if it wasn’t for 
the YouTube trans* community and his viewers: “I didn’t even know trans men existed 
before YouTube. I think the YouTube trans community has helped lots of people realize 
who they are and helped them solve many problems like how to come, how to pack, how 
to pass, how to go on T [testosterone] and so on” (FTM 24). In his reflection, Ross 
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connects the notion of community with survival, identification, and knowledge. Watching 
other trans* men talk about their lives creates a sense of community, even if the vlogger 
and viewer never digitally interact. Without a doubt, trans* men who vlog see the 
medium as collective.  
Merely being aware that there are other trans* men in the world – particularly 
trans* men who find happiness in publicly declaring a trans* identity – can change how 
individuals understand and narrate their lives. Ashton Colby reveals that his own 
transition did not seem possible until he “saw videos of real guys living their lives and 
feeling the same way” (FTM 35). YouTube gave Colby “hope” and “inspiration” that he 
too could live an openly trans* life (FTM 35). Many other trans* men in FTM’s 
“YouTube Issue” relate similar sentiments: Benton Sorenson thanks his viewers and 
those who have “supported [him] over the internet,” which, in his words, “means the 
world” (22); Ryan Cassata claims that YouTube “has allowed [him] to connect with the 
Trans community and to make many good friends” (27); Emery Quincy argues that 
YouTube vlogs have “shaped the community by providing an outlet and source of 
networking for thousands of transgender people all over the planet” (30); and Noah 
Wagoner suggests that the world is “more honest” because of YouTube, in that trans* 
vloggers are “reaching people outside [of their] intended audience” (32). There are many 
other examples of this kind of rhetoric in the interviews FTM features. Based on these 
interviews, as well as the interactions I discuss below, I argue that digital storytelling is a 
contemporary, more inclusive version of feminist consciousness-raising in that the 
diversity and wide array of voices on YouTube fosters complicated, nuanced, and 
collectively negotiated discussions.  
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The notion of fostering community through sharing stories is also imbedded 
within vloggers’ video posts. For example, Skylar explicitly states his archival yet 
collective intentions in “response to Kean – November twenty ten”:  
I originally started putting videos out to uh document my vocal changes…it 
was kind of like a blog for me, like a journal of my transition…so I never 
went out searching for other trans* guys on YouTube but all of a sudden 
like related videos would pop up and like it would be this guy who had just 
gotten top surgery and I would go looking and be like “wow! That’s 
incredible!”…and I really got excited about my own future.  
Skylar emphasizes his desire to archive his body’s changes as he begins testosterone and 
plans for a double mastectomy and, at the same time, draws attention to the ways that 
other trans* vloggers reflected his bodily desires and future possibilities. Later in this 
video, Skylar relates, “community is one of the most powerful things.” He has been able 
to see other trans* men on YouTube and thus “know[s] they exist,” which encourages 
Skylar to continue to share his own life stories with others (“response to Kean”).   
Ky similarly emphasizes his relationships with and imagined responsibility to his 
viewers, which informs the way he narrates his life. This fact is distinct in his first video, 
“FTM Intro,” in which he implores his audience to accompany him throughout his 
transition in ways that his rural, unsupportive community will not (see Image 5.1). “I live 
in a pretty conservative area…on the borderline of Illinois and Iowa, and so people aren’t 
very open-minded around here,” Ky confesses (“FTM Intro”). The only people in his life 
who know about his trans* identification and plans to seek hormones are his two sisters 
and a few friends; his parents and others are not yet aware. Ky goes on to explain, “I’m 
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hoping to share my experience with people who don’t really understand and other trans* 
guys out there. I know you guys on YouTube have helped me so much, so I just wanna 
thank you guys for that” (“FTM Intro”).  
 
 
Image 5.1: KyFord23 in “FTM Intro” discusses his choice to begin transitioning to a 
masculine subject position.  
 
Ky constructs an intimate, conversational storytelling experience through his 
direct address to the viewer and choice of setting. He continuously mentions his viewers’ 
questions and addresses his audience at the beginning of every video in the same way: 
“Hi guys, it’s me, Ky.” He often mentions “getting to his inbox,” which suggests that his 
viewers have messaged him with comments and questions to which he plans to respond. 
He promises his viewers that he will document his double mastectomy in “9 Months on 
T” and, one month later, follows through with this promise in “Top Surgery” (see Image 
5.2). His choice of setting—most often his bedroom—highlights how he conscientiously 
constructs his videos as intimate conversations. In these scenes, he draws attention to the 
posters on his bedroom wall—one of Michael Jordan, his “idol”—and several 
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drawings of his own making. In “Identity,” his clothes lay strewn across the floor and on 
the bed, and he occasionally apologizes about the clutter, as one might with a friend in a 
personal space (see Image 5.3). Ky’s consistently direct address to his audience, some of 
whom have previously empowered him, from within the domestic space of his—or his 
parents’—home, draws attention to the participatory and community-building nature of 
what Patricia G. Lange calls “videos of affinity.” Videos of affinity “try to establish 
communicative connections to people, often members of a social network” who “identify 
or interpellate themselves” in similar ways as the vlogger (Lange 71). Like other types of 
videos of affinity, Ky’s vlogs are “not oriented around content but rather around human 
connections” (Lange 78). Ky exemplifies this notion and consistently seeks connection 
with his viewers. 
 
 
Image 5.2: KyFord23 in “Top Surgery,” which includes before and after videos from his 
double mastectomy. In this clip, doctors unwrap Ky’s bandages for the first time. 
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Image 5.3: Kyford23, in “Identity,” perches on his bed, which is his favorite spot to vlog.  
 
Like many other trans* vloggers, Ky welcomes his viewers to follow his intensely 
personal journey and viewers respond in equally personal ways. Other users respond to 
Ky’s display of mutual validation in his “FTM Intro” video (as well as most of his other 
posts) with positive and intensely grateful comments. For example, Musiqluv788 
comments on his “6 months on T” video, writing, “I know I’m super late but its so nice to 
watch your transition. I feel like I’ve been with you the whole time.” Similarly, 
kiromasaje posts a comment on “Identity”: “oh my god, that almost brought tears to my 
eyes…guess i’m not the only one that feels that way.” In the comments sections for other 
videos, users ask questions about where Ky buys his binders, what doctor he used for his 
double mastectomy, and other more specific questions about the milligrams of 
testosterone he injects and his preference of sexual positions. In many places, particularly 
in the beginning of his transition, following the threads associated with these comments 
shows that Ky consistently responds to sincere encouragement and questions by offering 
answers, suggestions, and thanks. 
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Nevertheless, though most comments are supportive, many others “troll” Ky’s 
posts and some comments that seem encouraging actually reinforce transphobic 
discourses. Trolling is defined as an online act (particularly a post on a blog, article, vlog, 
or other digital forum) with the intention to redirect conversation, add ideas that are 
unrelated, odd, or humorous, and elicit an emotional response from others. Sometimes 
trolling is benign, but it can also be malicious, particularly when it is threatening, uses 
sexual imagery and language, or is derogatory. Some users try to encourage Ky and yet 
reinforce transphobic notions that he is “really” female or that he should question his 
identity since he incorporates some aspects of femininity into his gender expressions. For 
instance, in “Gay Frenzy,” Ky discusses feeling attracted to other trans* men, which has 
forced him to call his heterosexual orientation into question for the first time. Again, 
though many of this video’s 148 comments are supportive (the most common response is 
from individuals who express how excited they are to find another trans* story that 
relates to their own), other users police Ky’s gender expression, refer to his previous life, 
and call his narrative into question. lovelylady7 writes, “you look way better with less 
makeup on!” and seri0us adds, “Guys always hit on you because you’re gorgeous! I 
wouldn't be surprised if even the straight girls did too!” Though seemingly positive, these 
comments implicitly demand that Ky should express himself in stereotypically masculine 
ways. Though seri0us, in particular, suggests that Ky is attractive (which is a positive 
sentiment), hir statement that “even straight girls” might hit on him implies that Ky is not 
really or fundamentally male. Farther down in the comments, nakita_c asks, “what did 
you look like as a girl? J” These and other users reify the notion that Ky should be more 
masculine or that his “original” sex overrides his trans*-masculine identity and 
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experience. Clearly, even encouraging comments can harbor harmful and ignorant 
implications. Because of the way some users police trans* vloggers, digital storytelling 
spaces can easily become unsafe, threatening, and damaging to a vlogger’s sense of self.  
Though Ky and Skylar almost never respond to negative comments—except 
through addressing particularly hurtful ones in subsequent videos—other users actively 
pursue negative YouTubers. In this way, users police Skylar and Ky at the same time as 
they police one another. In one representative example, in response to Skylar’s five-year 
transitional montage video, AirbusA380rox writes, “I’d still call Skylar a guy, but it’s 
kinda weird that he’s a guy with no penis.” Though it seems that AirbusA380rox is trying 
to be supportive in validating Skylar’s identity as a “guy,” AirbusA380rox reifies the 
notion that genital formation trumps gender identity. Drawing attention to what Skylar’s 
body looks like takes attention away from his powerful video of transformation. 
Nevertheless, AirbusA380rox’s comment received thirty responses from other users 
coming to Skylar’s defense. itzmeherehi immediately counters, “you don’t need a dick to 
be a dude, if you think you do then your a dick.” Caz Savidge replies with a less 
combative response: “It’s not weird, it’s just something that isn’t extremely common.” A 
few interjections later, gnarlybudz enters the discussion with clear intent to troll the now 
passionate others: “Well youre wrong. If all genetic makeup considers you to be a female 
then your brain yearning to be a boy doesnt qualify you as a boy. Its not a matter of 
opinion because it is a fact that this is a girl. However we can all give her comfort by 
refering to her as a boy if she really wants.” Though the discussion somewhat devolves 
following this comment, several users engage gnarlybudz by referring to academic 
studies, writing personal narratives of their own trans* experience, and calling out this 
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user’s use of incorrect and harmful assumptions (not to mention grammar, spelling, and 
punctuation). Though gnarlybudz continues to troll this thread, the interactions that occur 
between users who try to change gnarlybudz’ mind visually map a collectively negotiated 
discussion. Though it is likely that gnarlybudz did not learn anything and will continue to 
troll other videos, the trans* and nontrans* users who were a part of this discussion were 
undoubtedly interested in exchanging knowledge with the hopeful intent of changing 
gnarlybudz’ perspective. Productively, this thread’s visible exchange of knowledge 
attests to the fact that there are thousands of users who share positive and supportive 
views of trans* identity and are committed to declaring and negotiating those views. 
Because Skylar never once enters the discussion, one might imagine this comment 
thread as displacing Skylar’s agency: several users speak for and about him without his 
consent. Though this notion is partly true, I also see the discussion as one that symbolizes 
how gender epistemology is constantly negotiated in digital storytelling spaces in ways 
that benefit all users. Though these discussions complicate the notion of a trans*-
masculine “community” on YouTube, it is not clear whether they negatively affect Skylar 
and other vloggers’ senses of self. Skylar continues to post videos, respond to positive 
comments, and disregard the trolls. Digital storytelling’s remote yet interactive nature 
thus offers him the ability to choose which responses to address and which to ignore; in 
these ways, YouTube is a space in which trans* knowledges are collectively negotiated in 
affirming yet precariously safe ways. 
For these reasons, the rhetorical power of digital storytelling centers around a 
vlogger’s ability to establish an identity that is not only self-made but also recognized and 
publicly discussed by viewers. Similar to queer “coming out” videos, trans* vlogs 
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illuminate the existence of many different kinds of online communities. Jean Burgess and 
Joshua Green maintain that the vlog “is a form whose persistent direct address to the 
viewer inherently invites feedback” in an “intercreative” fashion (94). Marilee 
Lindemann agrees, arguing that YouTube “is a community built almost entirely out 
of…publicly reiterated gestures of self-invention and affiliation” (210). Because of 
YouTube’s “intercreative” function, the viewer’s role is active rather than passive—the 
viewer participates in constructing the text, and, at the same time, validates, questions, 
and/or denies the identities to which the vlogger subscribes. The vlogger’s identity is thus 
relational, depending on the array of discussions his videos produce, as well as personal. 
Because, as Tobias Raun argues, trans* vloggers “address a selection of audiences” 
ranging from like-minded trans* people to “a larger global audience,” trans* digital 
storytellers “create awareness and advocacy for trans-related issues” at the same time as 
they begin conversations that develop and negotiate trans* knowledges (116). Though 
trans* vloggers encourage collectivity, the communities they create are complex and 
variable.  
 
Archiving Trans* Embodiment and Identity through Digital Storytelling 
Trans* digital storytellers like Skylar emphasize profound connections between 
one’s body and one’s biography. By connecting how they feel about their bodies to how 
they relate to individuals and socio-political systems, Skylar and Ky highlight how 
standpoint epistemology is interdependent with social location—both how ze identifies 
and how others identify hir through visual markers. As trans* youth engage in bodywork,  
social location shifts: ze may be more often publicly recognized as a boy or man, called 
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“sir,” or ze may notice that ze is treated differently by heterosexual men. Ze may receive 
different comments on videos as hir appearance and comportment figures in new ways 
onscreen. As hir public recognition changes, so too does hir sense of self. As Riki Ann 
Wilchins underscores, to understand our bodies, we must “understand the cultural gaze 
that fixes upon them, we must construct what our bodies can be said to mean and to look 
like” (40). One’s standpoint epistemology, in other words, is constructed by one’s 
position in society based on an array of visible and invisible identities. For many trans* 
vloggers, these identities are in flux, which illuminates critical ideas about the body. 
If we think of the body as a situation (à la Simone de Beauvoir), which occupies a 
particular setting, placement, and cultural rules to follow, to grasp our bodies fully would 
require that we think objectively and subjectively about them—how we move in and with 
them, how we take up space, and how others perceive our bodies. In other words, “the 
physical being is in itself a political statement” in that the “body is a participant in 
generating social practice” (Nagoshi and Brzuzu 435). As Julie L. Nagoshi and 
Stephan/ie Brzuzu suggest, we are the experts of our bodies because we are the only ones 
who inhabit them; and yet, at the same time, how others perceive our bodies influences 
how we view ourselves and how we negotiate dominant ideologies. Ky and Skylar 
embody these notions throughout their videos: they use their bodies to express new, 
subjective experiences as they become socially recognized men. Resisting “the meanings 
culture drapes” on their bodies, which can often be “extremely painful and depressing,” 
Skylar and Ky’s creative documentation allows them to situate their bodies in ways that 
feel more right and that reflect a more fitting cultural gaze (Wilchins 40). 
Skylar, Ky, and other trans*-masculine vloggers document their changing bodies 
215 
 
 
in ways that function as a digital scrapbook with a chronological index. When a viewer 
finds a new vlog, ze can watch the entirety of the vlog’s progression or start fresh from 
the newest entry without any background information. This set-up allows individuals “to 
put events in context and get the whole story without the diarist having to explain again” 
(Lindemann 201). Users (vloggers and viewers alike) can also access the videos 
chronologically, which is of particular importance for those who document their journey 
throughout all processes of medical intervention. With this interactive function, users can 
scroll back through time and visually see identity, body, and narrative change or choose 
to focus on one topic that is of interest.  
Throughout his videos, Skylar documents hormonal and surgical milestones, 
which expresses his body as the signifier or “evidence” that he is changing. With an 
emphasis on archival documentation, Skylar records how his use of bodywork (hormone 
injection, surgery, hysterectomy, and other masculinizing practices) transforms him 
corporeally. In early videos, he titles his posts in relation to the passing of time after 
beginning bodywork: “1 week on Testosterone,” “2 months on T,” and “1 week post-op” 
are three examples of over 200 videos that archive his transition. In almost every video, 
he outlines hormonal effects on his body and mind while he flexes his muscles, shows 
developing acne and hair growth (particularly on his arms, face, stomach, and legs, which 
are characteristic of a male-typical body), displays bruises and scars that accompany 
surgery, and reveals his post-op chest (see Image 5.4). As he shows these changes, he 
comments on how he feels about his body and conjectures about how others might feel 
who could be differently experiencing testosterone. 
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Image 5.4: SkylarkEleven in “six months on testosterone! + comparison” documents his 
surgery scars and new hair growth. 
 
 
The masculinization practices Skylar documents performatively create his 
masculine social identity in personal and political ways. Based on dominant notions of 
what a “man” is, it is not surprising that trans*-masculine vloggers like Skylar emphasize 
stereotypically masculine characteristics such as deepening voices, muscle and hair 
growth, and post-surgery, flat chests. Skylar documents his post-surgery body in “Chest 
Healing over Four Months!” wherein he pieces together six previously posted videos that 
show his chest from the side and front as he comments on how happy he is with his 
recovery and newfound freedom. Like many other trans*-masculine vloggers, in 
subsequent videos, Skylar records himself shirtless, visibly relishing his ability to bare his 
chest on camera in a public space (see Image 5.5). This documentation process shows his 
body changing at the same time as it rhetorically and visually establishes a new identity.  
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Image 5.5: Skylar in “SkylarkEleven’s Channel Trailer,” in which he discusses and 
shows testosterone’s effect on his muscle and hair growth. 
 
 
Intriguingly, many other trans*-masculine vloggers who do not receive or are 
waiting to receive top surgery place the camera in such a way as to appear flat-chested, 
by only showing the viewer the bare tops of their shoulders, arms, chest, and neck (see 
Images 5.6 and 5.7).9 This practice legitimates the notion that body transformation 
constructs identity and how one is perceived in the world at the same time as it celebrates 
non-medical gender fluidity. By bearing part of their chests even without surgery, these 
vloggers illuminate the fact that self-representation has the capacity to create a new 
identity, even when the body doesn’t change. Douglas Schrock, Lori Read, and Emily M. 
Boyd suggest that an emphasis on bodywork “shapes subjectivity, identity, and 
perception” both for trans* individuals and those who respond to them (318). In light of 
this argument, perhaps trans* individuals who emphasize bodywork or visually present 
themselves in masculine ways do so to reiterate and evoke their newly negotiated selves.  
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Image 5.6: Alker in “Hombre Trans/FTM Transition: Two months on T/2 meses” 
appears shirtless, though he has not yet received top surgery. In this video, Alker uses a 
headset to reduce the sound of his voice. As he clarifies, he is not yet out to his family, so 
he doesn’t want to risk them hearing his YouTube narratives. 
 
 
 
 
Image 5.7: Popeslave introduces himself to the YouTube community in “Radford’s FTM 
Vlog Intro.” Though he has received hormone therapy for several months, he has not yet 
received top surgery yet still bears the top of his chest.  
 
 
YouTube thus functions as a mirror, illuminating the literal ways one can reinvent 
gender through or in spite of one’s body. As trans* men capture themselves on video in 
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the moment of recording as well as in the editing process, they also continually see 
themselves reflected back onscreen. This notion is clearly evident in the videos trans*-
masculine digital storytellers produce: they adjust clothing and hair, smile and make 
funny faces, laugh at disheveled appearances, and analyze how their bodies translate on 
camera. In relation, the vlogger’s camera, computer, or smart phone witnesses the “birth” 
of a new identity and corporeal form (Raun 119). This external yet internal mirroring 
gaze allows vloggers to evaluate themselves while “assum[ing] the shape” of a desired 
representation (Raun 120).  
 Though intended as an archive of his changing body, Skylar’s vlog becomes an 
archive of his changing identity as well. For instance, in “a march 2012 update!”, Skylar 
contemplates his trans* identity and body after he has been on testosterone for two years:  
 I started hormones at a young age, and I definitely think that was the right 
choice for me but…I also think it’s important to understand that gender is 
very fluid, and so although my like I identify as a man, um my body is 
neither male nor female at this point. And I’m starting to groove on that, 
like I’m accepting that. But it’s okay to be in-between and uh for me, 
hormones and surgery were…a way of making my body identify more 
with my own identity um but also realizing that that is fluid…But um I 
think it’s really important to realize that gender is like a very much 
constructed thing and it’s very inherent as well. So, I’ve had a lot of 
thoughts about my own identity. 
Though his first year and a half of videos focus on his transitioning body as he becomes 
socially accepted as a man, in this and other subsequent videos, Skylar begins to 
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contemplate his identity in more contradictory ways. At times, he rejects a trans* label, 
maintaining that because he passes most of the time as a man, his transition is 
“complete.”10 In other videos, he fully embraces a trans* identity and even occasionally 
rejects identifying as a man.11 With or without access to academic theory, his experiences 
as a trans* man with a “female past,” as he calls it, reveal the ways that gender is both 
“constructed” as well as “inherent” (“a march 2012 update!”). His changing body 
encourages him to think more openly about the concept of gender identity itself. 
Skylar’s emphasis on bodily change in relationship to identity illuminates what 
Lucas Cassidy Crawford calls a “geo-affective theory” of gender. According to 
Crawford, using bodywork as the basis for an authentic trans* identity demands 
“metaphors of…literal movement from place to place by those who practice it” (129). 
Embodying and representing change, then, is “an essential component” of the trans* self 
(Crawford 435). It is too easy to say that the self changes as the body changes or that the 
body must change if the self changes; instead, the body and the self alter in 
interconnected ways. Skylar performs Crawford’s geo-affective understanding of trans* 
experience by pairing body documentation with explanations of identity transformation.  
Though Skylar is consistently positive about his transition, he occasionally 
contemplates the notion that to change is also to lose or even “murder” a part of himself 
(“addressing my ‘past’”). For example, in “transition 4 months!”, Skylar remarks, “I 
think [transitioning] was definitely the right choice for me and I couldn’t imagine my life 
any other way. But at the same time like the more I think about it I’m also kind of losing 
part of my identity, like what I was before. And um it scares me.” In subsequent videos, 
he continues to come back to the notion that he might be losing something he can no 
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longer recover. At the same time, Skylar suggests that publicly using YouTube to identify 
as trans* helps to recover the “lost” history he occasionally mourns. Three years after 
posting “transition 4 months!,” Skylar reflects on this issue in one of his most personal 
videos, “addressing my ‘past.’” In this twenty minute video, he cognizes his life before 
coming out as a “disassociation” in that he has already “lived a second life.” “Looking 
back at who I was then is not at all who I am now,” Skylar muses.  
Nevertheless, he goes on to contradict his previous thought that this idea means 
that he has somehow “lost” or “murdered” a part of himself; rather, he has gained the 
ability to understand himself as “whole” by reclaiming a female past:  
That’s a huge part of my life right there that’s like the first fifteen years of 
my life…So I’ve been thinking a lot about this idea of the past and how 
that ties into the present um, and how I could either completely remove 
myself from who I was or I could embrace that and carry that with me. 
And while it does feel that I was a different person then, I think that I'm 
more open now that I am comfortable with myself and comfortable with 
who I am to wholeheartedly acknowledge who I was and where I've come 
from and say you know, yeah I was born, I was born female and raised as 
a girl…It doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with my body and it 
doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with my gender identity ‘cause 
those things aren’t, haven’t been fixed and they’ve been changing…I think 
I’m kind of at this comfortable place um where I identify as a man um but 
I’m not as rigid with my masculinity and femininity so that’s really cool. 
But I think like this idea…carries over into the kind of guy that I am now 
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like and I really I really appreciate that…My past isn’t really you know 
like it’s isn’t like a different part, it’s part, it’s part of the whole like it’s 
not something separate from me now. (“addressing my ‘past’”) 
Skylar comes to realize that growing up in a world that socialized and viewed him as 
female actually contributes to his ability and desire to publicly share his story and to 
identify as trans* instead of as a man. His past, in other words, prepared him for his 
current conception of self and thus he can never truly “lose” or “disassociate” that part of 
himself. By rejecting the common narrative that to be fully trans* is to mourn or lose 
one’s past, Skylar performs a new way of understanding gender transformation – as 
something that is not only inevitable but always already happening. His past as a girl 
named Katherine Elizabeth does not disallow his present life as a trans* man named 
Skylar; in fact, his past sets the foundation for his life story. 
What these moments of tension or ambiguity show is that digital storytelling, 
perhaps unlike the more traditional genres of autobiography and documentary, 
illuminates the ways that identities are fluid and much more complex than a simple label 
or linear narrative allows. Like a diary, digital storytelling is a medium in which viewers 
“encounter the real of others,” including the authors’ messy, unmediated, and disparate 
conceptions of the self (Strangelove 69). As Raun argues, vlogs “bear out the feminist 
slogan that the personal is political by their personalized unraveling and negotiating of 
the meaning of trans identity” (126). Instead of seeing Skylar’s narratives of identity as 
contradictory, Raun’s conception helps to clarify how Skylar documents how his body 
and identity changes as he reconceptualizes himself as a socially perceived man. Skylar 
uses the serial yet scrapbook nature of the medium to document gender transition as it 
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occurs at the level of the body while exploring various identities and narratives to mine 
them for potential liberation and meaning. 
Interspersed with his diary entry posts, Skylar uploads a “montage” video every 
six months, which displays his transition from the beginning to the moment of creation, 
allowing him to reclaim control over his disparate, digital stories. In “photographic 
evidence of who i was to who i am,” images of Skylar’s childhood precede images that 
depict him becoming more masculine: he begins testosterone, flexes his muscles, hangs 
with friends, receives top surgery, shows hair growth, shaves, and begins college. His 
voice-over narration tells the viewer at the beginning of the video, “one of the most 
important things that I’ve discovered in my life is that where I was and where I’m going 
is inevitably where I will be found.” In the background, “Glosoli” by Sigur Ros plays, 
which gives the video an eerie overall effect. The song’s lyrics, which are in Icelandic, 
reinforce Skylar’s ability to claim agency over his story: translated to English, Sigur Ros’ 
lead singer croons, “Now that you’re awake, everything seems different…Go on a 
journey and roam the streets.” Through the juxtaposition of Skylar’s message, the music, 
and the images, Skylar connects his trans* identity with becoming someone new. 
However, Skylar’s emphasis on “movement” in his opening quote does not suggest that 
he has traded one identity or body for another; rather, he suggests that transitioning to a 
masculine subject position has allowed him to reconstitute his body to fit an identity he 
already had in order to (re)awaken in a world that sees him anew.  
These archival and confessional practices are significant largely because they 
exist within a culture that tends to insist that the mind and body are separate faculties of 
the self. In this conception, one tends to distance one’s mind from the powerful 
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experiences of one’s body. In medical legitimation discourses, some doctors imagine that 
the trans* “problem” exists or begins with the body and thus the body should change to 
match an individual’s internal identity. This framework, however, cannot account for the 
myriad ways trans* individuals demonstrate the social through the personal and use the 
body to talk about the self. Skylar complicates academic and medical discourses, which 
may limit his ability to create coherent and non-dysphoric understandings of his own 
experience. Concurrently, Skylar expands Western ideologies by incorporating new 
metaphors to explain trans* existence: in “october twenty first exactly nine months! 
changes + art,” he imagines himself as “a glacier” who is “hiding a wooly mammoth 
inside…fully frozen.” He laughs away this powerful metaphor, yet mentions that he 
recognizes that his experience, social position, and identity are “really rare. And really 
cool.” Skylar does not imagine that his body must change but that societal knowledges 
about gender need to develop to match the practices of his trans* existence. 
Skylar and other trans*-masculine vloggers illuminate how the body is both a 
producer and product of gender. Photographic montages, documentation of bodywork, 
and explicitly masculine cues produce the identity Skylar knows himself to be. As 
Jonathan Alexander and Elizabeth Losh argue in relation to queer “coming out” videos, 
the “performative quality of the speech act also reminds the viewer than an actual change 
of state takes place through the speaker’s rhetoric” (39). Similarly, Skylar’s use of visual 
and aural documentation de-stigmatizes the body modification practices he incorporates 
and brings into being his new conception of self. Skylar’s body can be understood as a 
palimpsest on and through which he performs masculinity with a body that bares traces of 
a female past; through digital storytelling, he creates a new epistemology of the 
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relationship between gender and sex that is all his own. 
 
 
Resisting Trans* Pathology through Digital Storytelling 
Though Skylar, Ky, and other trans* men use YouTube to archive their changing 
bodies and identities, many vloggers simultaneously underscore the notion that changing 
one’s body is not necessary to publicly declare a trans* identity. Trans*-masculine 
vloggers consistently argue that one should feel free to shift from one gender to another 
without any intervention at the level of the body. To better understand the resistant tactics 
trans*-masculine vloggers incorporate, in this section, I briefly analyze current medical 
conceptions of trans* identity and, subsequently, discuss how Skylar, Ky, and other 
trans* vloggers incorporate yet subvert these ideologies. 
According to the World Professional Association for Transgender Health’s 
(WPATH) “Standards of Care” (SOC), before beginning hormone therapy, individuals 
must see a therapist and receive a diagnosis of Gender Dysphoria (GD).12 Individuals 
who want to transition must sign forms that indicate that they will shift to the “opposite” 
sex and remain that sex thereafter (WPATH). Couched in the pathological language of 
this document, therapists must also write a letter of recommendation for the “patient” so 
that ze can receive hormone “treatment.” To receive a mastectomy or genital surgery, an 
individual must present as the “opposite” gender and receive hormone injections for a 
period of one year or two years respectively. In granting permission or drafting letters, 
therapists must assess the individual’s ability to hold a job or go to school, function in the 
community, and “pass” as the new gender. To get one’s sex changed on a birth certificate 
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or social security card (and be seen this way in the eyes of U.S. legal and judicial 
systems), one must live as the “opposite” sex for two years. If trans* people do not follow 
these procedures or refuse to pathologize their identities, they inevitably risk the 
institutional denial of care. Gender-diverse individuals who do not want surgery or do not 
identify as transsexual are forced to lie to therapists to receive access to other kinds of 
bodywork. As Kate Bornstein iterates, trans* people in remedial spaces are labeled as 
“diseased, for which the therapy is to lie, hide, or otherwise remain silent” (Queer and 
Pleasant 62). She elaborates: those of us who identify as trans* are “not allowed, in 
therapy, the right to think of ourselves as transsexual,” only as failed women and men 
trapped in the wrong bodies and in need of intervention by medical experts (Bornstein, 
Queer and Pleasant 62). There are few viable and no legal alternative options.  
Despite these rigid medical protocols, some trans*-masculine vloggers 
depathologize gender movement, even if they reconstitute the notion that gender is a 
congenital variation in need of intervention. For instance, though Skylar incorporates 
medical discourse in some of his narratives, he nevertheless tells his trans* viewers that 
they do not have to engage in bodywork to be socially recognizable men. In “information 
on getting testosterone, binders, packers, and chest surgery,” Skylar answers viewers’ 
questions concerning his decision to pursue bodywork. After explaining where he bought 
his binder—“underworks.com”—he goes on to say that viewers do not have to “take 
testosterone to be transgender or to be perceived as male in society, just so you know.” 
Further, he mentions that he does not wish to “pack” (or wear a prosthetic dildo so as to 
appear to have a “bulge” in his pants). In Skylar’s words:  
It’s not at all that I feel that having a penis is what makes me a man, that’s 
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not at all how I feel so I just wanted to put that out there like some guys 
have no desire to pack and some guys like really need it to feel whole and 
that’s absolutely normal...It’s all about your comfort level. It’s all about 
what you wanna do as you discover who you are. (“information”) 
Though Skylar finds comfort in his identity as a trans* man who engages in bodywork 
through weekly testosterone injections and a double mastectomy, he still maintains that 
other trans* men do not have to take the same path. Interestingly, there are dozens of 
glowing comments in this particular video’s feed: comment after comment thanks Skylar 
for doing this video, applauding him for how “helpful” it was in their own transition 
process or in thinking through personal identifications. Based on these comments, it is 
clear that Skylar’s trans*-masculine identified viewers have not been able to find a 
resource as valuable as this video in other medical or social media. In effect, this video 
opens up a space for trans*-masculine individuals to contest medical and cultural notions 
that a penis, flat chest, and testosterone-induced secondary sex characteristics do not 
produce Skylar’s masculine identification. Instead, it is the way Skylar identifies and 
performs masculinity that produces his trans*-masculine status. 
Similarly, Ky separates himself from medical legitimation discourse by imagining 
gender diversity as electable or even preferable. Like Skylar, Ky often contradicts his 
previous videos to draw attention to how his gender identity is not static and that he is the 
expert of his gender. In his coming out video, Ky identifies as “transgendered” (“FTM 
Intro”). In “Gay Frenzy,” Ky foregoes labels and maintains, while fighting back tears, 
“I’m me and this is who I am.” Later, after several months of testosterone treatment, he 
expands identification by describing himself as a “female to male gender transguy boi 
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trans androgyne androgynous unisex bigender genderqueer man” (“Identity”). By linking 
many diverse trans* identities together, Ky rejects the notion that he should simply 
identify in one way. In effect, engaging in bodywork through testosterone injections and 
top surgery, Ky is able to more radically define his identity. Medical legitimation, in this 
way, affords Ky agency over his appearance and identification rather than placing him in 
a system or role he rejects. 
Ky continues to explore his identity because, as he explains, viewers consistently 
ask how he identifies and why he wears makeup and dresses in a stereotypically feminine 
manner if he wants to transition to a recognizably masculine identity. Ky explains:  
I know people have like watched my videos, like my friends especially, 
and they’re so worried about me changing like as a person and I mean it 
really makes me sad because I’m still gonna be me…I don’t think I’ll 
change whatsoever…Uh I don’t consider myself as a trans* man, like I 
don’t consider myself as a man, I consider myself as like a trans* guy. I 
mean, I am boi, basically. Uh I know I’m not [laughs] you know very, 
very manly but I’m definitely male…I’m gonna keep shaving, 
whatever…I don’t know, maybe one day I’ll grow it out. See like shit like 
that it just, uh I don’t know, I mean like I’m pretty femme for a dude, I 
guess to say. (“1st Appt”) 
In this narrative, Ky separates what he thinks of himself as a person—an internal “me,” 
which will not change throughout his transition—and how he thinks of his fluid gender 
identity as a “trans* guy” or “boi.” He resists one label that would represent his total 
person and instead chooses to string together many categories. This narrative exemplifies 
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the common argument that individuals who transition reconfigure their bodies to be more 
in line with who they already are, not to become someone fundamentally different. Ky 
also resists the wrong body narrative trope that medical legitimation discourses use to 
explain trans* experience as an individual “problem” that surgical and hormonal 
intervention must fix and, instead, reimagines gender identity as both innate (it’s just 
“me”) and constructed. His emphasis on feeling like a guy—in fact, that he is male 
already—paired with his acknowledgment that his feminine attributes and practices do 
not have to stop highlights his resistance to narratives that represent trans* individuals as 
trapped, inauthentic, or dysphoric. The contested and complex discussions that occur 
within the comments section attached to this video (as previously discussed) attest to the 
fact that Ky’s identification is both rare and contentious within contemporary discourses 
of gender identity. 
Ky’s identity cannot be neatly mapped onto medical models, which rely on a 
binary gender system, nor can his identify map onto cultural explanations of what it 
means to identify as trans* rather than as a man or woman. He explains others’ reactions 
to his ambiguous identity by stating, “people don’t like it, ‘cause I’m in the gray area. I’m 
frickin’ in the gray area! It’s not black and white, people. I mean, you know, gender is so 
ambiguous…just be who you are, you know. And fuck everyone else. They don’t matter” 
(“Identity”). To visually diagram his identity, Ky shows a drawing he made, which 
illustrates his position within the gender spectrum (see Image 5.8). Though he 
acknowledges his shift in position, he highlights the ambivalent nature of gender 
categories, particularly in terms of the inherent and far-reaching problems that come from 
a strict binary system; at times, Ky identifies as male and as a feminine trans* man. At 
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other times, Ky resists identification entirely, abandoning gender labels and marking 
himself as who he knows he is no matter what others say. This tactic allows him to 
separate sex (anatomical and biological characteristics, which would typically categorize 
him as “female”) and his gender, which he determines to be more about what he fluidly 
feels and desires than any categorization can encompass. Using the metaphor of the “gray 
area,” Ky repositions his gender as spatial, but not necessarily in the sense that he is 
moving toward or away from one category to another.  
 
 
 
Image 5.8: KyFord23 in “Identity” maps his gender identity between “F” and “M.” 
 
 
 
Many other vloggers who identify as trans* resist the therapeutic mandate that 
they must identify instead as boys or men. For example, JoeLikesHisBro (who now goes 
by TheRealAlexBertie) insists that he is neither male nor female and prefers the gender-
neutral pronouns ze/hir/hirs or they/their/theirs. In hir video, “Gendergifted?!”, ze 
questions why ze must fit a certain mold: “I wasn’t born in a box, so how can I actually 
think in a box?” Ze goes on to say, “If you look beyond gender, uh, gender dysphoric 
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people are actually uh more beautiful and more open-minded than anyone else, because 
you know, they’re gender euphoric people.” By refusing to pathologize hir gender and 
upending medical vocabulary, JoeLikesHisBro draws attention to how a trans* identity 
can be rewarding rather than stressful, confusing, or harmful.  
By visually enacting variation, which the medical field tends to limit, some 
trans*-masculine vloggers encourage more than two gender options. Some emphasize the 
fact that bodywork does not make the man. Others probe the institution’s control of their 
identities and narratives. Trans*-masculine vlogger Chase Ross (who goes by 
uppercaseCHASE1 on YouTube and was featured in the “YouTube Issue” of FTM 
Magazine) resists the notion of a dominant trans* narrative, which his story does not 
follow. For one thing, like JoeLikesHisBro, Ross does not feel that he experiences 
dysphoria because he is trans*. In “being happy before transitioning,” Ross explains:  
I feel like there’s a really big misconception in society that think that 
people who are trans* um live like an absolute horrible life before coming 
out and they were completely unhappy and they’ve always known they 
were trans* and I um I don’t follow that narrative at all. And I think it’s 
important to distinguish that I don’t talk for the whole trans* 
community…every single trans* experience is different…And this is just 
my experience...before I came out, I was a lesbian and identified as 
such…I was generally happy with my life…I was just like a tomboy or a 
butch lesbian. I saw nothing wrong with this…I never questioned my 
gender I think people questioned my gender for me…I feel like it’s only 
after I realized trans* people existed…something clicked and I was like 
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looking at the screen like “oh my god, I am trans*.”  
Ross maintains that his experience does not follow the traditional trans* narrative, which 
mainstream media and medical discourse often highlight; nevertheless, he strongly 
identifies as trans*. At the same time, he suggests that until he knew that being trans* 
was an option, his experiences with gender (and, in connection, sexuality) were not 
necessarily difficult for him to understand. Perhaps his identification as a “tomboy” or 
“lesbian” aided in his ability to feel validated and find others who were “like him” or 
looked like him (see Image 5.9). Still, gender “dysphoria” was not what he experienced. 
 
 
Image 5.9: Chase Ross in “being happy before transitioning.” 
 
 
 In many other instances in his more than 200 videos, Ross discusses his 
relationship with – both his use of and then rejection of – testosterone. He documents his 
decision to take hormones, go off hormones, and then begin to take them again. The sheer 
fact that he archives his decision to discontinue taking testosterone, as well as his 
ambivalence about top surgery and the fact that he likes his breasts and vagina, 
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illuminates an alternative and differently imagined yet viable trans* story. Though his 
decision to cease testosterone was based on many “personal reasons,” which he does not 
specify, one reason Ross gives is that he began to feel that he was no longer visible as a 
queer person. Passing as a man made him feel happy and comfortable and yet, at the 
same time, passing as a man within queer communities disallowed his lesbian identity 
from being visible to other potential partners. Because other lesbians no longer 
recognized him as queer, he felt his transition had put him in an awkward and 
imperceptible place. In “why i stopped t,” Ross explains that he identifies both as a trans* 
guy and as a lesbian because these identities most closely fit his experience as well as 
individuals whom he desires. What’s more, being on testosterone the first time around 
made Ross feel like he should “act more like a guy,” which he did not accept and which 
actually caused him to “feel dysphoric and unhappy” (“why i stopped t.”). This narrative 
flips the traditional, psychiatric understanding of trans* experience. For Ross, being 
forced to perform or identify in a particular way (or to dis-identify, as is the case with his 
need to continue to claim a lesbian existence) was actually more harmful than his 
experiences of being socially perceived as a girl or woman. Though claiming a trans* 
identity makes sense for him, he refuses to imagine that being trans* disallows him from 
embracing his past and incorporating multiple identities into one coherent whole. 
Through these tactics, Ross encourages his viewers to imagine other ways to 
identify and live a trans* life, which may or may not rely on corporeal change. In “lack of 
dysphoria,” Ross maintains,  
Your dysphoria is 100% valid but my no dysphoria is absolutely 100% 
valid as well. I am allowed to love my body as much as I want to. I’m 
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allowed to show it off. I’m allowed to do whatever I want with my 
body…It’s okay, you do not have to have dysphoria [to be trans*]. I keep 
getting messages from all these trans* people so this video is for that.  
Speaking directly to his trans* viewers, Ross validates their lives and choices, whatever 
they may be. Though he claims a non-dysphoric identity, he recognizes the fact that many 
trans* people experience dysphoria, particularly in relation to how others recognize them 
in social situations. In suggesting that he keeps “getting messages from all these trans* 
people,” Ross implies that others have contacted him perhaps because they are confused 
how he can be both trans* and not experience dysphoria or perhaps to ask questions 
about his choices concerning testosterone. In “regretting t?”, Ross emotionally discusses 
the fact that he has been “really upset” that he felt he had to take testosterone “in order to 
feel like [he] was trans*.” Framed as a public service announcement, he explains:  
this is just a message for people out there to know that if you are unsure 
about taking testosterone, please do not take it…it sucks that I had to go 
on T because I felt like I needed to be trans* and I wanted to pass and I 
wanted to be seen as male and shit like that. But now [after going off 
testosterone] I am happier in my body. 
The fact that Ross feels he needs to explain this sentiment and encourage viewers to be 
aware of their potential ambivalence towards bodywork suggests that his life narrative is 
both rare and controversial.  
The comments in this video’s feed support this claim: in comment after comment, 
YouTubers encourage his thoughts and express gratitude and awe at his honesty and yet 
many users completely disregard his trans* identity or viciously troll his radical views. At 
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least thirty comments offer solidarity and dozens of users thank him for finally 
representing a trans* identity the commenter shares but had not been able to articulate. 
NinjaSubmarine writes, “this video makes me feel less alone, and for that i thank you. my 
respect and admiration for you is beyond anything i could actually put in words. i relate 
so much which is so refreashing for me because the trans people i meet all seem to be big 
about T. now i feel like i have more options. thank you so much.” In this response, 
NinjaSubmarine suggests that ze has not yet met a trans* person (let alone a health 
professional) who doesn’t fully support or even demand medical legitimation and 
hormone use. Nevertheless, many other comments are derogatory and some are 
downright vicious: huntingflowersx writes that Ross is a “pussie” for going off 
testosterone and making it “that much harder” for other trans* guys. Huntingflowersx 
implies that Ross’ thoughts might dissuade doctors from prescribing testosterone to 
patients whose narratives do not match medical legitimation discourses or who are 
ambivalent about testosterone. dasrael tells Ross, “You’re screwing yourself over and 
confusing cis-gender people,” which suggests that nontrans* individuals can only 
understand simplified, linear narratives of trans* identity. Josh Gerbasi homophobically 
adds, “this faggot is wasting good testosterone, fuck this gay earth.” As these comments 
imply, Ross’ alternative narrative is both refreshing and taboo. In speaking of his 
different life experiences, Ross’ videos are in and of themselves political acts of defiance.  
In these ways – based both on what Ross says in his videos and the comments he 
receives – resisting traditional trans* narratives and claiming more than one seemingly 
contradictory identity makes others, both trans* and nontrans* people, very 
uncomfortable. Not only do the commenters police Ross’ gender and choices, they also 
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demand that he change his narrative to one that is more acceptable to a cisgender 
audience. Though these comments are disheartening, Ross continues to post about how 
empowered he feels; in many instances, Ross directly addresses these derogatory 
statements and continuously and sometimes robotically repeats the phrases “this is just 
my experience” and “I do not represent the entire trans* community.” Clearly, there is 
something about alternative narratives that seems dangerous to a good deal of people, and 
perhaps this reason encourages Ross and other vloggers to continue to tell their unique 
trans* stories. 
Alternative narratives like Ross’ and Ky’s clarify how our gendered social reality 
is not a given but is continually created “through language, gesture, and all manner of 
symbolic social sign” (Butler, Bodies 14-15). According to Judith Butler in Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex, gender performativity refers to the recurrence or 
“citation” of recognizable acts, which (re)produce the separation between anatomical sex 
and performed gender. Nontrans* individuals have the privilege of taking gender 
expression for granted while simultaneously assuming that it is inherent or literally a part 
of the body rather than layered on the body as socially constructed signification. Judith 
Lorber adds, “gender is such a familiar part of daily life that it usually takes a deliberate 
disruption of our expectations of how women and men are supposed to act to pay 
attention to how it is produced” (64). We are taught to believe from a very young age that 
expressions of gender signify an “inner” identity and, concurrently, prescribed gender 
roles, rights, and responsibilities. However, because gender is “an ongoing discursive 
practice,” it is also “open to intervention and resignification,” which Skylar, Ky, and 
Ross perform in their vlogs (Butler, Bodies 33). For trans* digital storytellers, “doing 
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gender” is not unconscious; on the contrary, it is deliberately practiced, narrated, and 
reflected upon. These videos are thus a lasting archive of the ways that “doing gender” 
can produce different social outcomes as well as newly imagined ways to see the self. 
We should nevertheless interrogate the concept of “doing gender” in relation to 
trans* digital storytelling. Stemming from the rise of queer theory in academia more than 
two decades ago and heralded by—among other things—the publication of Butler’s 
Gender Trouble, some theorists argue that gender is something we “do,” not something 
we “are.” Gender is thus a citational process where each act layers over the other to 
create a behavioral set of recognizable practices that we daily perform in conscious and 
unconscious ways, which others read and respond accordingly. As Wilchins puts it, 
“gender is always a doing rather than a being. In this sense, all gender is drag” (12). This 
notion has become so commonplace that the opposite—that we fundamentally “are” our 
gender because we know it to be so—might seem contradictory or counterproductive. 
However, it is no less authentic or political for Ky or Ross to claim that they “are” a 
particular gender. It is no less authentic or political for a trans* person to claim a 
masculine existence and yet celebrate female-typical bodily characteristics. We should 
ask, why might Ky claim to “be” gender rather than “perform” or “do” gender? What 
kinds of stories might proceed from feeling like a particular gender and thus playing the 
part or bucking the system, rather than the other way around? No matter what, we should 
trust these trans* youth to tell us the stories of their lives rather than jump to applications 
or refutations of academic gender theory. Above all else, it seems unethical to continue to 
argue that gender is merely performative when it clearly isn’t for so many who do not fit 
conventional trans* or nontrans* scripts. 
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Conclusion: Collectively Negotiated Knowledges 
Trans* digital storytellers on YouTube encourage self- and community-created 
possibilities at the same time as they create new realities and identities within their 
videos. Though the confessional mode is a historically patriarchal medium, which has 
been used to garner information to catalogue and hierarchize individuals, contemporary 
trans* vloggers destabilize our culture’s emphasis on personal disclosure as a means to 
stratify persons. Instead, trans* digital storytellers re-signify the confessional as a tool of 
personal and collective survival, which trans* youth use to rewrite their histories and 
futures.  
YouTube, Tumblr, WordPress, and other social networking sites produce 
collectively negotiated knowledges, which do not rely on authorial oversight or master 
narratives. As more individuals add their stories to these networks, the way we 
understand and view gender must expand. The “rhetorical” power of digital storytelling 
has the “potential to create fluid and challenging representations” of gender identity—
representations that, “like cyberspace itself,” understand gender “as complex, changing, 
[and] dynamic” (Alexander and Losh 46). On YouTube, trans* digital storytellers 
legitimate their worldviews and changing bodies and push against societal notions that 
they are unacceptable as gendered subjects and citizens. In these ways, digital storytelling 
gives silenced individuals with differing views the chance to speak and be heard.  
Furthermore, trans* digital storytellers articulate critical ideologies, which resist 
binary gender. This stance—what Butler in Undoing Gender calls a “transformative 
relation”—allows trans* vloggers to both remain within and look outside the system. 
Butler illuminates,  
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I may feel that without some recognizability I cannot live. But I 
also may feel that the terms by which I am recognized make life 
unlivable. This is the junction from which critique emerges, where 
critique is understood as an interrogation of the terms by which life 
is constrained in order to open up the possibility of different modes 
of living; in other words, not to celebrate difference as such but to 
establish more inclusive conditions for sheltering and maintaining 
life that resists models of assimilation. (Undoing Gender 4)  
How trans* digital storytellers narrate their experiences clarifies Butler’s ideas. Because 
trans* identity is not yet recognized as a legal or political gender category, narrating a 
viable trans* life is in itself an act of resistance. Through digital storytelling, trans* 
vloggers clarify more inclusive “conditions,” which might allow for differently gendered 
lives to exist. What’s more, trans* vloggers resist normative epistemologies and thereby 
valorize historically subjugated identities. Because contemporary U.S. social institutions 
reinforce hierarchical understandings of individuals by disenfranchising many to 
privilege some—which also works to validate what counts as a recognizable life—trans* 
digital storytelling has the capacity to displace our culture’s determinations of which 
bodies, identities, and narratives “matter.” At the least, it offers a platform through which 
trans* knowledges can be more ethically and publicly negotiated.  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In Methodology of the Oppressed, Sandoval traces postmodern and de-colonial methods 
individuals employ to combat oppression. Sandoval shows how “academic apartheid” 
(152) prevents oppressed people from “horizontally” moving between subjective 
positions on the cultural map of subjugation (Methodology 72). Her “methodology of the 
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oppressed” includes: recognizing injustice through Gloria E. Anzaldúa’s la facultad (or 
sense perception in a state of “abyss”), deconstructing and “appropriating dominant 
ideological forms…to transform them,” locating love in a “post-empire world,” and 
employing “differential movement” across social and cognitive maps (82-3). While 
Sandoval agrees with some of Fredric Jameson’s notions of postmodernism—particularly 
the flourishing of culture and the distance it demands of the subject—she also wants to 
make clear that there is love and hope still accessible in the world. We are not fragmented 
subjects but fragmented objects in need of decoding (Sandoval, Methodology 166). With 
an emphasis on fluidity, politics, and the rejection of power, Sandoval employs Michel 
Foucault’s “individual” to suggest how we should work toward social change 
(Methodology 166). Not only do we need a new concept of the individual, we also need a 
new vocabulary so that we can “break with ideology while at the same time also speaking 
in, and from within, ideology” (Sandoval, Methodology 44). Trans* digital storytelling 
offers an example of how Sandoval’s theory plays out in the world; vloggers openly 
combat their experiences of oppression and gain visibility and acceptance by doing so.  
 
2 Susan Driver also suggests that digital queer youth communities “are able to bypass 
unwanted adult control…seeking social ties and knowledges that are not adult initiated, 
mediated or evaluated” (176-77). Knut Lundby echoes this idea: “Digital storytelling not 
only bypasses set forms of authority but also invites new forms” (369). 
 
3 Though race and class may not encourage nor prevent youth from interacting online, the 
most statistically salient factor that did prove relevant was participants’ level of education 
(Cohen and Kahne 28). Cohen and Kahne do not expand on this point in their report, 
though it certainly is a factor that requires further exploration.  
 
4 Additionally, digital storytelling lends a certain amount of immediacy and intimacy to 
its form: vloggers can post videos within minutes of recording them and thus others can 
view them almost as if they occur in real time. This real or imagined proximity heightens 
the viewer’s sense of identification, since ze “can experience vicariously the events in the 
diarist’s life” as if they are happening at that moment (Lindemann 207). Social discourse 
scholarship suggests that individuals view their online activity as more personal and 
private than other forms of popular culture, such as movies, television, and magazines, 
which individuals address as more public and final (Burgess and Green 104). However 
mediated viewers perceive it to be, digital storytelling allows individuals who are 
unaware of trans* issues or who struggle with the thought that they might be trans* 
themselves the ability to watch personal and informative videos in a private setting.  
 
5 As Erich Alan Werner argues, vlogs are “revolutionary,” “highly interactive” (1), and 
“highly emotional” (5). In a sense, YouTube vlogs are so expansive in terms of content 
that they do not necessarily comprise a coherent genre. Nevertheless, YouTube vloggers 
use similar rhetorical strategies, which Werner argues points to the vlog as a 
“ceremonial” mode rather than a genre (24).  
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6 I take seriously Jacob Hale’s manifesto, “Suggested Rules for Non-Transsexuals 
Writing about Transsexuals, Transsexuality, Transsexualism, and Trans,” which purports 
that those of us who do not identify as trans* need to be cautious about using “plurals” 
(i.e. making claims about all trans* people or referring to trans* people as 
“transgenders”) and “the” (i.e. “the trans* self,” “the trans* body,” “the trans* 
community,” etc.) when researching trans* people. 
 
7 The emotions women feel and are able to share with others, according to Naomi 
Scheman, are never “politically neutral” (34). In reality, who and what we are depends on 
“what others take or at least allow us to be” (Scheman 34). In Scheman’s conception, all 
identities (whether they are oppressive, privileging, liberating, or otherwise) relationally 
depend upon others’ recognition. Though we have the capacity to name our emotions and 
identities, they nevertheless depend in part “on the particular social processes, which will 
give or fail to give our feelings the possibility of definition” (Scheman 34). 
Consciousness-raising groups allowed women to name emotions and identities in 
collectively recognizable ways, albeit perhaps only identities and emotions that were 
recognizable from a dominant perspective. 
 
8 When analyzing the collective potential in digital storytelling, we must keep in mind 
that the liberation one can receive in cyberspace can be just as real as the social, cultural, 
and political empowerment one experiences offline. As Helen Kennedy maintains, it is 
imperative to hold life online and offline in “dialectic tension”: in other words, “one 
should not be privileged at the expense of the other” (132). 
 
9 This is a very common practice on YouTube for trans*-masculine youth. Others who 
document body changes and show their bare chests though they have not received top 
surgery include (but are not limited to) ALionsFear, Transmansable, TransIrish, 
LiamMichaelBauer, and hundreds more. As some of these usernames evince, being 
trans* or going through the process of changing one’s gender is often why young people 
come to YouTube in the first place.  
 
10 For example, see “what it means to be transgender (to me),” in which Skylar rejects 
identifying as “transgender.” 
 
11 See, for example, Skylar’s identification with the trans* community in “response to 
Kean – November twenty ten” and “addressing my ‘past,’” in which he discusses his 
choice to continue to identify as female on health care forms and in doctor’s offices, so 
that he can be a medical “educator” and so that he does not have to face potentially 
inaccurate medical care. He explains, “how others see me really isn’t as important as how 
I see myself.” 
 
12 For a full discussion of WPATH’s health care guidelines, see Chapter II’s 
“Contemporary Medical Legitimation Discourses” section.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
EPILOGUE:  
 
GENDER DIVERSITY AND TOOLS OF CHANGE 
 
 
Having become aware of the fictions and fissures in our belief system, we 
perceive the cracks between the worlds, the holes in reality…it is in the 
cracks between worlds and realities where changes in consciousness can 
occur. In this shifting place of transitions, we morph, adapt to new cultural 
realities. As time goes by things start to solidify again and we erect new 
walls. They stay in place until the next generation kicks holes in them. 
When the dust settles, who knows what the new structures will look like?  
—Gloria  E. Anzaldúa, Interviews/Entrevistas 
 
 
The main arguments in “Radical Epistemologies in Twenty-First Century Trans* 
Life Narratives” are ones that I have been wrestling with for at least two decades. Though 
I have never doubted my identity as assigned to me by midwives at birth, I have been 
consistently unwilling (and unable) to conform to dominant conceptions of femininity. As 
a child, I was captivated by gender diversity and all the various ways individuals express 
themselves, though I was always confused by the rigid standards and contradictions this 
system produces.  
Identifying from a young age as queer, not only was I physically and emotionally 
attracted to girls and boys alike, female-typical individuals who used and expressed 
masculinity as well as male-typical individuals who embodied feminine characteristics 
fascinated me. In middle school, I would scour magazines for images of masculine 
women and feminine men. When I would find an image I liked, I would put it up on my 
bedroom wall. Over the course of a year, I filled this wall. Though these images 
comforted me in a way I still cannot describe, they perplexed and distressed others. To 
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me, then as well as now, these images represented a futurity I could not yet express – a 
futurity that no one else seemed to understand.  
As I approached the end of the dissertation, I decided to mark my body in a way 
that would exemplify the futurity I needed as a young adult and yet couldn’t articulate, a 
futurity that “Radical Epistemologies” begins to put into words (see Image 6.1).  
 
 
Image 6.1: Gender-diverse tool-kit. Personal image. 
 
This image combines traditional symbols of femininity, masculinity, androgyny, and 
trans* identity with common tools one might find on a Swiss Army survival tool: a 
knife’s blade, bottle opener, corkscrew, scissors, and wrench, as well as the addition of a 
pencil. For me, this image represents gender diversity as a set of weaponry, which can be 
strategically used to combat oppressive structures of power. To resist systems of control, 
we are sometimes required to cut ties with our own bodies or communities. We might 
have to whittle down negative conceptions of ourselves to see the possibilities underneath 
or the new possibilities we might create. At other times, we are required to physically 
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resist structural oppression through sustained and unwavering force and resistance to 
violence. When oppressive ideologies tell us that we are wrong and abnormal, we fight 
back by developing self-acceptance and by simply enjoying ourselves, creating chosen 
families, and forging solidarity with others. And we write – we create new narratives that 
explain our experiences, which others might incorporate as their own, and we craft new 
ways to understand the world around us so that future generations will not have to 
reinvent the wheel by struggling through the same issues that limit and constrain our 
lives. We morph and change and tactically employ diverse resistant practices. In my 
dissertation, and in my own life, I see gender diversity as a set of tools that, when held 
differently, can become radical weapons of survival.  
 
Rethinking a Radical Trans* Identity 
In Interviews/Entrevistas, Gloria E. Anzaldúa purposes a radical analogy of 
identity as a “process-in-the-making” or as a series of interconnected tracks on which 
countless trains move (239). In this analogy, the train symbolizes an identity category, 
and the train stations represent significant experiences that force one to re-evaluate. 
When the train is in motion, the individual aboard doesn’t know who ze is or is in the 
process of becoming a new person. The scenery is moving by so quickly that ze cannot 
define any features of the landscape. Once the train comes to a halt, ze has a chance to 
look around. Ze reflects on hir journey from this new perspective and evaluates if the 
train ze has been on (the particular identity ze has chosen, fallen into, or been forced to 
occupy) is still working. Ze can then get back on the same train or get on a new train. Ze 
might also decide to build a new train or new tracks that lead hir in a different direction. 
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In this analogy, ze actively traverses hir identity; identities do not just happen, nor are 
they merely prescribed. Though a new train—a new identity—can be built, one must 
convince others to help and must struggle against those who are comfortable in the trains 
that already exist and in the locations to which they lead. Similarly, contemporary trans* 
life narratives conceive of identity as a process, which depends on past experience and 
other intersecting forms of identity. If laying claim to an identity makes subjects, as 
Michel Foucault argues, the process also occurs bi-directionally: identities come into 
existence through the act of claiming them. The twenty-first century trans* life writers I 
have analyzed—Jules Rosskam, Gwen Haworth, Alex Drummond, Jennifer Finley 
Boylan, Skylar Kergil, and Ky Ford, among others—claim self-determination by creating 
new ways to understand trans* identity.  
Though these trans* life writers and film and video artists reconceptualize 
identity, they do so in varying ways. While many twentieth century trans* individuals 
tended to rely on institutional recognition, citing medical legitimation discourse and 
“wrong body” narratives, some twenty-first century trans* people reimagine trans* 
identity. For example, Haworth and Rosskam depict trans* identity as relational. 
Haworth’s relational identity depends on her family’s ability to recognize her as Gwen 
and not Steven. To fully cognize Haworth as the trans* woman she becomes during the 
filming of She’s a Boy I Knew, Haworth’s family mourns her past and imagines Gwen as 
a new person who only contains traces of the boy she once was. Through her 
autobiographical documentary, however, Haworth reclaims Steven as an integral part of 
who Gwen becomes. In Against a Trans Narrative, Rosskam’s relational identity comes 
into view as he negotiates others’ (his lesbian partner and generations of feminist and 
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queer individuals) conceptions of him. Rosskam’s identity, then, relationally depends on 
collective acknowledgement from lesbian feminists just as Haworth’s identity relationally 
depends on familial acceptance and love.  
 Boylan and Drummond, however, see trans* identity as a latent force, which 
helps to situate but not encapsulate their life narratives. For both autobiographers, trans* 
identity depends on one’s ability to personally recognize and articulate it. Though 
Drummond represents her trans* identity as something she actively chooses, Boylan sees 
her trans* identity as something that found and chose her. In both conceptions, Boylan 
and Drummond come to identify as trans* as they acknowledge the other ways they 
supersede cultural recognition: Drummond inhabits her male-typical body as a woman 
without any medical intervention and Boylan theorizes her trans* identity through the 
feminine ghosts that visit her. Trans* identity, for Drummond and Boylan, is simply one 
factor that contributes to a radical life. 
 Moreover, Skylar and Ky understand trans* identity in ways that blur the 
distinctions between collective and personal recognition. In other words, Skylar and Ky 
see their trans* identities as both relational and chosen depending on context. Skylar 
identifies variably as a man, trans* man, genderqueer, male, and transgender, and at other 
times rejects these identities to name himself simply as “Skylar.” Ky similarly identifies 
in divergent ways depending on the video and the questions he contemplates. Though 
Skylar always identifies as trans*-masculine, Ky is never quite sure how masculine he is 
or wants to be and continues to embrace femininity, even after viewers question his 
motives. Skylar and Ky conceive of trans* identity as something that can infinitely 
change depending on how one feels and to whom one feels responsible.  
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Though Rosskam, Haworth, Boylan, Drummond, Kergil, and Ford differently 
cognize trans* identity, they all similarly understand gender diversity as initially internal 
and yet contingent on social realities. Ze must first recognize a point of departure so that 
ze can change hir inner dialogue and images concerning the problem. Only after internal 
narratives shift can ze work to change society. At the same time, because gender is 
contingent on social realities—because it is always relational and self-fashioned—there is 
no way to secure personal gender agency without simultaneously altering society. 
Though these contemporary trans* narratives and tactics change depending on genre and 
author, the underlying motive stays the same: trans* identity should expand to include a 
range of diverse subjectivities, some of which have yet to be narrated into existence. As 
more trans* people differently theorize identity and articulate new ways to contemplate 
trans* identity, personal and collective trans* epistemologies will expand.  
 
Future Research 
In future work, I intend to more explicitly address how whiteness and trans* 
identity are co-productive and co-dependent identity categories. Experiencing skin 
privilege, to be sure, has a huge impact on feeling comfortable identifying as trans*; 
privilege affects the level of visibility and freedom to which one has access, as well as the 
level of comfort one feels in identifying in alternative ways. White individuals who 
choose to publicly document their trans* identities might not risk the same levels of 
harassment, violence, familial rejection, loss of housing or employment, and other 
detrimental outcomes. In other words, the empowerment associated with sharing one’s 
story may only be available to otherwise privileged people. In future research, I will more 
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fully interrogate how whiteness informs trans* identity.  
In White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness, Ruth 
Frankenberg argues that whiteness affects one’s perspective. Whiteness is both a 
“location of structural advantage” as well as a “‘standpoint,’ a place from which white 
people look at ourselves, at others, and at society” (1). At the same time, whiteness 
“refers to a set of cultural practices that are usually unmarked and unnamed” 
(Frankenberg 1). To name whiteness is to fundamentally “question” and “delimit” its 
authority (Frankenberg 234). Based on these definitions, it is not surprising that the 
trans* individuals I have highlighted—with the exception of Rosskam—do not 
contemplate how whiteness affects or informs their trans* identity and experience. More 
specifically, again, with the exception of Rosskam, all of the contemporary trans* life 
writers I chose do not even mention that they are white. Frankenberg might argue that it 
is simply because they do not have to – as white trans* individuals, they take their 
experiences for granted as universal, no matter how different those experiences are from 
traditional or stereotypical conceptions of gender. Because it goes unrecognized, 
whiteness becomes a “formless entity,” which continues to carry a great deal of power 
(Frankenberg 197). Because they do not question or even name their whiteness, they hold 
in place systems of domination, which ground whiteness “as normative masquerading as 
‘generic’—unadorned, basic, essential” (Frankenberg 205).  
Future work should also analyze how whiteness and masculinity are in tension 
within trans* narratives. For instance, one way white trans* vloggers implicitly address 
whiteness is through expressing ambivalence concerning normative masculine gender 
roles. By discussing the ways they reject cultural scripts for masculinity, which are so 
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often associated with domination and violence against women, Skylar, Ky, and many 
other digital storytellers resist the allure of (white) male privilege. Skylar documents the 
ways he continually outs himself in social situations, refuses to be a part of male bonding 
rituals that objectify women, and draws attention to the ways that others treat him 
differently as a man who denounces stereotypical masculinity. Rejecting these gendered 
scripts, perhaps Skylar creates new ways of being a white man within a white 
supremacist, sexist, transphobic world.  
Frankenberg suggests that we should rethink the normativity of silence 
surrounding whiteness; similarly, I believe we should also begin to rethink the 
normativity of silence surrounding nontrans* identities. We desperately need to explore 
the ways that white trans* people might similarly perpetuate systems of racial domination 
by not marking themselves and their life narratives as white. What other possibilities 
might emerge, what new narratives might be told, if both whiteness and nontrans*ness 
become visible? 
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